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ABSTRACT
Nixon and Carter:

A Comparative Analysis of

American Foreign Policy Toward the Middle East exeunines
the Nixon Administration's policies and objectives toward
the Middle East, particularly its handling of the October
1973 Arab-Israeli war, and contrasts them with the Carter
Administration's policies, which culminated in the peace
talks at Camp David.

This examination focuses on how

these two very different presidents approached a dilemma
which has been central to American Middle Eastern policy
since the creation of Israel;

how can the United States

achieve a balance between the competing interests of
protecting Israel and maintaining access to Middle East
oil?
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CHAPTER 1
IHTRODDCTIOH
On October 6 1973, when Egypt and Syria launched a
coordinated surprise attack against Israel, they managed
to catch not only Israel, but to a certain extent both of
the superpowers, off guard.

The regional conflict that

ensued had global implications because it highlighted the
tenuous boundaries of the international system which had
evolved during the Cold War, a system in which the two
major players, the United States and the Soviet Union,
sought to satisfy their respective national interests
while avoiding potentially disastrous confrontations
(Craig and George 1990, 119).

In this respect, the Middle

East, one region among several which had become
increasingly important to American foreign policy during
the post war era— was suddenly thrust to the fore.

The

October War of 1973 was really only the latest in a series
of conflicts in the Middle East;

it posed a challenge to

the Nixon administration, but it also presented President
Nixon and his staff with an opportunity to make progress
toward some form of Arab-Israeli settlement.

Five years later, amid the isolation of Camp David,
President Jimmy Carter had the unprecedented opportunity
to participate in 13 days of intensive negotiations
between Anwar Sadat of Egypt and Menachem Begin of Israel.
"By all accounts Carter himself played the decisive role
in the negotiating process" (Bradley 1981, 30).

In order

to do so, he faced several challenges before, during and
after the negotiations.

Meanwhile, President Carter met

the continuing need to fashion a Middle East policy within
the context of an ever-changing relationship with the
Soviet Union, and against the backdrop of a nation which
was being consumed by an expanding energy crisis.
Purpose
This thesis will examine the Nixon Administration's
policies and objectives toward the Middle East,
particularly its handling of the October 1973 War, and
contrast them to the Carter Administration's policies,
which culminated in the peace talks at Camp David.
Nixon's basic challenge was to assure the continued
security of Israel and to maintain U.S. access to oil,
while avoiding potential confrontations with the Soviet
Union.

Carter sought to reconcile Arab-Israeli

differences in an enduring manner which would compromise
neither Israeli security nor American oil interests.

The coordinated Egyptian-Syrian attack on Israel in
1973 created an immediate challenge that required an
immediate response.

Carter's challenge was much less

urgent, but nonetheless extremely important.

This

analysis will explore the similarities and differences in
the challenges facing these two very different presidents
to determine what lessons can be drawn for future Middle
Eastern policy.

Similarly, this examination will focus on

the methods each president used in dealing with this vital
area of the world.

Most importantly, after establishing

the nature of the challenge posed to Nixon and Carter, and
determining how each chose to respond to Middle Eastern
issues, this thesis will turn to outcomes, the end results
of each president's respective policies, to determine how
and why they differed.
This study has benefitted from a well developed and
extremely varied body of literature.

Each of the

administrations in question has provided fertile grounds
for scholars studying a number of issues, running the
gamut from general foreign policy orientations to the
decision making styles of the presidents themselves.

Both

Nixon and Carter, as well as several prominent members of
their administrations, have proven to be prolific authors,
particularly with respect to foreign policy issues.
American foreign policy toward the Middle East is itself a
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very broad subject, as the plethora of books and articles
devoted to it demonstrates.

The goal of this thesis has

been to lift out from each of these broad subject areas
the key facets needed to establish a valid basis of
comparison for Nixon and Carter's policies toward the
Middle East.
Several general features of American foreign policy
development provide a broader understanding of specific
approaches taken toward the Middle East.

Much of the

recent literature devoted to the study of foreign policy
is inexorably linked by a haunting question;

is it

possible for the United States to fashion and maintain a
coherent foreign policy (Kegley and Wittkopf 1988, 1)?
The post World War II era, particularly the years
following the Vietnam conflict, has been characterized by
an expanding body of literature which asserts that in
order to solve this dilemma, we must develop a more
extensive knowledge of how domestic stimuli interact with
each other and with external factors resulting in specific
foreign policy outcomes (Kegley and Wittkopf 1988, 2).
The traditional boundaries separating domestic and foreign
policy agendas are no longer distinct.

Groups within the

private sector as well as domestically oriented government
agencies have become increasingly involved in attempts to
shape foreign policy (Keohane and Nye 1977).

This interplay between domestic and external factors
results in the specific foreign policy context in which
individual decision makers must operate.

American

scholars and policy makers have become increasingly aware
of the fact that foreign policy cannot be successfully
crafted in a vacuum;

context— whether shaped primarily by

domestic factors such as public opinion, interest groups
and the media, or external factors, such as relations with
third-party states— has become a vital consideration.
This is particularly evident in the case of the Middle
East.

The creation of Israel was facilitated by President

Truman's support, brought about by strong pressure from
American Jewry.

For years, Truman's decisions regarding

Palestine vacillated from side to side, according to the
prevailing political climate.

Eventually he and his aides

perceived that the domestic political consequences
associated with alienating the Jewish vote were too much
for Truman to ignore (Snetsinger 1974, 139).
The precedent set during the Truman administration
has continued to the point that today both Arab and
Israeli interests are well represented by organized,
active lobbying groups.

Of the two, the Israeli lobby,

the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC),
clearly wields more resources^.

Mitchell Bard points out

that American Jews, fearful of the consequences for Israel

and within the United States if they do not have political
power, "have devoted themselves to politics with almost
religious fervor" (Bard 1988, 58).

His study revealed

that Jews have a higher voter turnout than any other
ethnic group.

Although a very small percentage of the

total American population, Bard found that Jews were
concentrated in twelve key electoral college states (Bard
1988, 59).
The formal Arab lobby, the National Association of
Arab Americans (NAAA), also possesses considerable
resources, but lacks the unity and organization of its
Jewish counterpart^.

Like AIPAC, the Arab lobby bases

requests for pro-Arab programs on the grounds that such
programs are in line with U.S. national interests.

Bard

suggests that framing issues in terms of national interest
is a key facet of AIPAC's strategy because it allows the
Jewish lobby to generate broader support than could ever
be possible if it were perceived to represent only Israeli
interests (Bard 1988, 60).

For its part, the NAAA argues

that aid to Israel is a waste of the American taxpayer's
money and emphasizes the potential benefits of closer ties
between the United States and the Arab states.
Studies conducted to determine the relationship
between the Israeli and Arab lobbies' activities and U.S.
policy indicate that neither lobby has proven to be

particularly capable of directly influencing policy (Bard
1988;

Quandt 1977).

Rather, their significance lies in

their ability to generate congressional support for their
respective agendas (Bard 1988, 64), and in their ability
to couple this support with "informative" campaigns
directed at the American public, campaigns which often
influence and define the context in which decisions are
made (Quandt 1977, 20).

Furthermore, their consistent

attempts to convince decision makers that U.S. interests
are inextricably linked to their own agendas takes
advantage of, and exacerbates, the United States' apparent
inability to consistently reconcile a set of highly
competitive interests in the Middle East.
The interests themselves have not only been clearly
defined, but have actually become quite well accepted, the
result of years of policy development that will be briefly
outlined in Chapter 2.

Tillman suggests that the United

States has sought to promote four fundamental goals in the
Middle East, "the most important single region in the
world from the standpoint of American interests— and the
most dangerous."

First, policymakers have sought to

maintain reliable access, at a reasonable cost, to the
region's oil.

Second, they have taken steps to ensure the

continued survival and security of Israel.

Third, the

United States, throughout the post World War II era, has
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sought to build a relationship with the Soviet Union which
avoids confrontation and enhances cooperation^.

Finally,

American foreign policy has been aimed at fulfilling, to
the greatest extent possible, specific principles such as
the peaceful settlement of international disputes,
intolerance for the forceful seizure of territory, and the
rights of the various peoples in the region to selfdetermination (Tillman 1982, 51).
In many respects, the first two goals represent not
only competing, but diametrically opposed, interests.

The

desire to maintain reliable access to oil requires some
degree of friendly relations with the oil-producing
countries of the Arab world;

yet, the American commitment

to Israel, at times "more the result of affiliation than
of specific strategy to promote American interests"
(Tillman 1982, 52), has often left the United States at
odds with the Arab community.
It is indeed difficult to determine which interest
should take precedence over the others.

Economic

necessity in the form of the growing need for oil has
certainly given more weight to arguments that the United
States must maintain viable relationships with the oilproducing Arab nations.

Conversely, it has opened the

door to fears that frustrated Arab leaders might try to
use coercive diplomacy, or "economic blackmail," to force

the United States to abandon its support for Israel
(Quandt 1977, 2).

In fact, both Nixon and Carter were

forced to deal with the threat of potentially disrupted
oil supplies during their presidencies.

Moreover, many

scholars argue that reasoning which links Israel's
survival to American interests is faulty, that it was not
necessarily in the United States' interest to support the
creation of Israel (Snetsinger 1974).

While this point

still generates debate, it has in essence been made moot
by the years of cooperation that have punctuated U.S.Israeli relations;

Israel has received financial and

military support and the United States has received a very
strategic ally in the region, an ally which has proven to
be quite adept at providing exceptional intelligence
information as well as advice on how to improve the
capability of U.S. military hardware, field tested through
years of conflict (Quandt 1977, 9).
American policy toward the Middle East has proven to
involve much more than simply choosing one side over the
other in the Arab-Israeli dispute.

The resulting dilemma

has led to repeated diplomatic attempts by many
presidents, most notably Carter, to find a solution to the
"seemingly intractable" Arab-Israeli conflict, a solution
which is also in line with American regional interests
(Bradley 1981, 1).

Meanwhile, the process of maintaining

10

American Middle East policy has been one of trying to
reevaluate and, more importantly, to prioritize American
interests in the region.

The relative weight afforded to

each interest will therefore serve as a major basis of
comparison for Nixon and Carter's policies.
Because of the very nature of these American
interests, a combination of ideological and pragmatic
concerns, the strategic, or national interests approach to
explaining foreign policy toward the Middle East falls
short of providing a complete understanding of why
decision makers may have chosen specific options under
given circumstances.

The national interest perspective is

largely "based on the assumption that foreign policy is
essentially a rational adaptation of means (resources) to
ends (national interests). Nation-states seek security,
well-being and prestige, and to attain these goals, they
employ power, whether in its military or economic form"
(Quandt 1977, 4).

Policy making is viewed as a process in

which the costs and benefits of potential courses of
action are compared.

Barring irrationality or error,

decision makers are expected to select the course of
action that best promotes the national interest at an
acceptable cost.

Quandt argues that the decision making

process is not nearly so clear-cut.

While the interests

themselves may be completely tangible to the foreign
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policy analyst who is seeking after-the-fact to explain why
a particular decision was made, this may or may not have
been the case during the decision making process itself.
Therefore, policy does not necessarily flow directly from
interests, nor do those interests necessarily remain
constant (Quandt 1977, 14).
Thus, while their respective prioritization of
national interests in the Middle East should reveal a
great deal about Nixon and Carter's policies, Quandt's
reasoning suggests that to stop there would amount to
barely scratching the surface.

Policy makers must operate

in a subjective environment, where the perception of
national interests is what matters;

moreover, the manner

in which conflicting interests are resolved and policies
devised can have a decisive impact on the decisions
themselves (Quandt 1977, 15).
The Level of Analysis of the Study
Quandt's emphasis on looking beyond national
interests to see how other factors affect foreign policy
formulation highlights the fact that one of the first
hurdles which must be overcome in the study of
international relations, as with any area of scholarly
inquiry, is the selection of a viable level of analysis for
the phenomena in question*.

To many who study
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international relations, the most appropriate level of
analysis has been the systemic level.

Often, the

international system has been likened to a billiard table,
and:
the units of the system— states—
are likened to billiard balls whose
reactions are determined exclusively
by the impact of each unit on the
others as they collide in an endless
action-reaction sequence of events.
What occurs inside the balls,
and how that might propel them in
one direction or another is beyond
the purview of the 'billiard ball'
model of international politics
(Kegley and Wittkopf 1988, 2).

While this approach may provide the means to develop
a better understanding of the system as a whole, a growing
number of scholars, like Quandt, contend that foreign
policy depends not only on the interactive processes among
nations, but on those within the various nations
themselves.

This has led several researchers to focus on

the level of the national state, yet, the vastness of the
subject area has left room for several interpretations
regarding how to further break it down for study.

Jervis

proposes four levels which deserve attention— the level of
decision-making, the level of the bureaucracy, the nature
of the state and the workings of domestic politics, and
the international environment. (Jervis 1976, 15)

Jervis'

inclusion of the fourth category, the international
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environment, is significant because it displays a keen
awareness of the interplay which occurs between the
domestic and international environments in the formulation
of foreign policy.

Various elements from each of these

environments can affect decision-makers, depending upon
the specific circumstances in question.

To ignore the

international environment in a study of domestic
influences over foreign policy would equate, perhaps
somewhat loosely, but equate nonetheless, to ignoring the
processes which occur inside the billiard balls when
taking a systemic approach.
Kegley and Wittkopf group "perceptions about the
multitude of influences on foreign policy-making" into
three basic categories which they depict as forming
separate, yet interrelated layers of influence.

The

broadest level consists of the societal environment, which
is impacted primarily by the political culture of the
United States, "the basic needs, values, beliefs and selfimages widely shared by Americans about their political
system." Below this level rests the institutional
setting, the various branches of the government, as well
as the departments and agencies responsible for decision
making and management.

Finally, foreign policy must pass

through the level comprised by decision makers and their
policy-making positions.

The personalities, psychological
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predispositions, perceptions and role responsibilities of
decision makers can have a decided impact on the policy
making process and, ultimately on foreign policy outcomes
themselves (Kegley and Wittkopf 1988, 5).
Kegley and Wittkopf's model suggests that a specific
policy outcome may be affected by elements from each of
these three layers of influence.

The third layer, that

comprised by decision-makers and their policy-making
positions, will serve as the "stable point of focus"
(Singer 1961, 78) for this thesis, which afterall is a
comparative analysis of how two different presidents chose
to approach a vital area of the world.

Yet, in order to

fully appreciate why each of them chose to pursue
particular options, how they established their respective
priorities and what caused them to form specific
perceptions, it is necessary to develop a more
comprehensive understanding of the context in which these
decision makers operated.
As alluded to previously, two elements make up the
broad contours of this context;

the domestic environment

and the international environment.
The Domestic Environment
While it may have once been a widely held belief that
"politics stop at the water's edge,"

that national

15

interests are considered before personal and partisan
interests when it comes to foreign policy, Kegley and
Wittkopf, like Quandt, suggest that this is no longer the
case.

Domestic considerations, which are themselves

affected by the political culture of the United States,
have begun to play at least as prominent a role in foreign
policy formulation as the international strategic
situation (Kegley and Wittkopf 1988, 11).

Public opinion

has become the litmus test by which a president's foreign
policies are judged (Craig and George 1990, 60).
Throughout the post war era, presidential authority,
once nearly unquestioned in the realm of foreign policy,
has waned considerably.

Hans Morgenthau's insistence that

statesmen should never allow their decisions to be
influenced by public opinion (Morgenthau 1973), has proven
to be an elusive goal.

Politics have intruded into the

decision making process, decreasing the ability of
presidents to make foreign policy decisions without
considering the impact those decisions may have on their
political future (Destler, Gelb, and Lake 1984, 18).
Destler, Gelb and Lake assert that the resulting
"breakdown" in foreign policy has led to the very
inconsistency and incoherence that has come to typify the
American approach to world affairs since Vietnam.

Over

time, the United States has lost the ability to frame "a
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coherent sense of national interests, the enduring purposes
that flow from values, geography, and our place in the
hierarchy of world power" (Destler, Gelb, and Lake 1984,
18).

Whereas in most nations, it takes a revolution to

redefine the overarching perception of what constitutes
the national interest, in the United States, significant
change can, and often does, result from a presidential
election

(Destler, Gelb, and Lake 1984, 18).

Richard Nixon's presidency was pivotal in terms of
domestic influences over foreign policy.

It began and

ended with significant events, Vietneun and Watergate, both
of which led to increased congressional and popular
involvement in the foreign policy decision making process.
Holsti and Rosenau point out that from 1945 to 1965,
before the foreign policy consensus was shattered by the
Vietnam War, the Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy
Administrations could count on support from Congress, the
media, other leaders and the informed public, as long as
they pursued policies based on an accepted set of
principles about foreign affairs and the role of the
United States in the world^.

After Vietnam, the near

consensus between elite and public opinion regarding the
direction which should be taken in foreign affairs began to
erode;

in the absence of this consensus. Congress and the

Executive Branch each became less sure of the other's
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position®.

Meanwhile, the prevailing anti-communist

ideology, since World War II the defining characteristic
of American foreign policy, began to dissipate, decreasing
the willingness among policy makers to make deals that fit
both national and party interests (Destler, Gelb, and Lake
1984, 18).
Presidential authority reached its apex, and even
began to diminish, during the aftermath of the Vietnam
War.

The period since has been characterized by a

continual fluxuation in presidential authority.

In spite

of this trend, Richard Nixon, like many of his
predecessors, enjoyed a nearly complete freedom to
maneuver in foreign affairs.

In fact, it was after

Nixon's presidency, and to a large extent because of it,
that the authority of the executive branch became the
subject of broad scrutiny in the face of a growing
accusation that abuses had occurred which threatened the
very system of checks and balances envisioned by the
Founders (Schlesinger 1973).

Critics charged that several

presidents, Nixon among them, had abused their right to
secrecy as a means to protect and preserve their national
security power

(Cronin 1988, 151).

Thus, successive

presidents, particularly Ford and Carter who came into
office at the height of this critical period, were forced
to operate in an environment punctuated by a popular and
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congressional impulse to restrict presidential authority,
even in foreign affairs.

The degree to which additional

constraints affected Carter's freedom to maneuver in
foreign affairs will serve as an interesting basis of
comparison to Nixon's presidency.
Holsti and Rosenau's study demonstrates the depths of
the chasms which divided opinion over the directions
foreign policy should take in the 1970s and 1980s.

Their

findings also underscore the fact that domestic issues and
foreign policy are often viewed as competing interests.
Public opinion surveys conducted by the Chicago Council on
Foreign Relations (CCFR) indicate that the pendulum has
swung back and forth several times, favoring one broad
category of interests, then the other.

Three studies,

conducted in 1974, 1978 and 1982, demonstrated a
preoccupation with domestic issues, reversing the public
opinion trend which had held from 1940 to 1973 (Reilly
1987, 45).

A fourth poll, taken in 1986, indicated a

swing back toward greater sensitivity in foreign affairs
(Reilly 1987, 46).

This was accompanied by a significant

shift in the way that both the public and leaders
perceived the United States' role in world affairs.
Reilly attributes these changing attitudes to the drop in
inflation which took place from 1978 to 1986, the easing
of unemployment from 1982 to 1986, and increased
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confidence among Americans with respect to the U.S.-Soviet
military balance (Reilly 1987, 48).
The "pendulum effect" exhibited in these successive
surveys would seem to indicate an unwillingness on the
part of the American people to support active involvement
in world affairs during periods of domestic uncertainties.
This limits a president's ability to enact and sustain
far-reaching policies;

domestic, particularly economic,

upheaval can lead the public to reel in any slack it may
have given the administration in the foreign policy arena,
expecting attention to be diverted from politics among
nations back toward problems at home.

This competition

can exact a heavy toll on the president (Destler, Gelb and
Lake 1984, 20).

In fact, Quandt suggests that Jimmy

Carter pulled back on his efforts toward a Middle East
peace initiative in the fall of 1977 because the domestic
political price he was paying had become too high (Quandt
1988, 94).
The structure of the electoral cycle compounds this
problem.

Quandt builds an extremely convincing case in

which he asserts that the present electoral cycle is
preventing the United States from realizing the full
potential of the presidency, and therefore from
establishing a consistent and effective foreign policy.
Because most newly elected presidents have very little
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foreign policy experience, they spend the first year of
their first term simply gaining that experience.

During

the third and fourth years, the administration is apt to
become increasingly preoccupied with re-election, placing
foreign policy on the back burner.

In essence, then, the

only opportunities for first term in-roads into foreign
policy occur during the second year.

The first year and a

half of the second term are the best for foreign policy
initiatives.

Late in the second year, however, domestic

issues are likely to again take precedence over foreign
policy concerns.

Midterm congressional elections become

an increasingly important determinant of how much power
the president will have during his last two years (Quandt
1988, 93-94).
Quandt's argument highlights a fundamental difference
between the Nixon and Carter presidencies.

Unlike Carter,

Nixon brought a wealth of foreign policy experience to the
office.

Therefore, one would expect Richard Nixon to have

made more headway in the Middle East during the earlier
stages of his administration.

As Chapter 3 will

demonstrate, however, this was not necessarily the case.
To understand why Nixon's extra foreign policy experience
did not translate into an early proactive involvement in
the Middle East requires a move out of the domestic
contextual environment into the international;

the first
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several years of President Nixon's first term were
overshadowed by the American involvement in Vietnam.
The International Environment
The second broad component of the foreign policy
decision-making context in which presidents must operate
is comprised by the international environment.

For years,

American leaders sought to conduct affairs as if the
United States were not affected by circumstances in the
world around it.

Following World War II, however, several

prominent leaders, Franklin Roosevelt among them, became
convinced that the United States had to move away from its
isolationist tendencies toward a more active foreign
policy directed at helping to establish and strengthen an
effective international system which would, in turn, avoid
breakdowns such as those which had caused both world wars.
Although his "Great Design," a variation of the
balance-of-power system based on cooperation between the
United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union and China,
was not adopted, Roosevelt was instrumental in terms of
placing American foreign policy on a new track, a path
which would allow successive presidents to remain heavily
involved in world affairs (Graig and George 1990, 103106).
After World War II, American leaders began to
perceive that a solid European recovery was in the United
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States' best interests.

During this period, Soviet

actions in Eastern Europe were viewed with a wary eye.
The initial belief that the Soviets were pursuing limited
objectives which could be justified in terms of their
security needs eventually gave way to concern as more and
more territory came under Soviet influence (Craig and
George 1990, 117).

By the time American leaders had

become alarmed, however, a great deal of territory was
controlled by Stalin.

Under the auspices of the Hitler-

Stalin Pact, the Russians had already annexed Lithuania,
Latvia, Estonia, and sizeable portions of Poland and
Romania by 1939.

After the war, Stalin installed

Communist puppet governments in Poland, Czechoslovakia,
Hungary, East Germany, Bulgaria and Romania.

Soviet

expansion continued with the annexation of four Japanese
islands and a series of attempts to establish Communist
regimes in several countries throughout the world (Nixon
1990, 16-17).

The view of Soviet intentions steadily

darkened as they brought strong pressure against several
governments in the Middle East, while pursuing their own
set of occupation policies in Germany (Craig and George
1990, 117).
Against this backdrop of perceived Soviet expansion,
anti-communism became one of the most persistent driving
forces in post-war American foreign policy.

In fact.
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several presidents were heavily influenced by the desire
to prevent the spread of Communism throughout the world.
A bipolar relationship developed between the United States
and the Soviet Union, a relationship which eventually
became known as the "Cold War" (Craig and George 1990,
119).
The ensuing U.S.-Soviet rivalry unquestionably
exerted a determining influence over world affairs and
beccune a defining characteristic of American foreign
policy.

More importantly, however, it gave a very

distinct complexion to American Middle East policy.

When

the new dimension of Soviet-American competition was added
to the equation, a very complex situation became even more
difficult.

Attempts to fashion a cohesive, enduring

Middle East policy became even more problematic.
Interestingly, Nixon and Carter gave different
emphasis to this Soviet-American competition, in general,
and particularly with respect to the Middle East.

Thus,

each president's respective prioritization of Middle East
affairs, as applied to the Soviet-American competition,
stands out as another interesting basis of comparison.
Although Soviet-American competition is the most
prominent feature of the international context in which
American decision-makers operated under Nixon and Carter,
the international environment also influenced Middle East
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policy formulation in other, more subtle ways.

First,

crises in other areas of the world, depending on their
scope and intensity, diverted attention away from the
Middle East for extended periods of time.

Such was the

case with the Vietnam conflict under Johnson and Nixon.
Second, and perhaps just as important, changes in the
dynamics of the situation within the Middle East itself,
when recognized, may have caused leaders to re-evaluate
their policies.
These three facets of the international environment:
the Soviet-American competition, crises which developed in
other areas of the world, and changes in the dynamics of
the Middle East, particularly with respect to the ArabIsraeli dispute, will be examined in the chapters which
follow in order to determine their impact on Nixon and
Carter's Middle East policies.
Framework of the S t n ^
As the preceding indicates, the basic framework of
this study is challenge and response, determining what
faced each administration and how each chose to act given
a particular set of circumstances.
Because context has often proven to be a determining
factor in how the United States has approached the Middle
East, this examination will compare the contexts in which
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Nixon and Carter operated.

Specifically, it will focus on

the domestic political pressures faced by each, the
effectiveness of information and advice available to each,
and the individual outlooks of the decision-makers
themselves.

Moreover, this examination will consider how

external factors, such as U.S.-Soviet relations, affected
decisions made vis-a-vis the Middle East.
This exploration of context will form the most basic
layer of the study, establishing a backdrop against which
we can then determine the nature of the challenges posed
to Nixon and Carter during their administrations.

This

will in turn provide a foundation to support an analysis
of each administration's policy objectives, both in terms
of overarching foreign policy and with respect to the
Middle East.

The former, overarching policy, will serve

as a bridge to link the analysis of context to the
discussions of specific Middle Eastern policy.

After all,

each president dealt with the Middle East as one portion
of a broader canvas.

To the extent that circumstances

allowed, Nixon approached his policy in terms of his
overarching detente goals. Carter within the framework of
human rights.
Once this foundation has been built and the
undergirding supports added, analysis will focus on the
actual methods employed by each president in attempts to
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achieve specific objectives in the Middle East.

How much

did each rely on the use of force, economic coercion and
other tools of statecraft?

Which tools, if any, proved to

be more effective than others?

To what extent did

specific contextual elements impact the effectiveness of
the methods employed?

This line of questioning will prove

particularly instructive, facilitating an analysis of the
relationship between the methods employed and the end
results.

If the outcomes of the presidents' policies

prove to be significantly different, our task will be to
determine what caused this difference— the methods
employed, the contextual elements, or some unexpected
factor?

If the differences prove to be negligible, the

question that will remain is whether or not, in the case
of the Middle East, context is such a complicating factor
that it simply interferes with the impact of traditional
tools of statecraft.
For the sake of simplicity, this study will address
each of the major areas of interest:

the context, the

nature of the challenge, the methods used, and the policy
outcomes, of each administration separately, in Chapters 3
and 4.

These separate analyses will be followed by a

chapter devoted to strict comparison in order to draw
conclusions to the many questions outlined above.

In

order to fully appreciate the scope of the issues that
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were dealt with by Nixon and Carter, however, it is
necessary to begin with an overview of the Arab-Israeli
dilemma itself, and with a brief survey of the development
of U.S. Middle Eastern policy.

Certain aspects of their

inheritance proved to be critical to the development of
policy by both Nixon and Carter.
these issues.

Chapter 2 will address
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several other politically oriented groups which act on
their own; for example, the Middle East Research and
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the American Palestine Committee.
3. This interest will need to be re-examined in
light of the recent collapse of the Soviet Union.
4. The "level-of-analysis problem" is particularly
intriguing in international relations because the field
lends itself to such a vast array of alternative
approaches. See, for exeunple, David J. Singer, "The Level
of Analysis Problem in International Relations," World
Politics 24 (October, 1961); 77-92; and Robert Jervis,
Perception and Misperception in International Politics
(Princeton New Jersey; Princeton University Press, 1976).
5. See, for example. Ole R. Holsti and James N.
Rosenau, "A Leadership Divided; the Foreign Policy
Beliefs of American Leaders, 1976-1984," in The Domestic
Sources of American Foreign Policy; Insights and
Evidence. eds. Charles W. Kegley and Eugene R. Wittkopf
(New York: St Martin's Press, 1988), 30-44. Holsti and
Rosenau found these principles to include; active
involvement in efforts to create a just and stable world
order; involvement in a broad range of international
organizations; support for the creation of peacetime
alliances; liberalization of foreign trade; foreign aid
programs; and containment, as the most effective means to
counter Soviet expansion.
6. Holsti and Rosenau categorized American leaders
as; Cold War internationalists, who perceived a world of
conflict with the primary challenges linked to the
division of the United States and the Soviet Union; Post
Cold War internationalists, who were more strongly
oriented to those issues dividing the world along a northsouth line; or, semi-isolationists, primarily concerned
with domestic issues.

CHAPTER 2
THE HISTORICAL COHTEZT

The historical context of the Middle East provides a
rich and vivid backdrop against which policy makers must
make contemporary decisions.

Failure to understand the

depths of the chasms which divide Arabs and Israelis can
lead to policy decisions which fail to garner sufficient
support from regional actors.

Failure to appreciate how

American Middle Eastern policy has evolved to its present
stage of development can lead to unrealistic expectations
among contemporary decision makers, who are often forced
to channel the momentum of past decisions into their own
foreign policy agendas.
The Arab-Israeli Dilemma
The state of Israel arose out of a
conflict between two peoples— Arab
and Jewish— occupying the same
general territory and unable to
satisfy their differences within it.
Following WWII, the British passed
the Palestine problem to the United
Nations, which partitioned it into
separate Arab and Jewish states. The
inequitable distribution of lands
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and resources provoked the Palestinian
Arabs to war, but they were no match
for the well-organized force of Jewish
WWII veterans. The remnants of Arab
lands were annexed by bordering Arab
states who came to suffer the
destabilizing effects of over one
million Arab refugees. Israel was
thus born in conflict and it has ever
since had to remain on the alert
because of oft-repeated threats that
she would be annihilated (Aker 1985, 4).
When it began, the October 1973 War, known to
Israelis as "the Yom Kippur War," and to Arabs as "the War
of Ramadan," was merely the latest explosion between two
peoples with a history of volatile relations (O'Ballance
1978, 7).
vital

A basic knowledge of the historical context is

to understanding the war because it, likeeach

of

the clashes which came before, was brought about asthe
result of a deep-rooted dispute between Israel and its
Arab neighbors, a dispute that began long before the state
of Israel was established.

Frank Aker's description of

Israel's origins is brief, yet it captures the essence of
the perpetual conflict which has pitted Arab and Jew
against one another for decades.
The major impetus for the establishment of the Jewish
state was provided by the Zionist Movement, "the strongest
unifying force among world Jewry" (Peretz 1983, 21).
During the late 1800s, several different Zionist movements
coalesced into a single. World Zionist Organization, which
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held the first World Zionist Congress in Basle, Switzerland
in 1897.

Among the chief accomplishments of the congress

was the formal establishment of an overriding goal for the
movement;

"to create for the Jewish people a home in

Palestine secured by public law" (Peretz 1983, 19).
Particularly in its infancy, the movement suffered from
internal division and external criticism;

however,

support for the Zionists eventually grew as the extent of
the atrocities committed against Jews during the Holocaust
became clear.
Peretz (1983) traces the historical evolution of
Israel from its earliest stages, when the Yishuv (Jewish
community) constituted a very small percentage of the
population in Palestine, up through the present era.

His

description illustrates a crucial point that should not be
overlooked when considering the Arab-Israeli conflict.
Since the beginning, when Arab and Jew first came into
contact with one another, external forces have exerted a
determining influence over Palestine.

During the first

World War, the predominant influence was British.

In

1917, the British publicly demonstrated support for the
creation of a national home for the Jewish people in
Palestine by issuing the Balfour Declaration.

After the

war, the League of Nations adopted a policy known as the
British Mandate for Palestine.

The Mandate formally
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recognized the Zionist Movement;

however, during the

mandatory era, the region was handled as if it were a
British crown colony.

Efforts were made to create self-

governing institutions in the region, but these were
defeated by the conflicting objectives of the three major
communities that occupied the area:
their Zionist nationalism;

the Yishuv, with

the Arabs, who were striving

for self-determination following the break up of the
Ottoman Empire; and the British, who sought to protect
their own imperial interests while somehow maintaining a
balance between their obligations to both Jews and Arabs
(Peretz 1983, 45).
The end of World War II brought an end to the British
Mandate in Palestine.

Great Britain, exhausted by the

war, suffered from tremendous financial pressures and
began to pull out of its most expensive imperial outposts,
especially those which had become troublesome to maintain.
In Palestine, Jewish nationalism intensified as the
Zionist movement began to lean toward militant activism.
The Yishuv demanded that restrictions imposed on
immigration and expansion of the Jewish homeland be
lifted.

Clashes between the Yishuv and British forces

became more frequent. "In desperation. Great Britain
turned the problem over to the new United Nations (UN)
Organization in 1946" (Peretz 1983, 46).
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At the same time, Arab opposition to a Jewish
homeland occupying all of Palestine was very strong.

To

accommodate this opposition, the UN General Assembly put
forth a compromise partition resolution.

It divided the

country into a Jewish state, an Arab state and an
international enclave around Jerusalem.

Intense emotional

reactions to the partition resolution led to civil war in
Palestine.

While Jews fought Arabs, the British resolved

to leave the region by the last official day of the
Mandate with as little trouble as possible.

As soon as

the UN adopted the partition resolution, Arab leaders
began organizing local militia forces to prevent the
establishment of the Jewish state.

The state of Israel

itself was actually established during the ensuing
conflict, on May 14, 1948.

The war ended in 1949, with

separate armistice agreements between Israel and each of
the Arab countries involved.

Thus, Israel emerged "in a

land that Arabs insist belongs wholly to Arabs" (Sobel and
Koset 1974, 1).
The second Arab-Israeli war took place in 1956 after
President Nasser nationalized, then closed, the Suez Canal
leading to an Anglo-French invasion of Egypt (O'Ballance
1978, 1).

Israel took advantage of Egypt's preoccupation

and moved troops accross the Sinai desert.

These Israeli

columns met light opposition and were able to press almost
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as far as the canal itself, gaining control of virtually
the entire Sinai Penninsula.

Months later, however, the

Israelis grudgingly withdrew to their foinner boundaries,
bowing to pressure from the UN and the United States in
particular.
The "Six Day War" was fought in June 1967.

Unable to

remain idle in the face of increasing Arab threats and
military preparedness, the Israelis opted to launch a
preemptive strike on Arab airfields (Aker 1985, 5).
Within six days, the military capabilities of the Arab
states had been effectively neutralized.

"The Israelis

managed to destroy the air force of Jordan, almost destroy
that of Egypt, and badly maul those of Syria and Iraq.
Left without air cover, the Arabs were disastrously
defeated" (O'Ballance 1978, 2).

In fact, the victory was

so decisive that it raised serious doubts about the warfighting capability of Arab military personnel, "no matter
how well armed or trained" (Aker 1985, 5).
In addition to their military defeat, the Arabs
suffered crucial territorial losses as a result of the
war.

In the north, Syria lost the Golan Heights, with its

commanding view of the valleys in northern Israel and of
the road to the Syrian capital, Damascus.

Jordan lost the

West Bank, including the Christian and Islamic temples of
Jerusalem.

Egypt, in spite of its 90,000-man army, lost
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over 20,000 square miles of land east of the Suez Canal,
the Sinai Penninsula.

"Arab humiliation was so great that

the Arab states refused to negotiate any kind of
settlement.

The stage was irrevocably set for another

clash" (Aker 1985, 5).
The Egyptian armed forces wasted little time.
Regrouped and resupplied with Soviet material, they
launched President Nasser's "War of Attrition" later the
sfune year.

The resulting battles were fought accross the

Suez Canal, which now served as the dividing line between
Egyptians and Israelis.

On the ground, the battles

included heavy artillery duels, mortar barrages and
commando raids.

In the skies above, aircraft were used

for strategic bombing and close air support of ground
troops.

Soviet supplied surface-to-air missiles (SAMs)

increased the effectiveness of Egyptian air defenses.
Since the June defeat in the Six Day War, when most of
Egypt's planes had been destroyed on the ground within a
matter of hours, the Israelis had been enjoying virtual
freedom of action in the skies above Egypt.

The

introduction of the Soviet SAMs severely limited that
freedom, and forced the Iraelis to install electronic
countermeasure (ECM) pods on their aircraft to warn pilots
of incoming missiles, thereby enabling them to take
evasive action.

Technological advances, in the form of
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electronics that could potentially give one side the edge
over the other, soon becaune a coveted prize.

Edgar

O'Ballance describes a "mad scientists' war" which
escalated "as on the ground, radar-directional, searching
and tracking equipment improved, and in the air, more
advanced ECM pods enabled the pilot to jam, counterjam and
even deflect missiles aimed at him" (O'Ballance 1978, 2).
When the War of Attrition ended on August 7, 1970, neither
side had gained a clear advantage over the other. Israeli
aircraft had, however, lost control of the skies over
Egypt and their activities were confined to the Suez Canal
Zone.
Opinion is divided as to whether or not the battles
fought from 1967 to 1970 actually constituted a "war."
Nonetheless, this period of repeated confrontations,
sometimes referred to as "No Peace, No War" (Aker 1985,
9), had a decisive impact on the ensuing conflict, which
began on Saturday, October 6, 1973 when six Syrian jets
attacked Israeli defensive positions along the Golan
Heights (Aker 1985, 20).
By nightfall, the Israelis had lost the southern
Golan.

Meanwhile, the Egyptians launched a coordinated,

all-out attack against Israeli positions in the Sinai,
striking airfields and mounting an artillery barrage
involving two thousand guns.

Using available broad, flat
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terrain as a staging area, the Egyptians mounted a
"blitzkrieg-like attack" (Shazly 1980, 222).

The Israelis

were caught off guard by the simultaneous offensives,
especially in the Sinai.
How could Israel, a "geopolitical island" (Aker 1985,
17) in the midst of antagonistic neighbors, allow itself
to be caught off guard?

What led the Egyptians and

Syrians to launch their coordinated attacks?

The answers

to these questions may be found in a closer examination of
the foreign policy context in which the Nixon
administration operated.

Before turning to this subject,

however, it is important to mention some of the milestones
of American Middle Eastern policy that are relevant for
later discussions.
O.S. Middle East Policy Development
The literature concerning American foreign policy is
imbued with the sense that it, like so many other facets
of the American political system, has undergone an
evolutionary process.

The United States was able to

remain distanced from foreign affairs for quite some time,
following a tradition of isolationism articulated by
George Washington who urged in his farewell address that
the new state's interests would best be served by never
taking part in the internal quarrels of Europe, and by
steering clear of "permanent alliances with any portion of
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the foreign world^.*' This tradition prevailed even after
victory in the Spanish-American War resulted in new
overseas interests and responsibilities, and even after
the pivotal role the country played in World War I.
The precept which guided American political thought
and foreign policy at the beginning of the twentieth
century held that the United States should restrict its
involvement to a well-defined area in the Western
Hemisphere.

Of course, the nation would protect its

citizens and interests in these areas, but these interests
were primarily commercial, philanthropic and cultural (De
Novo 1963, 3-4).

In the case of the Middle East, this

pattern of development is particularly apparent.

For

years the United States remained "politically
disinterested" (De Novo 1963, 7) in the region, content to
concentrate efforts in Central America.

The six European

powers (Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy, AustriaHungary, and Russia), on the other hand, were deeply
interested in the Middle East, primarily because of its
strategic location.

American leaders sought to avoid the

international competition among the European powers and
chose to fashion a policy based on the traditional
guidelines of non-intervention (Bryson 1977, 45).
This non-intervention, although it was the norm in
the case of the Middle East, was by no means absolute.
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The necessity of establishing an expanded market place,
vital to the survival of the new republic, prompted the
United States to begin efforts at Middle East diplomacy as
early as 1784, when Congress appointed a special
commission consisting of Benjamin Franklin, John Adams and
Thomas Jefferson to negotiate treaties with the Barbary
States (Bryson 1977, 2-3).

In a sense, it was in the

national interest of the new nation to pursue economic
expansion.

In March 1815, for exeunple, the United States

declared war on Algiers for the protection of American
economic interests in the Middle East (Bryson 1977, 6).
Furthermore, it was the need for economic expansion which
drove early efforts at diplomacy and which eventually led
to the establishment of American naval power, developed to
safeguard vital shipping routes (Bryson 1977, 7).

The

continued assurance of "freedom of the seas" thus became
another guiding principle used by American diplomats when
dealing with the Middle East.
The full evolution of American Middle Eastern policy
can be traced through several stages.

From 1784-1920,

although there were a number of commercial interests in
the area, U.S. diplomats devoted most of their attention
toward protecting the various missionary and educational
interests which had penetrated into many parts of the
region (Bryson 1977, vii; De Novo 1963, 19).
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Over time, the missionary lobby wielded considerable
influence not only in the Department of State, but in the
White House and the halls of Congress as well.

The lobby

actually became so powerful that in 1900 diplomat Lloyd
Griscom delared that "the missionaries had been among the
first to learn how to exert pressure in politics— even the
head of our State Department used to quake when the head
of a Bible society walked in" (Griscom 1940, 134).

De

Novo points out that the national support of missionary
activities serves as a reminder that American isolation
did not extend to cultural endeavors.

By 1900, American

missionaries were operating in Anatolia and European
Turkey, Syria, Persia, Egypt and the Persian Gulf region
(De Novo 1963, 8).
The missionaries were at the height of their power
during the Wilson administration.

Woodrow Wilson, the son

of a Presbyterian minister, was raised amid clergy and
missionaries;

as president, he maintained personal

contact with several missionary lobbyists.

Needless to

say, this direct contact with Wilson, coupled with
contacts with influential members of Congress and the
State Department, afforded the missionaries considerable
access to official Washington.
promote various agendas;

They used this access to

most notably, they were actively

involved in pressuring the United States government to act

41

on behalf of Armenia.

In fact, although they failed to

make it a reality, "their all-consuming goal was to
realize American acceptance of a mandate for Armenia"
(Bryson 1981, 4).
When the American missionaries first arrived in the
Levant in 1820, they discovered that the Muslim population
was not at all receptive to Christianity (Bryson 1981, 3).
Finding little success in evangelizing the Muslims, they
directed their religious efforts primarily toward the
native Christians in the region, the Armenians, Greeks,
Nestorians, Copts, and the Christians in Lebanon (Bryson
1981, 2).

At the same time, they redirected much of their

remaining energy and resources toward education and
medicine.

As educators, they emphasized the importance of

cultural traditions and native languages, thereby fanning
the embers of what has since become the flame of modern
Arab nationalism, and stimulating the emergence of
nationalism among the peoples of Armenia (Bryson 1981, 3).
Through institutions such as Robert College, founded in
1863, Syrian Protestant College, founded in 1866, and
Constantinople Women's College, founded in 1871, the
missionaries trained many of those who would eventually
become leaders in the modern Middle Eastern nation-state.
Exposure to western political theory, the writings of
Locke, Jefferson, and Hume for exemple, strengthened
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nationalist sentiments and actually awoke in the subjects
of the Ottoman Empire, the Arabs, Armenians, Bulgarians,
Greeks, and Cretans, the desire to pursue unique national
destinies (Bryson 1981, 3).

The United States served as

an example for those who sought to achieve selfdetermination.

However, as various movements got

underway, requests for actual assistance were denied on
the basis of the long-standing policy of non-intervention
and the Monroe Doctrine, first put forth in 1823.

In

spite of this official stance, the missionaries were
committed to assisting these national movements in their
struggles for self-determination.
Early American involvement in the Middle East
highlights the often conflicting duality of American
foreign policy, the realistic, pragmatic desire to further
the national interest, and the idealistic, crusading zeal
to spread democracy throughout the world.

In the case of

early Middle Eastern diplomacy, the former was typified by
the pragmatic decision to resist becoming involved in the
various struggles for self-determination which began to
take root.

The latter was promoted primarily via the

missionary influence in terms of the short-term gains the
lobby was able to bring about by pressuring the American
government.
By the beginning of the twentieth century, commercial
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interests began to compete in earnest with the
missionaries for a voice in the shaping of U.S. Middle
Eastern policy (Bryson 1977, 44).

Prior to World War I,

however, the missionaries remained the strongest interest
group in the region (Bryson 1977, 45).

During this

period. Great Britain devoted a great deal of effort
toward securing Middle Eastern oil, whereas the United
States did not.

In fact, the State Department did not

exert any pressure during the pre-war years to support
those Americans who were seeking oil concessions in the
Middle East (Bryson 1977, 56-57).

By the 1920's, this had

changed somewhat as U.S. diplomats began to employ the
Open Door policy^ to secure American access to Middle
Eastern oil reserves.
The preceding decade was also crucial in terms of
economic endeavors in the Middle East.

President Taft, an

avid proponent of Dollar Diplomacy, placed the pursuit of
economic interests at the top of his list of priorities.
The desire to find new commercial opportunities was so
great during this time frame that officials within the
administration were willing to violate the traditional
guidelines of non-intervention in order to pursue economic
interests^ (Bryson 1977, 49-50).
Although the basic desire to gain access to Middle
East oil had existed for quite some time prior to World
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War I, U.S. diplomats tended to defer to British supremacy
in the region.

This began to change during the inter-war

period as competition developed over oil in the Middle
East.

From 1919 to 1939, with the support of the U.S.

government, American oil companies successfully challenged
British control of Middle East oil.

By World War II,

American oil interests had gained substantial holdings in
Kuwait, a monopoly in Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, and
approximately one-fourth of the Iraq Petroleum Company
(Bryson 1977, 96).

By 1939, approximately 15 percent of

the oil produced in the region was for American oil
companies.

American participation in Middle East oil

production not only promised enormous profits, but
eventually led to a reliance on the importation of Middle
East oil (Bryson 1977, 109).
The pre-and inter-war periods were crucial in Middle
Eastern diplomacy in the sense that the American
government became increasingly responsive to another very
influential group, American oil interests.

U.S. oil

companies were not content to stand idly by, while the
British cornered the oil market.

They pressured American

officials for assistance in the nsune of the Open Door, and
of Free Trade.

World War II served as a point of

departure for US-Middle East relations as American policy
makers began to perceive the importance of maintaining
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access to the region's rich oil supplies.

After the war,

this oil was also perceived as vital to the recovery of
Europe which was, in turn, viewed as vital to American
interests, especially in the face of the growing threat
posed by Communist expansion.

Protection of private

interests was replaced by considerations of the national
interest (Bryson 1981, 1).

President Truman was faced

with the unenviable task of not only defining the broad
outlines of US national interests in the Middle East, but
of determining how to promote them within a highly
unstable context.
Truman's presidency served as a turning point in
U.S.-Middle East relations;

he made an actual commitment

to the region that has been passed on to every
administration since.

While it is true that several

presidents before Truman expressed interest in the Middle
East, little of this interest was manifested into actual
policy.

During the first World War, for example, Great

Britain approached President Woodrow Wilson, seeking
American support for an official pro-Zionist statement.
Great Britain saw in such a statement an opportunity to
encourage Jewish support for the Allies;

however, by

making a pro-Zionist statement, the government would be
running the risk of alienating recently cultivated
friendships with Arab nations.

This gave Great Britain
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cause for concern, and led British diplomats to seek
official support from the United States.

"A declaration

of sympathy with Zionism by President Woodrow Wilson would
dispel the British concern of becoming diplomatically
isolated on the Palestine issue" (Snetsinger 1974, 2).
In September 1917, Great Britain informally
approached Wilson on the subject.

Wilson, with advice

from Colonel Edward House, replied that any Allied
announcement concerning the future disposition of lands
within the Ottoman Empire would be inappropriate,
especially at a time when the Allies hoped to persuade the
Empire to drop out of the war (Snetsinger 1974, 2).

The

State Department, headed by Secretary of State Robert
Lansing, also advised against any pro-Zionist statements
(Adler 1948, 305-8; 334).
American Zionists, united under one of their most
influential members. Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis,
launched a campaign to convince Wilson of the need to
support the Zionist cause*.

Soon thereafter, the British

again approached Wilson regarding the pro-Zionist
statement.

This time, the President offered his support.

Snetsinger suggests that had Wilson's second response been
similar to his first, the British might have decided
against issuing a statement on Zionism.

Furthermore, by

using direct personal intervention to move President
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Wilson from flat disapproval to endorsement of the
proposed declaration, the Zionists laid the groundwork for
taking similar steps during the Truman administration,
"with even more striking results" (Snetsinger 1974, 2-3).
In November 1917, the following statement was issued
in a letter from Great Britain's Foreign Secretary, Arthur
Balfour, to Lord Rothschild:
His Majesty's Government views
with favor the establishment in
Palestine of a national home for
the Jewish people, and will use
their best endeavors to facilitate
the achievement of this objective,
it being clearly understood that
nothing shall be done which may
prejudice the civil and religious
rights of existing non-Jewish
communities in Palestine, or the
rights and political status enjoyed
by Jews in any other country^.
The Balfour declaration, although it contained
imprecise language, had a profound impact within the
Zionist ranks;

it came to be viewed as the "emancipation

proclamation" of the movement (Tillman 1982, 10).
Furthermore, President Wilson's endorsement of the Balfour
Declaration was interpreted by many as a moral commitment
to the Zionist cause.

Needless to say, this placed Wilson

in an awkward position, because support for Zionist
aspirations conflicted with the president's commitment to
the principle of self-determination.

While Wilson was
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sympathetic to the Zionist cause, his peace program was
based largely on the notion that lasting peace must be
built upon the self-determination of existing populations
(Tillman 1982, 11).

In fact. Point Twelve of Wilson's

Fourteen Points called for an "absolutely unmolested
opportunity of autonomous development" for the peoples of
the Ottoman Empire®.
In light of the fact that Arabs had inhabited
Palestine for centuries and that, by the end of World War
I, Jews comprised no more than 10 percent of the area's
population, Wilson's apparent support for the Zionist
cause was inconsistent with his foreign policy
initiatives.

The chances that he would be able to make

gains in the latter while remaining true to the former
were very remote.

British Foreign Secretary Balfour noted

"the ambivalence of American foreign policy" toward the
Middle East at a meeting with Felix Frankfurter and
Justice Brandeis, held in Paris on June 24, 1919.

Balfour

told both men that "he could not understand how President
Wilson reconciled his advocacy of Zionism with his
commitment to the principle of self-determination^."
This inclination of trying to satisfy both sides in
the developing Arab-Israeli conflict, but satisfying
neither, would become an all too common characteristic of
subsequent American Middle East policy.
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After World War I, American Zionists pressured the
U.S. government to use diplomatic means to persuade
Britain to implement the Balfour Declaration.

British

forces occupied Palestine, and in April 1920, the Supreme
Allied Council awarded Britain a mandate for the region at
the San Remo Conference.

The League of Nations approved

the mandate in July 1922, on the condition that Britain
create a national Jewish home.

The American government

resisted the pressure to become involved in the situation.
During the 1920's, in fact, the State Department continued
to follow the guidelines of non-intervention and sought
only to protect American interests.

For the most part

Palestine was considered to be a British concern (Bryson
1977, 90-91).
One of the most controversial issues facing the
British during the mandatory era concerned Jewish
immigration.

By the 1930's, Arab fears that Jews would

overrun Palestine had just begun to subside.

These fears

were renewed, however, when Adolf Hitler's rise to power
in Germany, and the resulting persecution of European
Jews, caused a rapid upsurge in Jewish migration to the
United States, Britain and Palestine.

A violent Arab

uprising in 1936 led the British to appoint an official
investigative body, known as the Peel Commission, to
determine the causes of unrest.

In 1937, the commission
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recommended that Palestine be divided into two states, one
Jewish and one Arab.
from either side.

This proposal found little support

After further violence in 1938, British

forces found it necessary to restore peace and the British
government was compelled to re-evaluate its position in
Palestine (Bryson 1977, 91).

To assuage Arab concerns,

the Foreign Office issued a White Paper in 1939.

This

document extended British rule over the region, limited
the sale of land to Jews, and most importantly, restricted
Jewish immigration to Palestine to 75,000 over a five year
period.

Furthermore, immigration after the designated

five year period would be subject to Arab approval
(Tillman 1982, 13).
American Zionists, who had been weakened by
factionalism during the 1920's (Bryson 1977, 91), began to
coalesce in the face of the threat to European Jews.

In

1938, they launched a campaign urging the Roosevelt
Administration to persuade Britain to fulfill the promise
of the Balfour Declaration.

Meanwhile, American oil

interests insisted that support for the Zionist movement
would endanger American oil holdings.

Resisting pressure

from both groups, the Roosevelt Administration continued
to regard Palestine as a British sphere (De Novo 1963,
342-344).
Events that took place during, and to a greater
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extent after, the second World War led to pronounced
changes in U.S. Middle East policy.

During the war.

Allied interest in the region intensified and is perhaps
best illustrated by the struggle which took place between
the British, the United States, and the Soviets over the
sovereignty of Iran.

In 1941, the Soviets occupied

Northern Iran as a means to ensure an open supply route
into Russia.

Meanwhile, the British moved into southern

and central Iran, also as a strategic measure.

In January

1942, a Tripartite Treaty was concluded, declaring that
the presence of foreign troops on Iranian soil was not
intended as an occupation and that these troops would be
withdrawn within six months of the war's conclusion
(Lenczowski 1990, 9).
In the years that followed, Roosevelt was
particularly interested in preserving allied unity,
despite the increasingly apparent post-war ambitions of
the Russians.

This was not the case during the Truman

Administration, however.

As the war came to a close, the

desire to project an appearance of allied unity was
replaced by concern over the evolving relationship between
the two emergent superpowers (Lenczowski 1990, 8).

At the

Potsdam Conference, held from July to August, 1945, Stalin
objected to Churchill's proposal that allied troops
withdraw from Iran ahead of schedule (Truman 1955, 380).
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After Japan surrendered in September, American and British
forces began to pull out of Iran in accordance with the
guidelines of the Tripartite Treaty.

The Soviets, on the

other hand, remained in the area past the deadline, set up
two pro-Soviet separatist regimes in northwestern
Iran— the Autonomous Republic of Azerbaijan in Tabriz, and
the Kurdish Republic in Mahabad— and actually began to
move their troops southward (Lenczowski 1990, 9-10).
For President Truman the impending threat of a
Communist coup in Greece, coupled with Soviet actions in
Iran, "began to look like a giant pincers movement against
the oil-rich areas of the Near East and the warm-water
ports of the Mediterranean" (Truman 1955, 523).

Truman

foresaw the potential for grave danger to American
interests in the Middle East and diplomatic measures were
taken to discourage Soviet actions and to bolster the
Iranian position®.

Once the Soviets had actually left

Iran, the American government encouraged the Shah to send
Iranian troops to the north to remove the last vestiges of
the pro-Soviet regimes in Azerbaijan and Kurdistan^.
Thus, in the face of a growing perception of a Soviet
threat. President Truman took the first steps toward what
would become a substantial commitment to the security and
well-being of Iran, a strategically important ally because
of its location and its rich oil supplies.

In time, the
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policies toward Iran would expand to include economic and
technical assistance, strengthening the country's military
capabilities, and incorporating Iran into a regional
security system comprised of the northern tier of the
Middle East and the Persian Gulf (Lenczowski 1990, 13).
The threat of Soviet expansion into Iran was the
first of several successive episodes which challenged the
Truman Administration.

While issues were still being

resolved in connection with the Azerbaijan and Kurdish
republics, situations developed in both Turkey and Greece
which caused additional concern over Soviet aggressive
tendencies.

To complicate matters, on February 21, 1947,

the British ambassador in Washington, Lord Inverchapel,
informed Secretary of State George C. Marshall that
Britain would no longer be able to ensure the security of
Greece and Turkey (Lenczowski 1990, 15).

This gave the

administration a very compelling reason to increase
American involvement in the region.
Truman felt the need for a quick and decisive
response from the United States (Truman 1955, 98-101).
Before any action could be taken, however, he had to gain
congressional and public support for a tougher stance
toward the Soviets^®.

On March 12, 1947, the president

delivered a message, since referred to as the Truman
Doctrine, to Congress.

This message outlined the
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deteriorating situations in Greece and Turkey, requested
military advisory aid and economic assistance in the
amount of $400 million for both countries, and emphasized
the fact that a global contest had begun pitting the
United States against the forces of Communist subversion
(Lenczowski 1990, 17).

On May 22, 1947, Congress

authorized the military and financial aid that the
president had requested.

During the crucial period

immediately following World War II, the policy of
containment began to solidify as the primary American
response to Soviet expansion^^ (Craig and George 1990,
118).

The episodes in Iran, Greece and Turkey proved to

be early applications of containment.

In time, the policy

would lead to increased American involvement in the Middle
East and other areas of the world.
Within days of having been sworn in as president on
April 12, 1945, Truman was under pressure to take action
in the Zionist matter. Rabbi Stephen S. Wise, chairman of
the American Zionist Emergency Council, approached Truman
for help in resettling Jewish refugees and in establishing
the proposed Jewish homeland in Palestine.

Since 1939,

when the White Paper limited Jewish immigration into
Palestine, British-Zionist relations had become very
strained.

In 1942, a Zionist Conference held in New York

established the Biltmore Program with the goal of making
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all of Palestine into a Jewish state.

During this

conference, American Jews asserted themselves and assumed
leadership of the world Zionist movement, criticizing
European Jews for having been weak and indecisive.
Meanwhile, concerted efforts were made to help persecuted
Jews immigrate into Palestine, in spite of the newly
imposed restrictions.

In the latter stages of the war,

extremist groups, such as the Irgun Zvai Leumi led by
Menachim Begin, launched campaigns of terror against the
British in order to force them to leave Palestine
(Lenczowski 1990, 22).
Lenczowski suggests that in the initial phase of the
Palestine problem, Truman was primarily concerned with the
humanitarian aspects of the issue.

Although he was aware

of the goal to establish a Jewish state in Palestine, he
was not prepared to support it.

On August 31, 1945,

following the victory of the Labour Party in Great
Britain, Truman broached the subject of Jewish refugees
with Premier Attlee, urging him to immediately allow
100,000 Jewish immigrants into Palestine.

The British

were not prepared to do so and instead proposed to set up
an Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry to review the
Palestine issue and to make recommendations.

The

resulting proposals called for the continuation of the
British mandate pending the establishment of a United
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Nations trusteeship;

immediate approval for 100,000

Jewish refugees to enter Palestine;

and repudiation of

the limitations on land transfers (Tillman 1982, 15).
Once these proposals were made, a second committee
was set up to consider how they would best be implemented.
The resulting report, the Grady-Morrison plan, proposed
the establishment of a federalized Jewish-Arab state in
Palestine.

In addition, it put forth a requirement that

Jews and Arabs both consent to further Jewish immigration.
Naturally, the Zionists were displeased with this plan,
and President Truman rejected it.

On October 4, 1946, he

sent a new message to Attlee renewing his request that
100,000 Jews be allowed to enter Palestine immediately
(Lenczowski 1990, 23).
Soon, joint U.S.-British efforts to find a mutually
acceptable solution to the problems in Palestine broke
down.

Lenczowski suggests that it was at this point that

the issue of statehood became the primary focus of
international diplomacy.

In April 1947, the British

submitted the Palestinian question- to a special session of
the United Nations General Assembly.

Throughout the rest

of the year, the assembly and the Special Committee on
Palestine (UNSCOP) deliberated.

In the meantime, Truman

came to terms with his own position on the issue of Jewish
statehood (Lenczowski 1990, 24).

57

This was not an easy task, primarily because Truman
found himself at the center of a virtual tug-of-war.

On

the one hand, representatives of the State Department, the
Department of Defense and the military were vehemently
opposed to the adoption of pro-Zionist policies, which
they believed would cause immeasurable damage to the
national interest by alienating oil-rich Arab nations
(Snetsinger 1974, 139).

On the other hand, Truman was the

focus of a "relentless" Zionist campaign, designed to
pressure him into adopting a pro-Zionist stance.

This

pressure became particularly intense after the Palestine
question had been brought before the United Nations
(Lenczowski 1990, 28).
Interestingly enough, the pressure came not only from
well-known Zionist leaders, but from other directions as
well.

Mobilizing non-Jewish leaders and the groups they

represented was a major goal of the Zionist campaign.
Advocates included several White House officials, such as
David K. Niles, adviser on national minorities, and Clark
Clifford, an assistant to the president.

In March 1948,

his former partner in the haberdashery business, Eddie
Jacobson, convinced Truman to meet with the head of the
Jewish Agency for Palestine, Chaim Weizmann (Lenczowski
1990, 29).
With an election on the horizon, these influential
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presidential aides "convinced Truman of the political
necessity of catering to American Jews by supporting the
cause of Israel" (Snetsinger 1974, 11).

When the UN

Special Committee on Palestine proposed that the disputed
teritory be partitioned into a Jewish and an Arab state,
with Jerusalem established as an international enclave,
Truman directed the State Department to support the plan.
Similarly, on November 29, 1947, the U.S. delegate to the
UN General Assembly cast the American vote in favor of the
partition plan.

On May 14, 1948, when Israel was

proclaimed a state during the conflict that followed UN
acceptance of the partition plan, Truman did not hesitate
to recognize the newly formed government.

He gave de

facto recognition to Israel within eleven minutes of the
proclamation.

On January 31, 1949, de jure recognition

was extended to the Jewish state (Lenczowski 1990, 25-26).
Truman's decision to extend diplomatic recognition to
Israel marked a turning point in his approach to
Palestine.

It was followed by a series of decisions

designed to support the Jewish state (Snetsinger 1974,
116), thus committing the United States to the idea of the
Jewish state's legitimacy^^. This left the tremendous
responsibility of actually defining the exact nature of
U.S.-Israeli and U.S.-Arab relations to successive
American presidents.

Although he bore the brunt of
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relentless pressure from several groups which tried to
influence his policy toward Palestine, and in spite of the
critical Arab response to his eventual decisions, Truman
did not have to contend with any major crises in which
American Middle East interests were seriously threatened.
Such crises would, however, occur during later
presidencies.

Dealing with these critical situations

would shape the subsequent evolution of U.S. relations
with Israel and with the Arab states (Lenzowski 1990, 30).
During the Eisenhower Administration, the Middle East
continued to receive a great deal of attention,
particularly in terms of the threat of Soviet penetration
into the area, the security of oil supplies and the tense
relationship between Arabs and Israelis.

Within the

context of this broader framework, Eisenhower had to
contend with four major crises:

the Iranian oil crisis;

the Suez crisis, which resulted in the second Arab-Israeli
war;

the civil war in Lebanon;

and the revolution in

Iraq (Lencowski 1990, 31).
In order to address potential Soviet incursions into
the region, in 1955 the United States sponsored the
Baghdad Pact, which combined the efforts of Turkey, Iran,
Pakistan, Britain and Iraq in a defensive alliance against
the Soviet threat.

In spite of this, Soviet penetration

into the region continued to be a grave concern for the
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Eisenhower administration.

In fact, Bryson suggests that

the theme of anti-Communism dominated the thinking of the
administration, especially after President Gamal Abdul
Nasser of Egypt established closer ties with the Soviet
Union in the wake of the Suez crisis (Bryson 1977, 204;
Lenczowski 1990, 40-41).
In dealing with the Suez crisis, and throughout his
presidency, Eisenhower insisted on an impartial approach
to the Arab-Israeli dispute.

This was demonstrated by his

refusal to provide arms to Egypt, which ironically drove
the Egyptians toward their arms agreement with the Soviets
in 1955, and by his denial of arms to Israel even after it
became apparent that the Soviet-Egyptian deal threatened
the balance of power in the region (Altéras 1993, 85; 137140).

Whenever possible, Eisenhower sought to use the

peacemaking apparatus of the United Nations to resolve
disputes involving the Middle East^®.
In January 1957, following the Suez crisis,
Eisenhower's concern over Soviet penetration in the region
had become so great that he requested congressional
authority to grant military and economic assistance to any
state that requested it.

Furthermore, he requested

authorization to use military force as required to prevent
aggression or subversion within the region.

After a great

deal of debate. Congress approved these requests on March
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9, 1957, in what came to be known as the Eisenhower
Doctrine.

This doctrine was intended to complement the

earlier Truman Doctrine, but was more specifically
directed toward protecting the Arab states in the core of
the Middle East (Bryson 1977, 204).

In order to be truly

effective, it required, but did not completely receive, a
positive response from the Middle Eastern states it was
intended to protect^*.
In addition to these specific crises, Eisenhower had
to deal with a growing inter-Arab dispute which eventually
resulted in two diametrically opposed Arab camps, a
radical camp that consisted of Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Yemen
and Algeria, and a conservative camp comprised of Saudi
Arabia, Jordan, Kuwait, Lybia and Morocco.

From 1957 to

1967, inter-Arab relations were characterized by repeated
attempts at subversion, assasinations, and several coups
d'etat.

During this period of strained relations, known

as the Arab Cold War, the United States found itself
drawing closer to the conservative bloc^®.
During his presidency, John F. Kennedy sought to
change the basic flavor of American foreign policy in
general, and with specific regard to the Middle East.

In

terms of the latter, Kennedy believed that American policy
should view the various Arab nationalist movements
sympathetically.

Moreover, stability in the region should
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not be equated with protection of the status quo.

In

fact, he believed that rigid attempts to contain the
forces which sought change could only lead to violence and
unrest.

In essence, Kennedy linked the acheivement of

stability in the Middle East with accommodating the forces
of change (Lenczowski 1990, 76).
In particular, Kennedy sought to restore friendly
relations with all the states in the region, radical and
conservative alike.

In his view, it would be detrimental

to American policy for the United States to be continually
identified with the forces seeking to preserve tradition.
Instead, he hoped to establish more viable ties with
progressive Arab leaders, believing that they represented
the future.

To this end, Kennedy viewed American policy

toward the Arabs in terms of the same general principles
that were to guide his approach to other parts of the
Third World;

a sympathetic understanding of nationalism

as a driving force of ex-colonial peoples;

acceptance of

neutralism professed by the emerging nation-states;

and

advocacy of American support for development, reform and
modernization as the best means to avoid extremism and
assure stability in less developed societies (Lenczowski
1990, 68).
Ironically, Kennedy's attempts to restore friendly
ties with the so-called radical Arab states, and Egypt in
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particular, met only moderate initial success and
eventually led to further distrust and irritation.
Furthermore, attempts to encourage the radical camp to
draw closer to the United States and to distance American
policy from traditionalist regimes tested the limits of
America's close identification with many of the
conservative countries.
The Yemen crisis dealt a severe blow to Kennedy's
optimistic belief that supporting the forces of change
would lead to greater stability in the Middle East.

On

September 26, 1962, a coup d'etat led by Colonel Abdullah
al-Sallal brought down the Yemen monarchy, forcing the new
king. Imam Ahmed, to flee to the north, where he joined
loyal tribesmen and launched a guerilla warfare against
the newly declared republic.

Nasser, who at the time was

trying to export Egypt's revolution as a means to promote
political unity among the Arab nations, felt that Egypt
could not stand idly by while events unfolded in Yemen.
He sent troops to join forces with Sallal, causing the
royalist governments in Saudi Arabia and Jordan to become
concerned over their own security.

Soon, the Saudi

government was assisting the deposed king by offering
refuge, supplies, money, arms and medicine.

The Arab Cold

War had developed to such a degree that major players from
each side, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, were engaging in a form

64

of conflict by proxy, the primary battlefield being Yemen.
On occasion, however, the conflict manifested itself into
direct fighting between Egypt and Saudi Arabia (Lenczowski
1990, 80).
When it became apparent that the war and subsequent
foreign intervention threatened to engulf a larger area,
the United States, through its own diplomatic channels as
well as those of the United Nations, sought an end to the
conflict^® (Lenczowski 1990, 87).

Ironically, the tide of

events in Yemen widened the existing chasm in U.S.Egyptian relations.

Much to Kennedy's dismay, Nasser

intensified his military involvement.

By November 22,

1963, when Kennedy was assassinated, little progress had
been made toward disengagement.
actually gotten worse.

In fact, the fighting had

Under Lyndon B. Johnson, the

United States stopped diplomatic efforts to find a
resolution to the civil war in Yemen.

Soon UN efforts

also subsided, leaving the matter to be handled by the
Arab governments, whose efforts to find a peaceful
solution also met with limited success^^ (Lenczowski 1990,
87-88).
During Johnson's presidency, foreign affairs became
increasingly dominated by the United States' growing
involvement in the Vietnam conflict.

Other important

areas of the world, including the Middle East, competed
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unsuccessfully with Southeast Asia for the Johnson
Administration's attention.

America's position in the

Middle East, already tenuous because of the contrasting
signals sent by the Eisenhower and Kennedy
Administrations, began to deteriorate rapidly in the face
of two new crises, the dispute over Cyprus and the ArabIsraeli war of 1967 (Lenczowski 1990, 90).
President Johnson, who was not particularly
experienced in foreign affairs in spite of having been
Vice President for over two years, did not undertake any
progreuns in the Middle East that differed significantly
from Kennedy's policies.

In general, his policies were

characterized by attempts to cultivate relationships with
the Northern tier (Iran, Turkey, Greece and Pakistan),
fairly close relations with oil-producing Saudi Arabia and
pro-Western Jordan;

and continued attempts to improve

relations with the so-called radical Arab regimes of
Egypt, Syria and Iraq

(Lenczowski 1990, 91).

More

significantly, Johnson's policies exhibited a very
protective attitude toward Israel.

In fact, the concept

of using Israel as a strategic asset within the region was
developed under Johnson (Lenczowski 1990,

115).

While the country was being drawn deeper into the
quagmire of Vietnam, Johnson's attention was also heavily
directed toward his ambitious domestic program, the Great
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Society.

This left him largely unprepared to deal with

the crisis which developed over the island of Cyprus^®.
On December 21, 1963, Greek Cypriots attacked a Turkish
sector in the island's capital, Nicosia.

Soon, the island

was embroiled in a bitter civil war between the better
armed Greek majority and the weaker Turkish minority.
Concerned over the threat to the island's Turkish
population, Turkey reacted swiftly, using both diplomatic
and military measures (Lenczowski 1990,

93).

As the situation escalated during the following
months, the challenge for American policy makers was to
find a peaceful solution to the island's conflict while
preventing a potential spillover of hostilities to Turkey
and Greece.

Moreover, the Johnson Administration sought

to prevent the island of Cyprus, under its president.
Archbishop Makarios, from aligning itself with the Soviet
Union.

The Cyprus crisis persisted for several years and

tested the relationship between the United States and
Turkey.

By 1967, after several rounds of diplomatic

efforts involving the guarantor powers, the United States,
NATO, and eventually the United Nations, Cyrus Vance,
acting as Johnson's special emissary, succeeded in
"patching up" the conflict during a mediating mission
(Lenczowski 1990, 104).
As events in the Cyprus crisis were unfolding, the
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dynamics of the Arab-Israeli dispute were leading toward a
new outbreak in hostilities.

During Johnson's presidency,

the United States moved from a policy of supplying Israel
with strictly defensive weapons to one of providing highly
sophisticated offensive equipment (Rabin 1979, 64-5).

The

Arab-Israeli War of 1967 Ccune about as a result of long
standing disputes which by the early 1960s were manifested
by a disagreement over the use of water from the Jordan
River.

The inter-Arab dispute, or the "Arab Cold War,"

was also a contributing factor.

In order to defend

themselves against Nasser's aggressiveness, the moderate
Arab regimes launched a ceunpaign directed toward
discrediting the Egyptian leader by emphasizing his
hypocrisy and cowardice in permitting the United Nations
Emergency Force (UNEF) to be stationed in Egypt since 1957
while Israel vehemently refused to allow UNEF on Israeli
soil.

This prompted Nasser, on May 16, 1967, to insist

that the UN withdraw its forces from the Egyptian-Israeli
borders.
UN Secretary General U Thant decided to remove the
entire UN force from the area.

As the UN force departed

from the Gulf of Aqaba in the Sinai Penninsula, Nasser
proclaimed a blockade of the Strait of Tiran to Israeli
shipping on May 22.

Israeli leaders interpreted the

blockade as an aggressive act that justified an armed

68

Israeli response^^.

Serious considerations were given to

launching preemptive strikes against key Arab targets.
The duality of U.S. foreign policy toward the Middle
East under Johnson is particularly apparent in the
American approach to the 1967 war.
broad features of this dualism.

Lenczowski cites four

First, although they

officially tried to dissuade Israel from launching a
preemptive campaign against the Arab states, neither the
president nor his cabinet members demonstrated clear
resistance to Israeli intentions.

Second, the American

delegate to the United Nations, Ambassador Arthur
Goldberg, took a position that was, if not pro-Israeli, at
the very least ambivalent toward the evolving situation.
Third, the United States never officially condemned the
Israeli strikes once they did occur;

instead. President

Johnson labelled Nasser's insistence on the removal of UN
forces from the Egyptian-Israeli border "illegal."
Moreover, after the war, the President and Ambassador
Goldberg adopted the position that a new peace settlement
was required in lieu of a simple return to the conditions
established in 1957 which were not "conducive to peace."
This position can be interpreted as the prelude to support
for Israel maintaining the territories occupied as a
result of the war.

Fourth, and perhaps most significant,

in spite of having made a public declaration of an embargo
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against arms shipments to the Middle East, Johnson
authorized the shipment to Israel of weapons systems along
with associated parts and equipment in the days
immediately preceding the war (Lenczowski 1990, 109-115),
Summary
Several key facets of the Arab-Israeli dispute in
particular, and of the development of American foreign
policy toward the Middle East, provide the context for a
more incisive comparison of Mixon and Carter's policies.
By the time Richard Nixon took office, the ArabIsraeli dispute had been simmering for decades,
periodically reaching the boiling point.

Several wars had

been fought, including one precipitated by the creation of
the state of Israel itself.

In fact, after the war in

1967, the "status quo" had become one of repeated clashes
punctuating a state of neither peace nor war.

The issues

separating the two sides were not simply geopolitical or
economic, but highly emotionally charged.

The devastating

losses incurred by the Arabs in June 1967 had a tremendous
psychological impact on the Arab people who began to
incorporate the desire to remove the stigma of cowardice
and failure associated with these losses into their own
collective sense of identity.

The Israeli collective

identity revolved around a staunch instinct for survival,
which after 1967 became linked to the notion that loss of
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the occupied territories would place Israel in grave
danger.
Initial American involvement in the Middle East was
somewhat distanced from the Arab-Israeli dispute and was
based largely on the principles of non-intervention,
protection of private interests, and freedom of trade.
During the inter-war period, religious and cultural
interests began to carry less influence in the face of a
growing competition between the United States and Britain
for Middle East oil.

Soon protection of private

interests, including economic concerns, gave way to the
belief that Middle East oil was vital to American national
interests.
Meanwhile, the worldwide Zionist Movement was gaining
momentum.

Increasing pressure was directed toward the

United States and Britain to support the creation of a
Jewish homeland in Palestine.

Under Wilson, the United

States was perceived as having made a moral commitment to
the Jewish homeland in the form of support for the Balfour
declaration.

As U.S. policy moved toward more specific

commitments to the Jewish state, conflicting interests
fostered the development of a Middle Eastern policy that,
lacking clear direction and focus, suffered from a
distinct identity crisis.

Under Wilson, this crisis

manifested itself in the desire to support the creation of
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Israel but the inability to clearly reconcile this desire
with moral commitments to support the self-determination
of the Arab people.
World War II served as a turning point for U.S.
Middle Eastern policy.

Great Britain, exhausted by the

war, began to decrease its involvement in the region.

As

the extent of the atrocities committed by Hitler against
Jews became more apparent, the Zionists gained the
sympathy of the world community.

American Zionists

coalesced into a stronger, more focused organization and
began an intensive campaign designed to compel the United
States to support the creation of Israel.

In spite of

growing pressure. President Roosevelt emerged from World
War II determined to shape a more internationalist policy
for the United States.

His chief concern was to protect

American interests while preserving Allied unity.
Under President Truman, concern over Soviet expansion
led to the increased application of the policy of
containment in the Middle East as well as in other areas
of the world.

Pressure from American Zionists led

Truman's advisers to urge the President to support the
creation of Israel in order to avoid the potentially
devastating political implications of alienating American
Jews.

During this period, a growing disagreement between

the White House and the State Department became more
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apparent.

While the former seemed to lean more toward

satisfying Jewish interests, the latter worried about the
implications for American interests if the country were to
lose access to Arab oil.

Truman eventually decided to

support the creation of Israel and, by recognizing the
newly formed state, committed the United States to the
notion of Israel's legitimacy.
This commitment placed successive presidents in the
position of having to deal with any immediate crises that
developed in the region while at the same time trying to
reconcile two diametrically opposed interests, the well
being of Israel and American access to oil.

The pendulum

that had been swinging back and forth between conflicting
impulses continued to swing erratically, without the
predictability or cadence that might enable American
Middle East policy to stabilize and grow.
President Eisenhower remained committed to the
protection of national interests in the region,
particularly oil interests.

Above all, he was deeply

concerned over the threat of Soviet expansion into what he
perceived as a vital area of the world.

When the Suez

Crisis erupted and during the diplomacy that followed,
Eisenhower attempted to maintain an impartial approach to
the Arab-Israeli dispute.
angered both sides.

In fact, his impartiality often

During his presidency, a chasm
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developed which separated the Arab states into two major
camps, one with a radical orientation, the other more
conservative.
John F. Kennedy sought to change the basic flavor of
U.S. Middle Eastern policy.

In particular, he hoped to

decrease the tendency for the United States to be
identified with efforts to maintain the status quo in the
region.

Instead, he believed that by accommodating the

forces of change, very often associated with the

so-

called radical regimes, he would be able to foster the
stability necessary to help the region grow.

To this end,

he hoped to improve diplomatic relations with Egypt which,
in the wake of the Suez crisis, had been drawing visibly
closer to the Soviet Union.

In spite of President

Kennedy's efforts, relations with Egypt and other radical
Arab states did not improve.

Moreover, relations with

conservative countries such as Saudi Arabia became
strained by Kennedy's attempts to distance American
foreign policy from the traditional powers.
To a large extent, Lyndon B. Johnson continued the
policies of his predecessor.

Under Johnson, however, a

more protective attitude toward Israel emerged, along with
the concept of using the country as a strategic ally in
the region.

Accordingly, American policy moved away from

shipping purely defensive weapons toward one of supplying
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Israel with more offensive systems.

Meanwhile, Johnson

pursued a policy which outwardly appeared to encourage
military restraint, while covertly supporting the Israeli
decision to launch a preemptive strike against the Arab
states in what would become known as the Six Day War of
June 1967.

American prestige among the Arab countries

declined considerably during Johnson's presidency while
Soviet influence reached new heights, especially cunong the
Egyptians and Syrians who began collecting Soviet military
equipment in preparation for the opportunity remove the
taint of their soiled military reputations.
Thus, the legacy left for Nixon and Carter by their
predecessors was a Middle East policy that was
increasingly complex, yet poorly defined;

that was

expected to cope with long standing disputes, yet was
continually plagued by immediate crisis; and that was
subject to pressures from domestic sources, yet
increasingly crucial in terms of international,
geopolitical considerations.
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CHAPTER 3

THE HIZOH ADNIHISTRATIOH
As I anticipated becoming President,
I found that I was awed by the prospect
but not fearful of it. I felt prepared.
I had the advantage of experience and of
the detachment that comes from being out
of office. The 'wilderness years' had
been years of education and growth...I
had no illusions about either the difficulty
of the challenge or about my ability to meet
it. I felt I knew what would not work. On
the other hand, I was less sure what would
work. 1 did not have all the answers. But
I did have definite ideas about the changes
I felt were needed (Nixon 1978, 361).
Richard Nixon's journey to the White House was long
and arduous, yet it was also replete with opportunities to
gain valuable foreign policy experience.

As a young

congressman in 1947, he travelled to Europe with the
Herter Committee to prepare a report in connection with
Secretary of State George C. Marshall's foreign aid plan.
The committee found a continent "tottering on the brink of
starvation and chaos."

Without American aid, the

committee believed that "Europe would very likely fall
into a state of anarchy and revolution, ultimately moving
closer to communism" (Nixon 1978, 49).
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In his memoirs, Nixon credits his work on the Herter
Committee with having taught him valuable lessons about
why communism became such a powerful force in postwar
Europe.

First, the communist leaders were strong,

vigorous and intelligent, whereas most of democratic
Europe was lacking in strong leadership.

Second, they

understood the power of nationalism and knew how to
channel it to their advantage.

Third, the European

communist parties were well financed by the Soviets (Nixon
1978, 52).
As was the case with many of his contemporaries,
anti-communism became the motif of Nixon's early political
career.

In 1950, he was elected to the Senate, after a

heated contest with Helen Gahagan Douglass.

The key

issues of the campaign dealt with foreign policy and
internal security.

Each candidate asserted that the

other's voting record in the House demonstrated more
support for Communist policies (Nixon 1978,

76-7).

In the spring of 1953, then Vice President Nixon and
his wife, Pat, embarked on a major diplomatic trip through
Asia and the Far East, including New Zealand, Australia,
Indonesia, Malaya, Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam, Formosa,
Korea, Japan, the Philippines, Burma, and Pakistan.

This

trip was followed by several others, as President
Eisenhower relied heavily on his Vice President to help
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establish and maintain an active foreign policy.

This

extensive foreign travel allowed Nixon to become familiar
with vital regions throughout the world, while
establishing contacts with major world leaders.

More

importantly, the Vice President formulated very specific
opinions regarding the role the United States should play
in world affairs.
Context
...I was determined to avoid the trap
Johnson had fallen into, of devoting
virtually all my foreign policy time
and energy to Vietnam, which was really
a short-term problem. I felt that failing
to deal with the longer-term problems
could be devastating to America's security
and survival, and in this regard, I talked
about restoring the vitality of the NATO
alliance, and about the Middle East, the
Soviet Union and Japan. Finally, I metioned
my concern about the need to re-evaluate our
policy toward Communist China...
(Nixon 1978, 340-1).
Nixon's perception of American foreign policy during
the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations was that it had
been "held hostage," first to the Cold War and then to the
conflict in Vietnam.

American policy-makers had succumbed

to the trap of allowing themselves to become preoccupied
with only one or two problems at a time.

This, according

to Nixon, had led to a deterioration of policy on all
levels.

To remedy the situation, he sought to use a
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different approach.

Instead of identifying any single

foreign policy priority, he sought to fashion his policy
around several priorities, "moving in tandem, each
affecting the others" (Nixon 1978,

343).

Since he would have to start somewhere, however, he
placed Europe at the top of his list.

By bolstering NATO,

he hoped to establish a position of strength from which
meaningful dialogue could then be opened with the Soviets.
In the Far East, relations with Japan, a nation well on
its way to becoming an economic force to reckon with, had
become strained.

Nixon attributed this primarily to

doubts about the credibility of America's defense
commitments.

American control of the island of Okinawa

exacerbated the growing problem.

As for China, Nixon was

disturbed by the "gulf of twenty years of noncommunication
that had separated the world's most populous nation from
the world's most powerful nation" (Nixon 1978, 343).
Thus, he intended to re-evaluate America's policy toward
China, with the goal of establishing meaningful diplomatic
relations.
The situation in the Middle East had become
particularly volatile by the end of the Johnson
Administration.

As Nixon waited to take office, he noted

that the "already explosive area" had been transformed
into "an international powder keg, that, when it exploded.
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might lead not only to another war between Israel and its
neighbors, but also to a direct confrontation between the
United States and the Soviet Union" (Nixon 1978, 343).
Israel's preemptive strikes during the Six Day War of June
1967 had led to an uneasy truce with her Arab neighbors, a
peace which was continually interrupted by intermittent
fighting carried out under Nasser's "War of Attrition^."
In order to assure the continued survival of Israel, the
United States seemed committed to providing the country
with a continued supply of arms.

Meanwhile, Egypt and

Syria, Israel's main antagonists, had begun receiving
Soviet arms.

This superpower rivalry in the bitter Arab-

Israeli dispute was cause for grave concern.
To better deal with potential crises in the Middle
East, as well as in other regions throughout the world,
Nixon announced his plan to overhaul the country's foreign
policy machinery, primarily by reviving the power of the
National Security Council (NSC).

In his view, the council

had been forced to remain dormant for too long.

Nixon

intended to make it the central decision-making instrument
of his administration, using a modified version of the
staff system used by Eisenhower.

Through regularly

conducted meetings, the council would discuss major
foreign policy issues, anticipating potential crises and
developing a full range of options for each contingency.
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Henry A. Kissinger, as Nixon's National Security Adviser,
would be charged with preparing the agenda for these
meetings.

Kissinger and his staff would also be expected

to maintain effective lines of communication between major
governmental officials and the White House, providing the
President with a carefully structured forum in which to
deliberate foreign policy issues with access to top
advisers^.

Many analysts regard the foreign policy-making

apparatus that Kissinger designed to fulfill these
functions as "by far the most centralized and highly
structured model yet employed by any president" (George
1980, 114).
Nixon came to office determined to exert his control
over the vast foreign policy bureaucracy.

The NSC gave

Nixon an effective means of educating the bureaucracy
concerning the new themes of his foreign policy, and of
keeping himself abreast of developments throughout the
world.

Shortly after assuming office. President Nixon

requested an unprecedented number of policy studies.
These came primarily in the form of National Security
Study Memoranda (NSSM), that were first discussed by the
Interdepartmental Group (later called the Senior Review
Group), then referred to the entire NSC for deliberation.
Once a decision was made, a National Security Decision
Memorandum (NSDM) would be issued (Quandt 1977, 73).
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Kissinger designed a novel system containing six
committees that operated out of the NSC.

These included

the Senior Review Group (responsible for general policy
issues), the Vietnam Special Studies Group, The Washington
Special Actions Group (responsible for dealing with
international crises), the Defense Programs Review
Committee, the Verification Committee (responsible for
strategic arms talks), and the 40 Committee (responsible
for covert action). Each of these committees was chaired
by Kissinger.

The Senior Review Group was further

compartmentalized into six lower-level departmental groups
organized on a regional basis and headed by an assistant
secretary of state.

Thus, Kissinger's span of control

reached not only into the realm of his own staff, but into
key departments and agencies, including the State
Department itself^ (George 1980, 114).
Those within Kissinger's staff who dealt with Middle
Eastern policy included his deputy, Alexander Haig, two
special assistants, Peter Rodman and Winston Lord, and his
senior Middle East specialist, Harold H. Saunders.

Joseph

Sisco served as the Assistant Secretary of State for the
Near East and South Asia.

A Democrat, Sisco had developed

his knowledge of Middle East affairs while serving in
Washington.

In fact, he had never been assigned overseas.

Alfred "Roy" Atherton worked closely with Sisco, first as
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office director for Israel and Arab-Israeli affairs, and
later as deputy assistant secretary for the Near East.
Nixon appointed a close personal friend, William P.
Rogers, to be his Secretary of State.

A lawyer, Rogers

had been Eisenhower's attorney general, and was not
particularly experienced in foreign affairs (Quandt 1977,
73-74).
In spite of his desire to conduct foreign affairs
from the standpoint of a more global orientation, with a
catalogue of priorities that would necessarily be adjusted
according to the prevailing circumstances, Nixon himself
was forced to admit that the "most pressing problem [he]
would face as soon as [he] became President was the war in
Vietnam" (Nixon 1978, 347).

The seemingly hopeless

entanglement in southeast Asia had seriously damaged
American confidence, destroyed consensus over the
direction that foreign policy should pursue, and
threatened to erode American resolve concerning the
importance of playing an active leadership role in world
affairs.

Each of these outcomes, especially the last,

could potentially cripple Nixon's foreign policy before he
was able to make the fresh start that he envisioned.
Moreover, Vietnam had been a major issue during the
election campaign.

Disentanglement was, in many respects,

a vital pre-condition to generating and maintaining the
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degree of support he would need to carry out his foreign
policy agenda.
To this end, secret negotiations were initiated in
Paris between Kissinger and representatives from North
Vietncun.

Simultaneously, a reduction in American forces

in Vietnam was begun, with the eventual goal of a complete
military withdrawal.

Nixon justified this new policy of

restraint and withdrawal on July 25, 1969 in a speech
given on the island of Guam during a tour of Asia.

In

what has become known as the Nixon Doctrine, the President
stated:
I believe the time has come when the United
States, in our relations with all of our
Asian friends, [should] be quite emphatic
on two points: one, that we will keep our
treaty commitments, for example, with
Thailand under SEATO; but two, that as far
as the problems of internal security are
concerned, as far as the problem of
military defense, except for the threat of
a major power, involving nuclear weapons,
that the United States is going to encourage
and has the right to expect that this problem
will be increasingly handled by, and the
responsibility for it taken by, the Asian
nations themselves*.

The Nixon Doctrine was specifically directed toward
Vietnam, but it was applicable to other regions, including
the Persian Gulf, which since the middle of the nineteenth
century, had been traditionally defended by Great Britain.
Like the Suez Canal, the Gulf was considered important as
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a means of gaining access from Britain to India.

The

region consisted of three larger countries, Iran, Iraq and
Saudi Arabia, and several smaller countries including
Kuwait, Bahrein, Qatar and the Sultanate of Oman, who were
too weak to protect themselves from a "determined
aggressive power" (Lenczowski 1990, 118).
In 1968, Great Britain formally announced its
intention to withdraw from the Gulf, granting independence
to the smaller states in the region.

This generated

concern over potential tribal disputes and, more
importantly, over the "power vacuum" that was likely to
develop, making the smaller states more susceptible to
potential Soviet infiltration^.

Russia might be tempted

to expand its influence in the Gulf by conquering several
of the weaker states, or by simply forming alliances in
the hopes of establishing bases within close prioximity to
pro-Western and oil-producing countries such as Iran and
Saudi Arabia.

While Britain prepared to relinquish its

imperial status in the region and to withdraw its military
forces by the end of 1971, the question arose as to who
would be both willing and able to replace Britain as the
"guardian of the Gulf" (Lenczowski 1990, 118).
American policy-makers faced a dilemma.

Although not

completely dependent upon Persian Gulf oil, American
interests would best be served by preventing the region
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from falling under Soviet control, if only to ensure that
allies in Western Europe and Japan, who did depend heavily
upon Persian Gulf oil, would not lose access to the
region's reserves.

However, caught in the process of

trying to extricate American manpower and resources from
Vietnam, officials were leary of involving the United
States militarily in another region.

Under the guidelines

of the Nixon Doctrine, a more palatable solution was to
find a country within the Persian Gulf which would assume
responsibility for the area's defense.
Iran, with adequate manpower and a vested interest in
preventing Soviet domination in the region, fit the bill.
However, officials in the State Department feared that the
Soviets would become alarmed, and perhaps even provoked to
action, if a neighboring country such as Iran were to
begin a considerable military build-up.

For his part, the

Shah, Mohammed Reza Pahlevi, had come to regard "the Gulf
as a natural sphere of influence®."

During a March 19,

1969, interview with the New York Times, he announced his
opposition to United States retention of the naval
facilities on Bahrein Island after the British
withdrawal^.

Moreover, he insisted that the Persian Gulf

states be permitted to handle their own problems without
any attempts by the great powers to fill the vacuum
created by the British withdrawal®.

Determined to assume
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the role of protector within the Gulf, the Shah pressed
Washington to provide the arms needed to bolster his
military capability, announcing that if he could not get
the desired military equipment from the United States, he
would turn to the Soviet Union.
Defense Department officials were reluctant to
provide Iran with technologically advanced weapons because
they could potentially be captured and exploited.

After

initial hesitation, however, the decision was made to
support Iran in its move to take on the guardian role in
the Persian Gulf (Lenczowski 1990, 118).

Iran's military

capability was steadily built up "under a billion-dollar
defense program quietly underwritten by the United States
and Britain®."

In July 1971, negotiations were underway

between Tehran and Washington for $140-million more in
1971 credits.

This was in addition to $220-million worth

of aircraft purchases during the preceding two years.
By 1975, when the build-up was expected to be
completed, Iran would be a major Middle East power, and,
American officials hoped, a source of stability in the
region.

The modernization and expansion of the country's

air, land and sea forces would include 135 F-4 Phantoms to
complement existing F-3 and F-86 squadrons^®, 1,500
American and British made tanks, over 200 helicopters,
four 1,200-ton frigates, eight 10-ton armored hovercraft.
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four 50-ton armored hovercraft, and several new air and
naval bases^^.
The Shah reportedly believed that the key to ensuring
stability in the region depended on developing a highly
mobile modern force.

In spite of American and British

assistance, this military “build-up proved to be a major
drain on Iran's foreign currency reserves.

Between 1965

and 1970, Iranian arms purchases on credit totaled $1.6billion, with $l-billion more expected in 1971 and 1972^^.
Concern over Soviet intentions in the Middle East
heightened as the British prepared to pull out of the
area^®.

Soviet intentions toward the Middle East during

this time frame, particularly just prior to the October
War of 1973, have been subjected to close scrutiny.

While

western scholars are largely in agreement that the Soviets
did not want another war to break out in the Middle East,
the literature is divided over whether Soviet leaders
genuinely tried to foster peace in the region (Breslauer
1983, 65). In fact, a broad range of interpretations has
emerged, running the gamut from one position which
contends that the Soviets preferred to perpetuate the
status quo of "no war, no peace," to the contrasting view
that Soviet diplomats sincerely hoped to establish a
superpower collaborative effort directed toward ending the
Arab-Israeli conflict^* (Breslauer 1983, 65).
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What is particularly interesting about these
interpretations is the fact that they are so markedly
different.

Moreover, as Breslauer points out, they do not

address one another;

one author rejects the argument of

another without even examining the premises upon which the
argument is based.

Breslauer's interpretation not only

considers other views, but actually incorporates them.

In

essence, he proposes a synthesis of the "no war, no peace"
hypothesis and the view that the Soviets were committed to
a peace settlement.

He suggests that the Soviet Union was

a collaborative competitor, "seeking to play the
competitive game in the Middle East while simultaneously
attempting to collaborate with the United States in ways
that would nudge the local actors toward an armed peace"
(Breslauer 1983, 69).

Thus, the Soviets were interested

in promoting a peace settlement, but not at the expense of
their own influence in the region.

Breslauer develops an

insightful case study in which he demonstrates that the
Soviets were willing to pursue a Middle East peace
settlement "based on superpower collaboration, that would
simultaneously reduce the probability of military
confrontation with the United States...advance the cause
of detente, and create a more stable base of influence for
the USSR in Middle Eastern affairs."

Soviet actions

between 1967 and 1972 indicate their belief that such
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terms would work to the advantage of their interests,
regionally and globally (Breslauer 1983, 96).
Breslauer's argument is not only compelling, it
raises the possibility that Soviet actions with regard to
the Middle East have been misinterpreted by the scholars
who have since studied this critical time period, and more
importantly, by key players within the Nixon
Administration, particularly the president and Kissinger.
An examination of Nixon and Kissinger's perception of
Soviet intentions toward the region provides a great deal
of insight into the foreign policy choices they made^®.
A recurring theme, interwoven within the pages of
Nixon's memoirs, reveals his unwavering belief that an
Arab-Israeli war would inevitably lead to confrontation
with the Soviet Union^®.

Yet, as Lenczowski suggests,

"nowhere in his writings or public statements did Nixon
subject [this likelihood] to careful scrutiny or
analysis."

Furthermore, Nixon tended to oversimplify, or

perhaps even to distort, the actual origins of the ArabIsraeli conflict by accepting the premise that the Soviets
were directly causing Middle East tensions.

Yet, as

Chapter 2 demonstrated, the roots of the Arab-Israeli
dilemma had a much deeper history, reaching back at least
to the establishment of Israel, after years of uneasy
relations between Arabs and Jews, the subsequent
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displacement of thousands of Palestinian Arabs, and the
series of bitter wars that had been fought since.
The Soviets were indeed making inroads into the
region, thereby potentially complicating the task of
finding a Middle East peace settlement, but they were not
the root cause of the conflict.

In fact, Lenczowski

further suggests that Mixon's view simply "reflected his
uncritical acceptance of Israel's political line."
Israel's leaders found that by emphasizing the theme of
Soviet mischief as the underlying cause of the seemingly
endless conflict, they could count more readily on Mixon's
support (Lenczowski 1990, 120-21).

In time, Mixon became

convinced that the United States had "an absolute
commitment...to prevent Israel from being driven into the
sea" (Mixon 1978, 481; 483).
Mixon's acceptance of Israel's "political line"
highlights a very interesting aspect of US-Soviet
competition in the Middle East.

The regional actors were

well aware of it, and perfectly willing to use it to their
advantage.

This was the case when the Shah of Iran

indicated he would turn to the Soviets if the United
States proved unwilling to meet his weapons requirements,
and when Masser "struck a sensitive chord in Soviet
leaders by threatening to resign in favor of a pro-United
States government" in January 1970^^ (Breslauer 1983, 81).
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While decision-makers were struggling with the issue
of who would fill the void left by the withdrawal of
British forces from the Persian Gulf, the dynamics of the
Arab-Israeli dispute were undergoing critical changes that
ultimately led to another conflict.

The devastating

losses incurred by Arabs in June 1967 had had a tremendous
psychological impact on the Arab people (Aker 1985, 20).
When Anwar Sadat became the Egyptian president in 1970,
the mood of his people "reflected a desire to remove the
stigma of cowardice and military ineptness left over from
the Six Day War" (Shazly, 1980: 222).

Clashes along the

Suez Canal were becoming commonplace.

Arab deployments

were regularly mounted to fulfill three purposes.

First,

as harassment in order to prevent or delay the
construction of military installations on land taken by
the Israelis in 1967;

second, to repeatedly frighten

Israel into full scale alerts— taking people away from
their regular jobs, forcing extra defense expenditures and
causing Israeli leaders to lose credibility;

finally,

these measures were employed to generate a false sense of
confidence in Israels' defenses, while the Arabs quietly
prepared to attack.

(Aker 1985, 9)

Equipment that had been lost in 1967 was replaced
with more modern Soviet armament, and integrated air
defense systems were installed in both Egypt and Syria to
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prevent ground troops from ever again having to be at the
mercy of Israeli aircraft, as they had been in 1967.
Regularly scheduled maneuvers were conducted, well within
view of Israeli observers, and designed to appear as
completely defensive tactics.

Meanwhile, offensive

maneuvers were practiced at designated hidden locations
with simulated Israeli targets, "including a mock-up of
the Suez Canal itself"

(Aker 1985, 10).

Egyptian

aircraft were placed in Soviet-designed hangarettes to
prevent heavy losses from air strikes.

These miniature

hangars were fortified to lessen the effects of bomb
blasts, and ceunmouflaged to look like hills, complicating
visual acquisition from the air as well as intelligence
gathering activities (Katz 1973, 10).

Advanced Soviet

bridging vehicles were assembled to facilitate the
impending assault accross the Suez.

Specific plans had

not yet been made, however, Arab preparations continued in
the fervid belief that it was just a matter of time before
their offensive began.

These preparations reflected an

intense desire to profit from the costly lessons of the
Six Day War.

As time passed, the Arab people became

increasingly impatient, to wipe the taint off their soiled
collective military reputation, and to test the
effectiveness of the improved armament they had been
receiving from the Soviets.
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As in the Arab case, psychological factors were a
strong motivating force for the Israelis.

Virtually

surrounded by belligerent nations, Israel had been
fighting the Arabs, in formal conflicts and in border
skirmishes, for more than two decades.

Whereas the Arab

identity had become heavily tied to regaining the
territory and self-esteem lost in 1967, the Israeli
identity revolved around the instinct for survival.

Loss

of any given conflict carried high stakes, perhaps the
very destruction of the Jewish state.

The desire for

collective security thus became the steel band which held
the nation together, and had a marked influence on the
official posture of Israel.

Because of what they

perceived as Arab "obstinacy," the Israelis believed they
must establish and maintain completely defensible borders,
a goal which was better served by retaining the
territories under dispute.
Relations with Jordan were considered to be
relatively secure.

This made the extensive deployment of

Israeli forces and the construction of defensive
installations along the Jordanian border a low priority.
In fact, it was deemed unnecessary.
the Syrian border was another matter.

The situation along
The loss of the

Golan Heights had deprived Syria of one of its best
locations for shelling northern Israeli settlements.
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Several measures were taken to prevent this strategic area
from being retaken.

Small villages which had once been

inhabited by Arabs were left deserted.

Fortified Jewish

settlements were established to serve as a deterrent to
guerillas.

Finally, a collection of antitank obstacles

was built, consisting of mine fields, a line of reinforced
concrete bunkers, and fixed tank emplacements with
overlapping fields of fire.

There were only four roads

from this area into Israel (Aker 1985, 6).
In the Sinai, terrain characteristics were used to
augment man-made deterrents.

Massive sand ramparts, which

were high enough to stop armored vehicles, were built
along the eastern bank of the Suez Canal.

A series of

fortifications was then built a short distance from these
ramparts to enable the Israelis to maintain a constant
surveillance of the Egyptian side with minimal exposure to
the artillery barrages which had become quite frequent.
This line of fortifications was rebuilt three times,
becoming stronger and larger with each reconstruction.

It

became known as the Bar-Lev Line, after its creator.
General Bar-Lev^® (Aker 1985, 7).
The cost of building and maintaining the defenses
adjacent to the canal was over $90 million.

An additional

$150 million was spent constructing roads to protect and
supply these installations.

There were two major roads
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which paralleled the canal, running north and south.

The

rest of the road complex was sparse, but vital, since
"whoever controlled the roads would dominate the entire
peninsula" (Aker 1985, 8).

In spite of the extensive

measures and enormous expenditures devoted to defense,
Israel still sustained significant casualties along the
Egyptian border, especially after 1969.

In that year,

construction of an electronic distant-early warning system
was begun in the Sinai's central mountain mountain ridges.
The intent was to use this sophisticated equipment (heat
sensors, infrared photo scopes, seismic detectors and
magnetic sensors) to scan the desert for hostile
activityl9

.

The state of Israel was a virtual fortress.

Safe and

secure inside strong defensive "walls," the country
developed a strategic concept of attack.

Any Arab state

that became too arrogant faced the threat of an air attack
from Israel's powerful air force.

On the ground, punitive

campaigns were launched into adjacent territories to
subdue Arab governments that threatened to get out of
hand.

The Israelis knew that Egypt and Syria had been

successful in securing Soviet arms, but when Russian and
Czech advisers were ejected from Egypt in July 1972,
Israeli analysts determined that Egypt would be unable to
handle newly acquired sophisticated equipment without
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Soviet assistance^®.

This led to estimates that attack

from Egypt would be highly improbable before late 1975.
Intelligence reports further indicated that increased
military activity that had been observed was of a
defensive rather than an offensive nature.

The Israelis

developed a self-image of invulnerability which was
closely linked to the belief that the territory gained in
1967 provided secure borders.
Michael Brecher's account of the 1967 and 1973 wars
provides further insight into why Israel let its guard
down, leaving itself vulnerable to surprise attack.

He

attributes this largely to a "shared psychological setting
among Israel's decision-makers and advisers during the
1973 pre-crisis period."
this setting.

Two factors combined to make up

The first was a pervasive general

definition of the situation, which Brecher calls the
"Conception."
Conception:

Two "pillars" formed the foundation of the
(1)

Egypt would not launch an attack against

Israel unless it had superior air power, that is,
sufficient to attack Israel in depth and dislocate its Air
Force and principal air fields;

(2) Syria would not

initiate a war against Israel unless Egypt were actively
involved.

Therefore, the Arabs would not attack Israel.

Misperceptions underlying these assumptions, about Arab
capabilities, the regional balance of power and the
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security provided by the occupied territories, increased
the Israeli propensity to discount the possibility of
attack (Brecher 1980, 55).
In time, the belief that Egypt would not launch an
attack until it had the capability to project its air
power well into Israel beceune transformed into an Israeli
dogma, a "truth" which was reinforced considerably when
Sadat's "Year of Decision" (1971) came and went without
Egyptian action.

Sadat's failure to follow through with

his announcement that Egypt would resort to war if
diplomatic channels continued to yield little progress
convinced Israel's military and political officials that
future verbal threats need not be taken seriously.
Moreover, the Israeli intelligence community failed to
distinguish between all-out war and war conducted for
limited political objectives.

This eventually diminished

their capability to discriminate genuine signals, clues
that indicated an adversary's intentions, from background
noise.

In fact. Chief of Staff David Elazar wrote in May

1975 that the Israeli Defense Force's (IDF) Intelligence
Branch had received over 400 significant items pointing to
the possibility of war.

Most of these were not brought to

his attention, however, until after hostilities had
begun^l.
Like Israel, Washington was caught off guard by the
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outbreak of hostilities on October 6, 1973.
have some advance notice, however.

Officials did

At approximately 6:00

A.M. Washington time, a flash cable arrived from the
American Embassy in Tel Aviv indicating that Israel had
conclusive evidence that the Egyptians and Syrians planned
to attack by Noon (Washington time).

The message included

Prime Minister Meir's assurance that Israel would restrain
from launching a preemptive strike, along with a request
that American diplomacy be directed toward avoiding war.
Last minute attempts to avoid hostilities proved
fruitless.

The first indications of fighting were

received at approximately 8:00 A.M., four hours before
Israel's estimate (Quandt 1977, 166).
Interestingly, American officials were also privy to
several earlier indications that the Arabs were moving
closer to war, including information regarding Egyptian
military training maneuvers, and a warning from Soviet
General Secretary Breshnev in June that the Arabs were
determined to fight.

In spite of these indications,

intelligence estimates continued to report that "there
were no clear signs of impending hostilities" (Quandt
1977, 168).

Kissinger did, however, become sufficiently

concerned to request the development of a new contingency
plan for coping with the Arab-Israeli conflict.

However,

The plan was not completed when war broke out (Quandt
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1977, 167).
The October War of 1973 marked a critical turning
point in the Nixon Administration's approach to the Middle
East.

In fact, several aspects of American policy prior

to 1973 may have actually fueled Arab frustrations and
indirectly reinforced the Arab decision to resort to war.
Thus, it is important to understand Nixon and Kissinger's
foreign policy goals, in general, and with respect to the
Middle East.
Foreign Policy Objectives
As they worked for disengagement in Vietnam, Nixon
and Kissinger focused their foreign policy toward
relations with the other major powers, particularly the
Soviet Union.

The possibility of nuclear war uppermost in

their minds, both men were drawn toward developing a
policy they felt would help to ensure global stability and
minimize the potential for superpower confrontation by
establishing a new relationship with the Soviet Union
(Quandt 1977, 76-77).

During the Nixon Administration,

the relatively tight bipolar structure which had
characterized the 1950s and 1960s began to give way to a
looser multipolar arrangement.

It was within this context

that Nixon and Kissinger fashioned far-reaching objectives
for American foreign policy.
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Although their program is often referred to as
"detente," their goal went far beyond the traditional
meaning, "a relaxation of tensions," to encompass an even
more ambitious objective.

Nixon and Kissinger "wanted to

build the foundation— or at least an important part of the
foundation— for a new international system" (Craig and
George 1990, 135).

They believed that the only countries

who could realistically be expected to participate were
the United States, the Soviet Union and the People's
Republic of China (PRC).

Japan was a major industrial

state, but its emergence as a potential military power was
neither desireable nor feasible.

Western Europe already

possessed considerable military capabilities, but relied
heavily on the United States for military support.
Furthermore, Western European political integration
remained an obstacle that would have to be overcome before
the region could take the part of a unitary actor in an
international system.

In light of these assessments,

Nixon and Kissinger sought an alternative to the classic
five-power balance-of-power system.
The foundation upon which this alternative was to be
built involved engaging the Soviet Union and the PRC, two
"archrivals," in a process of detente and accommodation in
order to moderate the threat to the United States' world
position posed by either states' policies.

More than just
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establishing a triangular relationship, Nixon and
Kissinger hoped to secure a unique middle position which
would allow the United States to play the two communist
countries against one another, gaining the leverage needed
to protect American interests and to actually induce the
Soviet Union and the PRC to cooperate with American
policies.

If one appeared reluctant to go along, the

United States would simply appear to "tilt" its position
in favor of the other (Craig and George 1990, 135).
In fact, the major impetus behind Nixon's efforts to
improve relations with China was the desire to gain the
leverage needed to enable the United States to cultivate a
more productive relationship with the Soviet Union, which
was considered to pose the greater potential threat.

The

strategy used by Nixon and Kissinger to draw the Soviet
Union into a more amicable relationship consisted of four
major components.

First, President Nixon formally

recognized, in several symbolic ways, that the Soviet
Union was entitled to the same superpower status as the
United States.

The Russians had been trying to gain this

sort of prestige since the end of World War II.

By

elevating the Soviet Union to a level of political
equality, Nixon and Kissinger hoped to foster a
relationship that would be more conducive to productive
relations between the two countries.
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Second, the plan included a conditional willingness
to accede to the Soviet Union's desire for foinnal
recognition of divided Europe.

Third, Nixon's detente

strategy sought to promote further mutual cooperation
between the two superpowers via a series of formal
agreements offering economic and technical assistance to
the Soviet Union.

Nixon and Kissinger were actually

willing to make concessions to the Soviets in the economic
sphere because they believed these agreements would
eventually create a "web of incentives" that would
motivate Soviet leaders to exercise constraint in their
efforts to gain influence in other areas at the expense of
the United States (Craig and George 1990, 138).
Fourth, Nixon and Kissinger hoped detente would yield
the long-term benefit of "a new set of norms and rules for
competition between the two superpowers" (Craig and George
1990, 138).

Crisis prevention was one of the most

important objectives of the detente policy.

In May 1972,

Nixon and Breshnev signed the Basic Principles Agreement
during their first summit meeting in Moscow.

This

document presented basic "rules of conduct" that were
intended to regulate the global competition of the two
superpowers.

The vague language used in the agreement,

however, coupled with differing perceptions of detente's
overarching purpose, actually widened the rift between the
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two countries.

Soviet leaders tended to associate detente

primarily with avoiding conflicts that increased the
danger of war between the two superpowers.

Nixon and

Kissinger's conception went beyond this to include
emphasis on crisis prevention in those instances when
Soviet assertiveness in other areas conflicted with U.S.
interests, even when these crises did not necessarily
carry the threat of potential U.S.-Soviet military
confrontation (George 1983, 2-3).
Based on Nixon and Kissinger's definition, American
leaders and the general public began to expect detente to
show signs of tempering the Soviet Union's aggressive
foreign policy.

The Russians on the other hand, saw no

reason why they could not continue to pursue progressive
policies in the Third World, while continuing to strive
for peaceful coexistence, as they often referred to
detente, with the United States (Craig and George 1990,
139).

In light of detente's inability to meet what they

viewed as a fundamental expectation, many Americans began
to have serious doubts about the entire strategy.

The

gist of American concern centered around the fear that
although Nixon and Kissinger were making concesions to the
Soviets in order to try and draw them into a more
constructive relationship, the Soviets were taking
advantage of economic agreements while continuing to

107

pursue their own agenda in the Third World and in weapons
development.

Nixon and Kissinger's ambitious detente

program fell victim to public impatience, failing to pass
the critical "acid test," of obtaining and maintaining
domestic supportez (Craig and George 1990, 140).
The basic problem was that, as a long term
investment, detente required a great deal of time and
effort.

A by-product of dentente was that it tended to

draw Nixon and Kissinger's attention away from foreign
policy issues that were not directly related to the
program.

Particularly during Nixon's first term in

office, relations with the Soviet Union and China, coupled
with efforts to deal with the Vietnam commitment, were the
priority concerns to his administration.

Each of these

foreign policy areas was managed almost exclusively from
the White House, with Nixon providing basic guidance and
Kissinger working out the specific details of
implementation (Quandt 1977, 77).
Although Nixon's preoccupation with the Soviet Union,
in the form of efforts to get detente on track, coupled
with the lingering situation in Vietnam, left little time
for him to devote to Middle East issues, the region was by
no means i g n o r e d ^ I t became the chief area of interest
for the State Department, headed by Secretary of State
William P. Rogers.

While Nixon and Kissinger thought of
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the region primarily in terms of how it might affect the
superpower relationship, State Department officials
perceived greater potential threats to U.S. interests due
to the erosion of American influence in the area and the
increased activity of the militant Palestinian fedayeen
movement^* (Quandt 1977, 80).
The Middle Eastern policy that grew out of these
circumstances can perhaps best be visualized as a large
tree with a solid base supporting two very strong
branches, each with its own set of smaller branches.

The

solid base represents those aspects of policy on which
there was general agreement between the White House and
the State Department.

The separate branches, however,

represent the areas where their respective approaches were
markedly different, leading to specific decisions that, in
some cases, remained completely distinct from one another;
while others were hopelessly entangled, never quite
meshing.
The common ground shared by the White House and the
State Department was characterized by several features.
The possibility that Israel might acquire nuclear weapons
worried White House and State Department officials alike,
and added to a growing perception that mishandling U.S.Israeli affairs might push Israel toward pursuing nuclear
options.

From early 1969 until August 1970, American
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policy toward the Middle East was shaped by the belief
that the United States should play an active role in
promoting a settlement based on the guidelines put forth
in UN Resolution 242^5.

Working with the other major

powers, particularly the Soviet Union, the United States
worked to establish negotiations between the regional
parties to define the basic principles of a settlement
that could then be worked out during talks between the two
superpowers (Quandt 1977, 80).
Beyond this, however, the White House and the State
Department held widely disparate views regarding the best
approach toward the Middle East.

For years. State

Department officials had insisted that the United States
should remain "even-handed" toward the Arab-Israeli
conflict^®.

This approach urged restraint in supplying

arms to Israel and tended to favor a US statement opposing
the Israeli acquisition of territory in June 1967
(Lenczowski 1990, 123;

Quandt 1977, 81).

Nixon and Kissinger, on the other hand, were
convinced that the military balance of power should be
maintained in Israel's favor.

Only a strong Israel would

deter the Arabs from resorting to war.

Soviet arms

deliveries to Arab countries were therefore closely
monitored and met or exceeded by arms aid to Israel^?.
Israeli officials, who perceived that the even-handed
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approach demanded a great deal from them yet promised
little in return, were well aware of the divergent
perspectives of the White House and the State Department.
Soon, they began to avoid dealing with the latter,
preferring to deal directly with Nixon and Kissinger
whenever possible (Quandt 1977, 81).
The Nixon Administration's first in-depth review of
Middle East policy took place on February 1, 1969^®.

The

National Security Council met and formalized the decision
to pursue a more active diplomatic role leading to
superpower talks.

Furthermore, should attempts to pursue

a settlement prove futile, the United States would fall
back to an option of pursuing objectives which fell short
of an actual settlement.

The basic principles that would

guide U.S. Middle East Policy included:
1. The parties to the dispute must participate
in the negotiations at some point in the
process; the United States would not hesitate
to move somewhat ahead of Israel, but any final
agreement would be reached only with
Israel's participation and consent.
2. The objective of a settlement would be a
binding agreement, not necessarily in the form
of a peace treaty, but involving some form of
contractual commitments.
3. Withdrawal of Israeli forces should take
place back to the international frontier
between Israel and Egypt, with a special
arrangement for Gaza. There should be Israeli
evacuation of the West Bank of Jordan, with
only minor border changes.
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4.

Some critical areas should be demilitarized.

5. Jordan should have a civilian and religious
role within a unified city of Jerusalem.
6. There should be a settlement of the refugee
problem/^.
In general, the diplomatic strategy which would be
used to achieve the basic objectives outlined above would
be a "step-by-step" approach.

Instead of focusing on the

entire set of goals at once, different aspects would be
successively added to the negotiation process.

This

approach would hopefully reduce the potential for
stalemates that might occur if negotiations were directed
toward the comprehensive settlement®®.

The framework

within which this strategy would be pursued would begin
with US-Soviet talks designed to produce a joint document
that, after being approved by the Four Powers, would be
given to Gunnar Jarring to be presented to the concerned
parties in the Middle East (Quandt 1977, 83).
Soon, several different rounds of negotiations were
begun.

Although US-Israeli talks were frequent, in order

to assuage the Israeli government's fears, the U.S.-Soviet
negotiations remained the centerpiece of American efforts.
The objective of this first round of negotiations,
conducted from March 18 to April 22,

was simply to

determine if sufficient common ground existed on general
principles to support pursuing a joint proposal (Quandt
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1977, 84).
These negotiations were carried out against the
backdrop of mounting, tensions in the Middle East.
Fedayeen attacks, and the subsequent Israeli retaliation,
became more severe.

In April, the same month that

President Nasser declared his "War of Attrition," Lebanon
declared a state of emergency after repeated clashes with
the fedayeen left the government in a complete state of
disarray (Quandt 1977, 85).
In early May, Joseph Sisco, Assistant Secretary of
State for the Near East and Asia, presented the basics of
the American proposal to Soviet Ambassador Anatoly
Dobrynin.
June.

The Soviets replied with a counterproposal in

In July, Sisco returned to Moscow with a new

document that incorporated several of the Soviet points in
June.

With their respective positions developed®^, the

United States and the Soviet Union each began to insist
that further progress would depend upon the other
superpower's willingness to make concessions.

In

particular, the Soviets sought a more specific delineation
of the final border between Egypt and Israel.

The United

States countered with the claim that such details depended
upon more specific information regarding the Egyptian
commitment to be peace and should not be dealt with until
the process included direct negotiations®^.
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The United States and the Soviet Union had reached a
major roadblock.

Each remained firm in its position.

Meanwhile, clashes along the Suez Canal had become more
frequent.

Israel began to turn increasingly toward the

United States, requesting fighter aircraft and related
equipment, particularly since France had decided to cut
off deliveries of all military equipment and spare parts
to Israel in January 1969®®.

In early September, King

Idris of Lybia was overthrown by a coup led by radical
young army officers, causing many within the
administration to suspect that Arab frustration over the
lack of progress in the peace talks was leading to
extremism.

The first American F-4 Phantoms reached Israel

during this time.

Although their delivery had been agreed

upon eight months earlier, the timing of their arrival
exacerbated Arab frustrations and came to symbolize
American support for Israel.

The Arabs launched a

concerted effort to prevent further weapons deliveries
(Quandt 1977, 88).
By October 28, 1969, the American position had
evolved into a proposal, referred to as the Rogers Plan.
Its preamble called "for the conclusion of a final and
reciprocally binding accord between Egypt and Israel, to
be negotiated under the auspices of UN Ambassador Jarring
following procedures used at Rhodes in 1949" (Quandt 1977,
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89).

The rest of the plan consisted of several points

calling for Israel and the United Arab Republic to agree
to officially end their state of war, to set a timetable
for Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territory, to
establish secure and recognized borders specified on maps,
to identify demilitarized Zones such as Sharm al-Shaykh
and the Gulf of Tiran, to guarantee freedom of navigation
to all states through these waterways and through the Suez
Canal, and to recognize each other's sovereignty.
Furthermore, the plan stipulated that the final agreement
would be detailed in a document signed by both sides and
ratified by the UN Security Council which would assume a
certain amount of responsibility for insuring that both
sides adhered to the provisions of the agreement.

The

final agreement would then be filed with the UN®*.
Although the Soviets helped to negotiate the terms of
the Rogers Plan, they declined to cosponsor it, preferring
to allow the United States to offer it to the local actors
as a U.S.-sponsored initiative.

The plan failed to

generate support from any of the relevant parties.

Nasser

rejected it on November 6;

Two

Israel on December 21.

days later, the Soviet government also formally rejected
the Rogers Plan.

The Soviet's apparent "diplomatic

backtracking," viewed within the context of their growing
military involvement in the Middle East, led some American
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officials, particularly Kissinger, to look for ways to
deemphasize the superpower collaborative approach and to
look for ways to negotiate with Egypt unilaterally
(Breslauer 1983, 84).

Thus, the Nixon Administration's

first Middle East peace initiative ended abruptly, an
apparent failure.
Throughout the negotiation process, relations between
the White House and State Department became more distant.
Their respective views regarding the Middle East came into
direct conflict over one issue, arms to Israel (Quandt
1977, 104).

Israeli leaders continued to exert tremendous

pressure on Washington to provide them with the caliber of
weapons required to maintain a military advantage in spite
of the Soviet weapons being supplied to Egypt and Syria.
Interestingly, President Nixon decided to postpone delivery
of twenty-five F-4s and eighty Skyhawk fighters to Israel
in March 1970 because he feared that conducting major arms
deals with Israel might jeopardize the peace process.
This decision elicited strong protests from the American
Jewish community and several members of Congress (Nixon
1978, 481).

Nixon's resolve concerning arms deliveries

was tested several months later by a crisis in Jordan
(Lenczowski 1990, 125).
The underlying causes of the Jordan crisis stemmed
from the increasing division of the Arab world into
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radical and conservative camps, and the growth of
increasingly militant factions of Palestinian Arabs
seeking to regain their lost homeland.

These Palestinians

operated mainly out of Jordan, where they defied King
Hussein's rule and established a virtual "state within a
state."

In early September 1970, one of these groups

hijacked four airliners, brought them to Jordan and
eventually blew them up.

This incident sparked a civil

war in Jordan between the Palestinian guerillas and King
Hussein's government forces.

Syria saw the conflict as an

opportunity to depose King Hussein and establish in Jordan
a more radical government.

Soon, approximately one

hundred Syrian tanks entered Jordan, heading directly
toward the center of the country.

At least two hundred

more tanks followed (Lenczowski 1990, 125).
Kissinger's description of the situation reveals a
great deal about the administration's perception of
American interests in the Middle East;

"It looks like the

Soviets are pushing the Syrians and the Syrians are
pushing the Palestinians.

The Palestinians don't need

much pushing" (Nixon 1978, 483).

Nixon felt compelled to

prevent what he perceived as a Soviet inspired rebellion
from overthrowing King Hussein.

On September 18, the

Soviet government sent a message to Washington stating its
intention to refrain from intervention and requesting the
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same of the United States.

However, as new information

revealed Syria's growing military involvement, Nixon faced
the dilemma of determining an appropriate American
response (Lenczowski 1990, 126).
In lieu of direct American involvement, Nixon chose
to turn to a regional actor.

Through Kissinger, Nixon

informed Yitzhak Rabin, the Israeli Ambassador, that the
United States "would be fully in support of Israeli
strikes on Syrian forces in Jordan if this became
necessary to avoid a Jordanian defeat" (Nixon 1978, 485).
Ambassador Rabin responded that Israeli officials believed
air strikes would not suffice, suggesting ground action
instead.

After initial hesitation, Nixon decided to

approve the use of ground troops, provided King Hussein
were consulted in advance (Lenczowski 1990, 126).
Two Israeli brigades advanced into the Golan Heights,
where they would be in a good position to deter Syrian
troops heading toward Jordan.

Meanwhile, President Nixon

placed 20,000 American troops on alert and ordered
additional American naval assets into the Mediterranean.
With the stakes rising dramatically, Soviet leaders
exerted pressure on Syria to avoid becoming entangled in a
risky military operation.

Haffez Assad, then commander of

the Syrian Air Force, refused to provide air support to
the advancing Syrian tanks, leaving them vulnerable to
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attack from Jordanian fighters.

Syrian losses were

sufficient to compel them to withdraw, making the use of
foreign intervention to protect King Hussein's government
unnecessary (Lenczowski 1990, 127).
Although neither American nor Israeli intervention
proved necessary, the Jordanian crisis was a significant
milestone in the Nixon Administration's Middle Eastern
policy for several reasons.

First, the crisis prompted

the beginning of a new strategic relationship between the
U.S. and Israel (Quandt 1977, 119), that would actually
surpass the relationship established during the Johnson
Administration.

This new closeness ended a period of

particularly strained relations caused by Nixon's
continued restraint in responding to Israeli arms requests
and by the U.S. negotiated August 7 cease-fire, which the
Israelis believed should have included qualified terms
based on indications that Egypt was not abiding by the
standstill provisions of the agreement (Quandt 1977, 106).
During the crisis, Nixon authorized $500 million in
military aid to Israel and agreed to accelerate delivery
of eithteen

F-4s (Quandt 1977, 114).

As the relationship between the White House and
Israel grew closer, the State Department was moved
increasingly toward the periphery of American Middle East
policy formulation.

Quandt suggests that Nixon and
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Kissinger were angry with the State Department for not
anticipating the need to identify potential violations of
the cease-fire agreement.

Israeli intelligence produced

evidence of the violations which the United States had no
means to verify.

"Israel's credibility at the White House

was by now greater than State's, and soon Nixon and
Kissinger were beginning to alter the thrust of United
States policy"

{Quandt 1977, 107).

In a manner reminiscent of Eisenhower, the Jordanian
crisis demonstrates the fact that Nixon and Kissinger
allowed the U.S.-Soviet perspective to dominate their
thinking (Quandt 1977, 106).

This reduced their ability

to separate a regional dispute from the confines of their
Cold War framework.

Both men were convinced that the

Soviet Union was behind Syria's attempt to overthrow King
Hussein.

This perception persisted in spite of the

Soviets' insistence that they did not intend to intervene.
Finally, the administration's apparent success in
handling such a dramatic international crisis could not
have come at a better time.

Congressional elections were

less than two months away and Nixon's popularity had been
sagging due to the deteriorating situation in Vietnam and
lack of clear progress in building a constructive
relationship with the Soviet Union (Quandt 1977, 105).
Jordan became the first of several "foreign policy
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spectaculars," including the opening to China, the SALT
agreement and eventually the Vietnam War negotiations,
that boosted the President's prestige and Kissinger's
reputation as a skilled negotiator.

These achievements

placed them on the crest of a wave of popularity that
helped carry them toward reelection in 1972 (Quandt 1977,
120 ).

The period between the Jordanian crisis and the
October War of 1973, although it appeared relatively
stable, was not especially productive in terms of American
foreign policy toward the Middle East.

Based on their

apparent success, Nixon and Kissinger allowed themselves
to become caught "in a perceptual trap" forged out of a
series of misinterpretations;

of Syria's motives in

entering Jordan, of the reasons for their subsequent
withdrawal, of the global dimension of the crisis, and
finally, of the degree to which the crisis was averted due
to United States action (Litwak 1984, 156-158;
1977, 124-125).

Quandt

After the Jordanian crisis, the

perceived "key" to stability in the Middle East,
maintenance of the balance of power, became an even more
vital component to Nixon and Kissinger's strategy.
Jordan, which would be relied upon to help promote
stability in the small oil producing Gulf states once the
British departed in 1971, and Israel joined Iran as
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"regional peacekeepers."

By providing arms to these

countries, the United States hoped to deter aggression by
Soviet supported states, while reducing the potential
necessity for United States direct intervention (Quandt
1977, 123).

Upon reaching this conclusion, Nixon and

Kissinger's willingness to provide any amount of support
to the logic of the "even-handed" approach evaporated
(Quandt 1977, 121).

The relative stability that followed

the Jordanian crisis contributed to the shared sense of
complacency between the United States and Israel.
Lacking any sense of urgency, U.S. support of
diplomatic efforts to promote a peace settlement appeared
to cool considerably.

The U.S. sponsored cease-fire was

due to expire in November, 1970.

Sadat agreed to a three

month extension, expecting the Jarring talks to resume.
On December 28, Prime Minister Meir announced Israel's
return to the talks, but meaningful progress between the
two sides remained elusive.

In February, Sadat agreed to

an additional one month extension.

The prospects for

reaching a settlement continued to look bleak however.

On

February 8, Jarring presented both sides with a document
calling for "parallel and simultaneous commitments."
issue of territory proved insurmountable.

The

Israel balked

at the stipulation that it agree in principle to withdraw
to the former boundary between Egypt and the British
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Mandate for Palestine, refusing to establish such a
withdrawal as a prior condition for negotiations.

Upon

hearing this, Egypt declared that Israel's unwillingness
to accept the principle of full withdrawal was itself an
unacceptable prior condition.

Under these circumstances,

the Jarring talks collapsed in February 1971 (Quandt 1977,
135-136).
Perhaps because he suspected that the latest round of
Jarring talks might lead to yet another diplomatic
impasse, Sadat launched his own peace initiative by
announcing on February 5, 1971 that in return for a
partial Israeli withdrawal, the Egytians would clear and
reopen the Suez Canal, which Egypt had closed to all
traffic, in part to attract world attention to the
situation's (Aker 1985, 15;

O'Ballance 1978, 3-4).

Golda

Meir, not especially interested in a partial agreement
such as this, responded that she was unwilling to pull
Israeli troops back from existing cease-fire lines until
an overall settlement had been reached (Quandt 1977, 136137).

Sadat launched a diplomatic campaign to get the

United States to support the initiative.

One month later.

President Nixon instructed the State Department to begin
working out the details of an interim agreement (Quandt
1977, 138).

To encourage Israel's earnest consideration

of the agreement, the United States used arms as an
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inducement.

On April 19, officials announced that twelve

more F-4s would be sent to Israel (Quandt 1977, 139).
Rogers and Sisco, acting as intermediaries,
encountered difficulties in keeping each side focused on
the areas covered by the canal settlement.

In

negotiations, each wanted to know the other's position on
a wider range of issues.

When these were discussed, as

past experiences had proven, the distance between the two
sides became even more vast, particularly when the subject
of territory was broached.

Rogers and Sisco were unable

to bridge the gap between the evolving Egyptian and
Israeli positions.

In fact, by portraying each side's

position in the most favorable light, hoping to coax more
flexibility out of the other party, Rogers and Sisco lost
credibility, leaving the Egyptians and the Israelis
feeling as though they had been deceived.

White House

support for Rogers dried up (Quandt 1977, 139-141).
The failure of the interim canal-settlement agreement
effectively signalled the end of Rogers and Sisco's
control over the directions of Middle East policy (Quandt
1977, 143).

If there were any new initiatives, Nixon and

Kissinger would provide direction.
possibility.

Yet this was a remote

With the American election looming just over

the horizon, secret negotiations with North Vietnam
underway in Paris, and the dramatic opening to China about

124

to become a reality, the Middle East, where success seemed
to continually elude negotiators, was allowed to fade into
the background.

This "process of deferral had a net

effect of transforming policy into the very kind of
shallow exercise which Kissinger had scorned as an
academic— that is the projection of the future as an
extrapolation of the past" (Litwak 1984, 157).
In April 1972, three months before announcing the
expulsion of Soviet advisers from Egypt, Sadat opened a
secret channel to Washington.

Kissinger suggests that

this was due, at least in part, to Sadat's growing
dissatisfaction with Soviet support.

In spite of the

steady supply of arms, Kissinger's sources revealed that
Egypt was pressuring Moscow for more support.

Kissinger

believed, however, that the "Soviets were holding Sadat at
arm's length, fearful of the risks of all-out support,"
and hoping to avoid "going to the brink" with the United
States over the challenge to Israel's survival (Kissinger
1979, 1293).

Sadat proposed that Kissinger meet

confidentially with his own national security adviser,
Hafiz Ismail, to discuss "mechanisms for shifting the
peace process off dead center."

Kissinger's heavy

involvement in the Paris negotiations during the latter
half of 1972 caused this meeting to be postponed until
February 1973, however (Litwak 1984, 158).
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The sense of urgency that had steadily decreased
regarding the Nixon Administation's Middle Eastern policy
would return in early October 1973.

Beyond fundamental

concerns for Israel's survival, however, the main thrusts
of this urgency centered around the possibility that this
regional conflict might cause a superpower confrontation.
Sadat astutely recognized the relationship that had
developed between the United States and the Soviet Union.
He was well aware that a conflict between the Arabs and
Israelis would have ramifications which extended well
beyond the region.

In fact, one of his primary objectives

in launching the October War was to "spark" an
international crisis.

He reasoned that increased

superpower involvement, which would most assuredly result,
would help him bring about some of the changes he
envisioned.

He hoped that their mutual desire to avoid a

nuclear confrontation would lead the superpowers to force
Israel into "reasonable" concessions (O'Ballance 1978, 15).
Soon after the coordinated offensives began, while
non-Arabs struggled to recover from the initial shock, the
attention of the world community began to focus on the
United States and the Soviet Union.

Basic American policy

focused on two goals, announced at a United Nations
Security Council meeting convened on October 8 at the
United States' request.

First, hostilities should be
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brought to an end as quickly as possible.

Second, the

U.S. called for restoring conditions in the area which
would be conducive to settling longstanding differences
(Rugh 1976, 1-2).
By adopting this basic posture, calling for a
ceasefire but nothing else, American policymakers hoped to
give quiet diplomacy a chance at success.

They did not

want to raise controversial issues in an open public
forum.

This might lead to complications, making it more

difficult for Washington to fulfill its mediating role.
Even the statement of U.S. policy made before the United
Nations was kept as general as possible to avoid
generating public debate.

American representatives chose

not to call for a vote in the Security Council because, as
Kissinger later explained in a press conference, they
"realized that no majority was available and [they] did not
want sides to be chosen prematurely" (Rugh 1976, 4).
The first order of business was to get the fighting
to stop.

This would not be possible, however, until the

overwhelming momentum gained by the Arabs in the initial
stages of the conflict could be slowed.

On the day the

war began, Kissinger convened the Washington Special
Actions Group (WSAG), the Administration's official
crisis-management body.

One of the first issues discussed

was whether or not the United States should supply
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additional arms to Israel.

Surprisingly, the issue

sparked a great deal of debate within the administration,
delaying the much-needed resupply.

Meanwhile, the Arabs

benefited from a nearly continuous supply of Soviet
equipment (Alroy 1975, 73).
Foreign policy analysts are divided over whether or
not arms were withheld from Israel for several days as
part of a larger political strategy.

Alroy suggests that

Kissinger orchestrated the pretense of disagreement among
key administration officials as a delaying tactic^®.

This

pretense was allegedly motivated by the belief that a
long-range political settlement would be facilitated if
the Arabs and Israelis made each other
1975, 77).

suffer^?

(Alroy

Lenczowski, on the other hand, contends that

Kissinger genuinely and actively supported sending arms to
Israel, insisting that if the United States refused aid,
Israel would no longer have any incentive to conform to
American views in postwar diplomacy (Lenczowski 1990,
130) .
Each of these positions has a certain degree of
merit.

There is little doubt that the United States could

not afford to let the Arabs prevail in the conflict.

The

American commitment to Israeli security could not simply
be put aside.

However, a decisive Israeli victory could

perpetuate, and perhaps even intensify, Arab resentment
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(Nixon 1978, 921).

Moreover, it would very likely cause

Israel to become even more entrenched, both politically
and physically, within the relative security offered by
the status quo.

In short, the war presented an

opportunity to make progress through diplomatic channels,
an avenue that up to this point had led nowhere^®.

The

situation could not be allowed to get out of hand,
however.

Thus, when Golda Meir sent appeals to Washington

for American aid, indicating that Israel would use every
means at is disposal to ensure its national survival, a
potential reference to the use of nuclear weapons, the
administration moved quickly to establish an "air bridge"
between the United States and Israel (Litwak 1984, 160).
Putting aside the issue of why the United States
delayed the airlift, the fact remains that this resupply
gave Israel a vital boost, turning the tide of the war.
Once the order for the airlift was given, the amount of
aid was quite substantial.

Within days, the United states

was supplying Israel with over one thousand tons of
weapons and equipment per day (Litwak 1984, 160; Nixon
1978, 927).

A total of 550 American missions to Israel

carried out the task of supply and resupply, an operation
that surpassed the Berlin airlift of 1948-9 ( Lenczowski
1990, 130;

Nixon 1978, 927-929).

Thus, during the second week of the war, the United
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States became more directly involved in the conflict by
providing arms to Israel.

Arab accusations that the U.S.

was otherwise intervening in the conflict were denied.
Nonetheless, on 17 October, the ministers of 11 nations of
the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OAPEC) met in Kuwait, announcing that they had agreed to
cut oil production by 5% per month until Israel withdrew
from the occupied territories and agreed to respect the
rights of Palestinian refugees.

Over the next few days,

oil cuts would become progressively higher, and would
target the United states directly in an attempt to force
it to change its pro-Israeli policies (Rugh 1976, 31-34).
Bolstered by the resupply, Israel launched
counteroffensives on both the Egyptian and Syrian fronts.
On October 15-16, Israeli troops crossed into "African"
Egypt.

Meanwhile, Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin consulted

with Sadat in Cairo, urging him to accept a Soviet
proposal that linked a standstill ceasefire to an Israeli
agreement to withdraw to its pre-1967 borders.

When

Kosygin departed from Cairo on 18 October, he had Sadat's
commitment to work for an immediate ceasefire.

Soviet

Ambassador Dobrynin quickly informed Kissinger of the
O Q

proposal**^.

Kissinger agreed to pass the terms on to Tel

Aviv (Litwak 1984, 160-161).
On 19 October, in a move that surprised many within
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the Nixon Administration, Brezhnev invoked the newly
established consultative mechanisms created by the June
1973 accords to invite Kissinger to Moscow to discuss the
situation in the Middle East (Golan 1977, 112-115;
1978, 931).

Nixon

While en route to Moscow on October 20, 1973,

Kissinger was advised that Saudi Arabia had joined the
other OAPEC states in declaring a total oil embargo
against the United States.

This embargo coincided with

President Nixon's decision to request $2.2 billion in
emergency military aid for Israel*® (Litwak 1984, 161).
During the Moscow talks, the Soviets reiterated their
proposal for an immediate ceasefire accompanied by a
return to the provisions of UN Resolution 242.

Kissinger

sought to fashion an agreement that also included peace
negotiations.

By October 21, both the Soviets and the

Egyptians had accepted Kissinger's formulation.

The

following day, a UN cease-fire resolution was drafted and
adopted as UN Resolution 338.

Meanwhile, the Israelis

launched a counteroffensive that elicited an angry protest
from Ambassador Dobrynin on October 23.

Over the next 24

hours, the Israelis continued to advance, managing to
press forward to the outskirts of Suez City and to
encircle the Egyptian Third Army, comprised of
approximately 20,000 troops, east of the Suez Canal*
Sadat responded by sending urgent requests to the United
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States and the Soviet Union, asking for armed troops to
enforce the second ceasefire, negotiated on October 24
(Lenczowski 1990, 130-131; Litwak 1984, 162; nixon 1978,
937) .
The period that followed was characterized by tense
diplomatic efforts by the United States and the Soviet
Union to balance their respective interests while meeting
the immediate needs of the situation.

Within hours of

Sadat's request, Dobrynin conveyed a message from Brezhnev
denouncing Israel for violating the cease-fire and
reiterating Sadat's request for a joint peace-keeping
f

o

r

c

e

*

2

.

Brezhnev's message ended with an indication,

which many U.S. officials perceived as a threat, that if
the United States did not support the joint effort, the
Soviet Union would be forced to act unilaterally to
prevent cease-fire violations*®.
On October 25, a group of government officials
described by Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger as the
"abbreviated" National Security Council met in the
Situation Room of the White House to determine the United
States' next course of action**.

They decided unanimously

to place all American conventional and nuclear forces on
military alert. Nixon, who was not present at the meeting,
approved the plan.

He then sent a message to Brezhnev in

which he denied that Israel had violated the cease-fire
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agreement.

Furthermore, he cautioned Brezhnev against

taking any sort of unilateral action (Lenczowski 1990,
131) .
At a press conference on October 25, Kissinger
explained the administration's decision to place American
troops at a higher state of readiness by emphasizing the
United States' opposition to the use of a joint SovietUnited States force in the Middle East, a move which
Kissinger and Nixon believed might risk "transplanting"
the great-power rivalry into the region.

Moreover, he

pointed out that the United States was even more opposed
to the unilateral deployment of troops by any great power,
particularly any power possessing nuclear capability*®.
While fighting continued between Egypt and Israel,
American officials pursued a new cease-fire agreement that
would ultimately lead to a lasting disengagement.
Providing relief to the beleaguered Egyptian Third Army
was also a high priority (Lenczowski 1990, 131).

On

October 26, the crisis fueled by Soviet-American
disagreement over the placement of troops in the Middle
East abated.

The Soviet Ambassador stopped insisting on

superpower participation in the Sinai peace-keeping force,
and President Nixon announced that American troops had
returned to their normal state of readiness*®.
On November 5, 1973, Kissinger initiated what has
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since been labeled "shuttle diplomacy" by traveling to
Egypt, Israel, Syria, Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia, Saudi
Arabia, Algeria and Russia to serve as an intermediary
among the interested parties.

During this period, he

facilitated an agreement concerning the resupply of the
Egyptian Third Army and, on November 11, an agreement
between Egypt and Israel calling for an end to
hostilities.

This agreement, signed on "Kilometer 101" of

the Cairo-Suez road, also stipulated an interim
disposition of forces (Lenczowski 1990, 131-132).
The next phase of diplomacy took place on December
21-22 at an international conference convened in Geneva in
response to a formal request by the UN Secretary General.
The conference was cochaired by the United States and the
Soviet Union.

Egypt, Israel and Jordan attended, while

Syria chose to boycott the meeting.

The Geneva Conference

consisted of a ceremonial dinner and one inaugural session
of negotiations. As such, it was not expected to serve as
a forum for dealing with the full range of substantive
disagreements between the belligerents;

rather, it served

as a springboard for successive rounds of negotiations
that took place first between Egypt and Israel, and later,
between Israel and Syria, with the United States acting as
intermediary.

These negiotiations eventually led to

separate disengagement agreements on January 18, 1974 and
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May 31, 1974, respectively*^ (Lenczowski 1990, 132-133).
The final months of the Nixon Administration were
characterized by Kissinger's increasing involvement.in
American foreign policy toward the Middle East.

President

Nixon, on the other hand, was forced to devote more and
more attention to domestic concerns, particularly the
cancerous effects of the Watergate break-in on his
administration, his popularity, and his status as
president.

On August 8, 1974, Nixon announced his

resignation as President of the United States, effective
noon the following day (Nixon 1978, 1083).
Summary
The Soviet-American approach that literally dominated
Nixon and Kissinger's thought processes casts a very
interesting complexion over American Middle Eastern policy
during the Nixon Administration.

When Nixon first entered

office, in spite of his announcement that the Middle East
would be among his chief concerns, he was not particularly
interested in devoting a great deal of time to the region,
which did not appear to hold the promise of any real
progress.

The president's desire to revitalize the

National Security Council and to play a significant
personal role in foreign policy formulation led him to
reserve the more "dramatic" foreign policy arenas for the
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White House.

Working to extricate the country from its

involvement in Vietneun, establishing a more constructive
relationship with the Soviet Union, and opening relations
with China were much more appealing projects to Nixon and
Kissinger.
Meanwhile, Nixon allowed his Secretary of State, at
least officially, to take the lead in Middle Eastern
policy formulation for several years.

Under State

Department influence, at the beginning of the Nixon
Administration, the desire to find a solution to the ArabIsraeli dispute emerged as a very high priority.

As such,

efforts to lauch two-power and four-power talks to
establish the framework of a potential settlement were
begun in earnest.

During this period, however, the

conflicting goals of promoting Israeli security and
maintaining reliable access to oil vied with one another
for preeminence, often thwarting attempts to find a
solution to the Arab-Israeli dilemma.

The evolving

struggle between the State Department, which generally
favored protecting U.S. access to oil, and the White
House, which favored supporting Israel militarily to
maintain the balance of power in the region, complicated
matters even more.

Israel in particular perceived the

growing divergence between these regionally and globally
oriented approaches, and began to deal increasingly with
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the White House.

In Nixon and Kissinger's view,

meanwhile, the highest priority for American foreign
policy, the Middle East included, was to prevent the
expansion of Soviet influence.

This outlook colored Nixon

and Kissinger's perceptions of significant events in the
Middle East, often causing them to misinterpret critical
regional developments such as those which precipitated the
Jordan crisis in 1970.
Soon, circumstances caused Nixon and Kissinger to
perceive that the Middle East was taking on increased
importance in the Soviet-American competition.

Secretary

Rogers, meanwhile, did not seem to be having much success
in getting the parties any closer to a settlement.
President Nixon allowed the support he had been giving to
his Secretary of State to gradually dissipate, until it
was eventually depleted after the futile attempt to
sponsor an interim canal settlement in early 1971.

This

period saw little meaningful diplomatic activity and led
the Arabs, particularly Sadat, to become increasingly
frustrated.
In addition to the Soviet-American competition, one
of the most interesting contextual features of the Nixon
Administration's Middle Eastern policy centered around
Arab and Israeli self-perceptions.

The Arabs became

increasingly impatient to regain self-esteem lost in 1967,
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while the Israelis became overconfident because of their
decisive victory in the Six Day War.

Arab frustrations at

the lack of diplomatic progress were fueled by the
increasingly apparent pro-Israeli stance of the Nixon
Administration.

The situation culminated in the

coordinated Egyptian-Syrian attacks of October 1973, which
caught both Israel and Washington off-guard.

More

importantly, however, the war provided Kissinger with the
opportunity to seek gains in the diplomatic arena because
it changed a vital component of the contextual
environment.

The Arabs no longer felt powerless and the

Israelis no longer felt invulnerable.

Finally,

Kissinger's "shuttle diplomacy," although primarily
directed toward establishing an end to hostilities, was
very important in terms of setting the stage for later
developments in the Middle East, particularly those that
led to the agreements at Camp David during President
Carter's Administration.

138

Chapter Botes
1. Nasser formally announced the abrogation of the
cease fire in April, 1969.
2. Robert B. Semple, Jr. "Nixon to Revive Council's
Power," New York Times, January 1, 1969, p. 1.
3. This was questioned during a presidential press
conference on February 6, 1969. Nixon responded by
indicating that the State Department and the National
Security Council both exist to advise the president, who
must then make decisions concerning foreign policy. See
The Nixon Presidential Press Conferences (New York; Earl
M. Coleman Enterprises, Inc., 1978) 16-17.
4. Nixon clarified the main points of his doctrine
in his Foreign Policy Report of February 18, 1970,
indicating that the United States would keep its treaty
commitments and provide a shield if a nuclear power were
to threaten any ally or nation considered to be vital to
U.S. security. The main thrust of his doctrine centered
around the new position the United States would take in
situations involving other forms of aggression. Military
and economic assistance would be provided when requested,
if deemed appropriate. However, the nation directly
threatened would be expected to provide the manpower for
its own defense. See also Lenczowski, 117.
5. Alvin Schuster, "Britain Pressing Plan for
Military Pullout in Asia by end of '71," New York Times.
June 20, 1969, p. 2.
6. Hanson W. Baldwin, "Shah Opposes U.S. Retention
of Bahrein Facilities after 1971," New York Times. March
25, 1969, p. 21.
7. Ibid. Bahrein had served as headquarters for the
U.S. Navy's Middle East Command, consisting of two
destroyers, (although four were authorized) and a
converted seaplane tender. After the British pullout,
Bahrein was to be granted full independence. Yet, citing
Iran's historical claim to Bahrein, dating back almost 200
years, the Shah intended to present a claim to the island
before the United Nations.
8.

Ibid.

139

9. Tad Szulc, "U.S., Britain Quietly Back Military
Build-Up of Iran," New York Times. July 25, 1971, p. 1.
The build-up included rare participation in the ExportImport Bank to finance purchases.
10. Ibid. Several of these F-86s were slated for
conversion to F-5s.
11. Ibid. These airbases were to be built at Jask
and Bushire, with an expansion of the naval base at
Khurramshahar and a new naval base at Bandar Abbas.
12.

Ibid.

13. Hanson W. Baldwin, "Soviet Making Inroads in
Arabia, Where West Was Once Strong," New York Times.
March 3, 1969, p.l.
14. Still another interpretation contends that the
Soviet Union had objective (strategic, political, or
economic) interests in maintaining a condition of
controlled tension, while other authors claim that the
Soviets felt that the best means to promote these
interests was by creating flexibility in the Middle East.
See George W. Breslauer, "Soviet Policy in the Middle
East, 1967-1972: Unalterable Antagonism or Collaborative
Competition?" chap. in Soviet Strateov in the Middle East
(Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1983), 65.
15. The Soviet Union's involvement in the peace
process was not readily accepted by everyone within the
administration. Two broad interpretations developed. The
first view held that the exigencies of global strategies
would compel the Soviets to cooperate with the United
States on the Middle East, in spite of the potential
weakening of relations with Egypt. Those who held the
second view found it difficult to believe that the Soviets
would sacrifice regional interests to improve relations
with the United States. They argued that the Soviet
position depended upon its role as arms supplier, and
would therefore benefit from perpetual fighting. See
William B. Quandt, Decade of Decisions: American Policv
Toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict. 1967-1976 (Berkely:
University of California Press, 1977), 86.
16. See, for example, Richard M. Nixon, The Memoirs
of Richard M. Nixon (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1978),
479-484; 921; 931; 937-943.

140

17. This occurred during a period when the Soviets
were becoming increasingly concerned that the United
States was moving away from collaboration toward
unilateralism. See Breslauer, 81.
18. This "line" consisted of three components
incorporated into a single defense strategy. The
fortresses, bunkers reinforced with stone and sand, were
intended to provide a vantage point from which to observe
the enemy and slow down any substantial attack. Large oil
tanks were buried nearby and connected to a series of
nozzles that could spray a wall of flame at anyone
attempting to cross the canal. The third component
consisted of armor and artillery, whose mission was to
delay and disrupt any Egyptian advance for as long as
possible. See Frank Aker, October 1973: The Arab-Israeli
War (Hamden, Connecticut: Archon Books, 1985), 6-7.
19.

This system was not yet in operation by 1973.

20. This action was misinterpreted by Israeli and
American intelligence officials. See Edgar O'Ballance, No
Victor. No Vanquished: The Yom Kiopur War (San Raphael,
California: Presidio Press, 1978), 50.
21. David Elazar, "Memorandum to the Cabinet," May,
1975 quoted in Michael Brecher, Decisions in Crisis:
Israel. 1967 and 1973 (Berkely: University of California
Press, 1980), 55.
22. Craig and George, 140. Craig and George point
out that it was Kissinger who wrote about the importance
of obtaining domestic support as the "acid test" of a
policy.
23. Quandt, Decade of Decisions. 77. Quandt
suggests that, due to the seemingly hopeless complexity of
the situation in the Middle East, Nixon preferred to avoid
dealing with the region, in favor of devoting his energy
to areas where success was more likely.
24. Palestinian nationalism became particularly
militant after the 1967 war.
25. This resolution was passed on November 22, 1967,
after the Six Day War.

141

26. Prior to his inauguration, Nixon sent former
Pennsylvania governor William Scranton to the Middle East
on a fact-finding mission. While in Israel, Scranton
indicated to a group of newspapermen that the United
States would do well by pursuing a more "even-handed"
policy toward the Middle East. Lenczowski suggests that
Nixon quickly learned that any reference to "evenhandedness could prove politically costly. See
Lenczowski, 120.
27. American efforts to maintain the balance of
power in Israel's favor often created tensions with Arab
states, most notably Egypt. See, for example, Raymond W.
Anderson, "Sadat is Assured on U.S. Missiles," New York
Times. 28 November 1971, p. 27.
28.
The outcomes of this meeting were discussed
during a presidential press conference on February 6,
1969. See The Nixon Presidential Press Conferences. 12.
29.

Quandt, Decade of Decisions.82-83.

30.
Henry A. Kissinger, American Foreign Policv 3rd.
ed., (New York; W.W. Norton and Company, 1977), 287-288
provides a rationale for the step-by-step approach.
31.

Quandt, Decade of Decisions. 83-89.

32. Washington's concern that Israel was being asked
to make tangible concessions in return for intangible
promises of peace was a recurring theme throughout the
negotiations. See, for example, Kissinger, American
Foreign Policv. 290.
33. James Feron, "Israel Assails French Ban on
Deliveries of All Arms," New York Times. January 8, 1969,
p. 1.
34. Arab Report and Record. Dec 1-15, 1969, 521-522
quoted in Quandt, Decade of Decisions. 89-90.
35. Quandt, Decade of Decisions. 135-139. Sadat was
responding in part to Israeli Defense Minister Dayan's
public announcements suggesting a "mutual thinning out" of
forces along the canal to reopen it to international
trade.

142

36. Gil Carl Alroy, The Kissinger Experience;
American Foreign Policv in the Middle East (New York:
Horizon Press, 1975). Alroy asserts that this delay was
part of a "geune" in which Kissinger appeared to
energetically seek relief for Israel only to be blocked by
Secretary of Defense Schlesinger. Kissinger addresses
this sort of criticism in Henry A. Kissinger, White House
Years (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1979), 478.
Nixon discusses the issue in Memoirs. 922; 926.
37.See also Nixon, Memoirs.
921. Nixon believed
that "only a battlefield stalemate could provide the
foundation on which fruitful negotiations might begin."
38. Robert S. Litwak, Detente and the Nixon
Doctrine; American Foreign Policv and the Pursuit of
Stability. 1969-1976 (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1984), 158-160. Litwak asserts that Kissinger's
guiding strategy from the beginning of hostilities was to
"use the war as an extension of diplomacy."
39. Nixon, Memoirs. 930. Nixon learned of the
proposal at 8:45 p.m. on October 18.
40. Ibid., 931. Nixon suggests that the Arab
announcement of the embargo actually came before his
request to Congress.
41. Ibid., 936. Israel claimed to be responding to
Egyptian cease-fire violations.
42.

Litwak, 162.

43. Additional Soviet troop carriers were moved into
the Mediterranean and seven airborne divisions in southern
Russia and Hungary were reportedly placed on alert. See
Litwak, 162; Nixon, Memoirs. 937.
44. Schlesinger Press Conference of 26 October, 1973
in Department of State Bulletin LXIX, No. 1795 (19
November, 1973), 620, quoted in Litwak, 162. In
attendance were: Kissinger, Schlesinger, General Haig,
General Scowcroft, Admiral Moorer, and CIA Director Colby.
See also Nixon, Memoirs. 939.

143

45. Kissinger Press Conference of October 25, 1973
in Department of State Bulletin LXIX, No. 1794 (12
November, 1973), 587, quoted in Litwak, 163. See also
Nixon, Memoirs. 940, where Nixon addresses the fact that
several of the questions during the press conference
implied that the decision was motivated by domestic
considerations rather than the international situation.
46. Presidential Press Conference of October 26,
1973 in Weeklv Compilation of Presidential Documents 9,
No. 43 (29 October, 1973), 1287-94, quoted in Litwak, 163
47. These agreements were quite similar. Both
provided for a separation of forces, with UN supervised
disengagement zones.

CHAPTER 4
THE CARTER ADMIHISTRATIOH

We were sure that ours was a nation of the
ballot, not the bullet, until the murders of
John Kennedy, Robert Kennedy, and Martin
Luther King, Jr. We were taught that our
armies were always invincible and our causes
always just, only to suffer the agony of
Vietnam. We respected the Presidency as a
place of honor until the shock of Watergate.
We remember when the phrase "sound as a dollar"
was an expression of absolute dependability,
until ten years of inflation began to shrink
our dollar and our savings. We believed that
our nation's resources were limitless until
1973, when we had to face a growing dependence
on foreign oil. These wounds are still very
deep. They have never been healed (Carter
(1982, 120).
On Sunday, July 15, 1979, Jimmy Carter addressed the
nation from the Oval Office after having spent an intense
week at Camp David meeting small groups of key advisers
reassessing his administration in light of reports that
his popularity had "dropped to a new low" (Carter 1982,
114).

He believed, among other things, that the people of

America had lost faith in themselves and in their country.
This lost confidence could be restored if Americans were
willing to work together to solve major problems (Carter
1982, 121).

Although his announcement was prompted by
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Carter's "reassessment" of his administration, it did not
reflect a significant change in his personal beliefs.
Carter came to the presidency seeking to promote a
revival of American support for the government by
convincing "the people that the barriers between them and
the top officials in Washington were being broken down"
(Carter 1982, 26).

He was well aware of the damage to the

public's perception of the presidency caused by Watergate,
and was determined to regain the American trust (Carter
1982, 22).

Thus, Carter's presidency was, in many

respects, a departure from previous administrations.

In

Carter's view, it was more accurately a return to the
basic values that had been conspicuously lacking in
previous administrations (Carter 1977, 196).
The need to foster a renewed sense of morality in
domestic and foreign affairs served as the basic motif of
Carter's presidency.

It translated into several

fundamental concerns, which he believed embodied the most
important American values— "human rights, environmental
quality, nuclear arms control, and the search for justice
and peace" (Carter 1982, 20).

In his memoirs. Carter

stresses his admiration for two past presidents, Wilson
and Truman.

In Wilson, Carter admired the quality of

idealism, a characteristic which he believed had been
absent from American foreign policy for far too long
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(Carter 1982, 142).

He dismissed the notion that foreign

policy was largely a choice between the realist and
idealist approaches, insisting that "the demonstration of
American idealism was a practical and realistic approach
to foreign affairs, and moral principles were the best
foundation for the exertion of American power and
influence" (Carter 1982, 143).
Ironically, the quality Carter most admired in Truman
was his willingness "to be unpopular if he believed his
actions were best for the country" (Carter 1982, 66).
This image embodied Carter's view of an elected official's
role, that once citizens make their opinions known, public
officials must ultimately "decide what actions to take for
the public good" (Carter 1982, 80).

This view, which is

reminiscent of Morgenthau's belief that statesmen should
not be too responsive to the forces exerted by public
opinion, is particularly interesting in light of the
potential inherent contradictions between it and the
idealsitic approach described above.

In essence.

President Carter's image of his role as a statesman, and
of the role the United States should play in world
affairs, were directly responsive to both of the
conflicting impulses that had driven American foreign
policy during the post war era.
Carter believed that he could achieve a balance
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between these two impulses.
goal would prove elusive.

In practice, however, this
As he undertook specific

foreign policy initiatives. Carter found that
circumstances inevitably drove him to choose one approach
over the other.

This is not particularly surprising.

Even Truman, whom Carter admired for making choices based
on the nation's interests, eventually bowed to political
pressure in supporting the creation of Israel.

Moreover,

Wilson, who typified the idealistic approach, made several
pragmatic decisions that would later prove difficult to
reconcile with his own desire to promote the selfdetermination of the Arab people.
What is interesting, however, is the impact that
Carter's personal impressions of the United States'
responsibilities had on foreign policy in general and
particularly on the situation in the Middle East.
Context
I am proud to meet with a group of men and
women with whom I share a total commitment to
the preservation of human rights, individual
liberty, and freedom of conscience...I would
like to talk to you about my view of how our
nation should encourage and support those
priceless qualities throughout the world.
This is, as you know a difficult question.
It requires a great deal of balancing
between idealism and realism, of our
understanding of the world as it is and
our understanding the the world as it ought
to be...The question, I think, is whether
in recent years officials have not been too
pragmatic, even cynical, and as a consequence
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have ignored those moral values that have
often distinguished our own country from other
nations around the world^(Carter 1977, 166).
Carter's perception of American foreign policy during
the Nixon-Ford years was that it had been allowed to
become too narrowly defined in terms of the SovietAmerican competition in the Cold War.

In dealing with

other governments, this led policy makers to place too
much emphasis on whether a particular country "espoused
the anti-communist line," without regard for the nature of
that country's own government.

In effect, oppressive

governments might receive U.S. support and protection from
internal political movements as long as they were willing
to side against the "evildoers" (Carter 1982, 142-143).
In Carter's view, the United States had a basic
responsibility to promote freedom and democratic
principles.

In fact, the nation had been "strongest and

most effective" during those periods when freedom and
democracy were most clearly emphasized in its foreign
policy (Carter 1982, 142).

Thus, in choosing the

priorities for his foreign policy. Carter was determined
to focus on those countries where people were imprisoned,
tortured, or otherwise deprived of human rights (Carter
1982, 146). Opportunities for such emphasis abounded.
The situation in the Middle East was not nearly as
volatile as it had been when Nixon entered office, yet
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unresolved issues still caused perpetual tensions.

The

prospects for a lasting peace still seemed remote after
the 1973 war, but there were several contextual changes
that indicated that progress might be possible at last.
Once the fighting had ended and the peace process was
renewed, many within the United States and the world
community began to wonder if, perhaps, the high costs of
the war would lead Arabs and Israelis alike to recognize
their mutual interest in a compromise peace^.
As for the Arab side of the equation, several
encouraging signs of a "changing Arab attitude" fueled
hopes that meaningful negotiations could begin in earnest.
In fact, the Arabs' willingness to begin direct peace
negotiations with Israel at Geneva was heralded as the
most fundamental manifestation of their evolving attitude.
This newfound willingness to negotiate was largely an
outgrowth of the Arabs' military performance in the
October War, which had lessened the sense of shame and
defeat that had permeated the Arab atmosphere since 1967.
Moreover, the realization during the war that oil could be
used as a "weapon" for coercive diplomacy, or at least as
leverage in bargaining, eliminated the Arabs' long
standing fears that they would be negotiating from a
position of weakness in direct talks.

This renewed sense

of honor and the discovery of a certain amount of
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bargaining power, coupled with the recognition that, in
spite of initial setbacks in the recent war, Israel still
possessed formidable military capabilities, led Sadat,
King Hussein and other Arab leaders to announce their
willingness to formally acknowledge the existence of
Israel, within its 1967 borders^.
The events of 1973 forced the Israelis to grapple
with realizations about their Arab neighbors and, more
importantly, their own growing isolation within the world
community.

The high number of casualties sustained, and

their failure to win a decisive victory in the conflict
severely damaged the Israelis' self-image of
invulnerability.

Furthermore, the heavy economic burden

of constant preparedness for war, the recognition of the
potential power of the Arab oil weapon, and the increasing
sense of dependence on the United States, led to a sinking
impression that even another military victory would do
little to bring the country closer to peace.

Mounting

dissatisfaction and criticisms of the Israeli military's
performance in the early stages of the war quickly led to
a governmental crisis, which undoubtedly amplified the
general perception of instability within the country.
Labor Party lost several critical seats in the
parliamentary elections on December 31, 1973.

After

repeated attempts to form a new government, Golda Meir

The
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relinquished premiership.

She was succeeded by Yitzhak

Rabin, the army chief of staff responsible for planning
the highly successful preemptive strikes in 1967.

As

Prime Minister, Rabin continued to maintain an Israeli
"hard line" in peace negotiations.
In spite of this official posturing, several
prominent Israelis were compelled to reassess their Arab
neighbors in the period following the 1973 war.

Israeli

Defense Minister Moshe Dayan, for example, contrasted the
recent war with previous conflicts:

This time they marshalled all their resources,
including oil, to achieve their purpose. They
took the international climate into account,
the role the Russians would play, the importance
of detente between Americans and the Russians.
They realized it was a changed world in 1973,
and we have to realize it too*.
One of the most compelling aspects of the "changed
world" facing Israel after 1973 was the country's growing
isolation within the world community.

The threat of an

Arab oil boycott had forced countries such as Japan,
dependent on Arab countries for 45 per cent of its oil,
and several western European governments, also heavily
reliant on Arab oil imports, to adopt a decidedly pro-Arab
stance during the war.

In fact, on November 6, 1973, the

European Economic Community issued a resolution calling on
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Israel to "end the territorial occupation which it has
maintained since the conflict in 1967^."
Israel's increasing isolation beccune a trend which
continued for several years, setting the stage for the
circumstances under which the Carter Administration would
have to operate.

Interestingly, the trend expanded beyond

admonitions expressed by individual governments to include
increasing pressure from the United Nations.

On January,

12, 1976, for example, the UN Security Council opened its
Middle East debate by voting 11 to 1 with 3 abstentions to
allow the Palestine Liberation Organization to participate
with speaking rights as a member.

On May 26, 1976, the

Security Council closed its debate on the Middle East with
a majority statement deploring Israeli measures to alter
the demographic character of the occupied territories.
The United States disassociated itself from this
statement.

On November 11, the Security Council, in a

consensus statement, denounced the establishment of
Israeli settlements in the occupied territories and
declared the annexation of East Jerusalem by Israel to be
"invalid."

On November 24, the General Assembly approved

by a vote of 90 to 16 with 30 abstentions, the report of
the Committee on the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian
People proclaiming the right of Palestinian refugees to
establish their own state and to reclaim former properties
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in Israel®.
Prior to becoming president, Jimmy Carter's exposure
to the Middle East had been quite limited.

In fact, in

his own estimation, his perspective needed broadening.
Most of what he knew stemmed from religious studies, which
led Carter to feel a certain bond with the Jews in the
region.

These feelings were strengthened by his belief

that prior to 1967 many of the holy places in the Middle
East had been closed to visits by Christians.
Furthermore, Carter felt that Jewish survivors of the
holocaust "deserved their own nation" and the right to
live peacefully among their neighbors.
Carter had an opportunity to learn more about the
"land of the Bible" and to see Israeli defense
requirements first-hand in May 1973 when, as Govenor of
Georgia, he and his wife were invited by Golda Meir to
take an extended visit to Israel.

This visit strengthened

Carter's sense of responsibility toward Israel to such a
degree that he made a special point of mentioning his
support when he announced his candidacy.

In essence.

Carter's "moral and religious beliefs made [his]
commitment to the security of Israel unshakable" (Carter
1982, 274).
While many of his initial impressions of Israel grew
out of his own religious convictions. Carter's early
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perceptions of the Arab states were colored by his
reactions to Arab oil policy.

Carter viewed the denial of

oil as "political blackmail" that had enabled the Arab
states to force vulnerable consumer nations to change
their foreign policies during the critical period from
1973 to 1974.

Carter was determined, therefore, to

develop a comprehensive energy policy that would reduce
the United States' susceptibility to coercion and, in
fact, much of his domestic policy revolved around his
efforts to increase public and congressional awareness of
the "energy problem" (Carter 1982, 92;

Lenczowski 1990,

159) .
Carter's comprehensive energy program, which he
described as the "moral equivalent of war" (Carter 1982,
91), consumed a great deal of the president's time and
efforts.

In fact. Carter felt that he struggled with

Congress in "bloody legislative battles" over energy
legislation throughout his entire term.

Carter's

objectives included energy conservation, more domestic
fuel production, development of alternative sources of
energy, and reduction of oil imports.

To meet these

goals, he proposed deregulation of oil prices, a windfall
profits tax on oil companies and the establishment of a
government owned "Synthetic Fuels Corporation" (Lenczowski
1990, 159).
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Carter divided his time between this ambitious energy
program and major foreign policy initiatives.

This is

evident in his description of a brief working vacation to
the Grand Tetons in August 1978 during a temporary lull in
congressional activity.

While there. Carter hoped to

study the complicated dynamics of the Middle East in
preparation for the upcoming Camp David talks.

However,

he was "forced to return early to Washington because of
the imminent threat of losing the natural-gas bill"
(Carter 1982, 106; 320).
Carter eventually succeeded in getting the bulk of
his energy program through Congress, but his success was
not without a price.

The president had to work very hard

to achieve his own objectives while maintaining an
effective working relationship with Congress.
he was not particularly successful.

Ironically,

Many of his fellow

Democrats failed to support him because they felt his
programs did not adhere clearly to partisan lines (Carter
1982, 68-73).

In addition to the energy program, one of

the biggest "legislative battles" Carter fought with
Congress centered around the Panama Canal Treaty.

The

President eventually emerged victorious, but lost a good
deal of public and congressional support in the process.
Along with his repeated efforts to establish a viable
working relationship with Congress, the Soviet-American
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aspect is one of the most interesting features of the
context in which Carter operated.

Detente, bereft of real

support from Congress and the public, had virtually faded
into the foreign policy background.

What would now

become the defining characteristic of the Soviet-American
relationship?

This question was uppermost in the minds of

many American and Soviet leaders.

The Soviets were

especially uncertain about how Carter's human rights
emphasis would affect the superpower relationship^.
Within the Carter Aministration, this question was
open to a great deal of interpretation and, in fact, the
source of a certain amount of dissension.

Carter felt the

need to move away from allowing the Soviet-American Cold
War competition to be the defining characteristic of
American foreign policy.

Human rights dictated a more

diffuse approach, one that focused on areas such as Africa
and Latin America, for example. Decisions to support
governments would be based on how their leaders dealt with
social, economic and other developmental aspects within
their society.

Ideally, this determination would be made

without consideration for how these governments stood in
relation to the Soviet-American competition, yet. Carter
was aware of the fact that American involvement in these
areas could lead to superpower confrontation.

In

discussing the Middle east, for example. Carter wrote:
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I recognized the legitimate needs of the
Israelis to protect themselves against
terrorism. But we needed to resolve the
underlying problems rather than see continued
violence, which threatened to spread beyond
the Middle East and involve the superpowers
(Carter 1982, 277).
This "duality" in Carter's approach toward the
Soviets, the notion that their actions were an important
consideration in crafting his foreign policy, yet not to
be afforded the seune emphasis as in the past, established
an atmosphere of uncertainty in the administration which
was most readily apparent in the context of the State
Department-National Security Council competition for
preeminence in foreign affairs.

Secretary of State Cyrus

Vance and National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski
had several substantive disagreements over foreign policy,
especially regarding matters that required an assessment
of Soviet intentions to determine the best strategy for
dealing with the Soviet Union.

Eventually, when

"jockeying" and competing with one another to sway
Carter's position on the issues failed to yield a clear
winner, the controversy spilled out into the open.
(George 1980, 118).

Brzezinski, who favored a less

optimistic view of the Soviets, began to make public
statements that, intentionally or not, had the net effect
of undermining Vance's position®.
In spite of his desire to change the basic tone of
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the Soviet-American relationship, or to at least reduce
its effects on American policy toward third countries.
Carter found it necessary to deal with the Soviets on
several critical issues, most notably SALT.

Carter viewed

these strategic arms talks as a means to "reduce the
nuclear threat to human survival" while also stabilizing
the U.S.-Soviet relationship.

Vance agreed with the

president and encouraged him to make SALT a high priority
in the administration because it offered an opportunity to
establish more "cordial" relations with the Soviet Union.
Brzezinski, on the other hand, supported SALT as a means
of "publicly testing Soviet intentions and, if the Soviets
responded favorably, for halting the momentum of the
Soviet buildup®."
To deal with the Middle East as well as other foreign
policy issues. Carter designed a foreign policy machinery
combined elements of a "collegial approach," based on
teamwork and shared responsibility among talented
advisers, and a "formalistic approach," characterized by
an orderly policy-making structure with well-defined
procedures and hierarchical lines of communication (George
1980, 109).

Carter sought to avoid the extreme

centralization of power acquired by Kissinger as special
assistant for national security affairs during Nixon's
first term, yet he sought to "restore the power and
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prestige of the NSC staff following the brief eclipse that
occurred during the Ford years (1974-1977) when Kissinger
was Secretary of State" (George 1980, 117).

In fact, at

his first Cabinet meeting. Carter gave his National
Security Adviser Cabinet status, setting a precedent that
was not followed by later administrations (Brzezinski
1983, 60).
There is little doubt that Carter intended to rely
heavily on the NSC in formulating foreign policy.
Responding to warnings that Brzezinski "might not be
adequately deferential to a Secretary of State," Carter
wrote in his memoirs:
Knowing Zbig, I realized that some of these
assessments were accurate, but they were in
accord with what I wanted: the final
decisions on basic foreign policy would be
made by me in the Oval Office, not in the
State Department (Carter 1982, 52).
As his Secretary of State, Carter chose Vance, who
had been Secretary of the Army under Kennedy and Deputy
Secretary of Defense under Johnson, for his extensive
background in military affairs and his equally impressive
experience in foreign affairs.

Vance had served as a

"troubleshooter" for various presidents during crises in
Cyprus, Korea and Vietnam (Carter 1982, 50).

Warren

Christopher, a Los Angeles attorney, was selected to be
Vance's Deputy Secretary of State.
Brzezinski designed his NSC staff to be lean and
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efficient, "not a small state department" (Brzezinski
1983, 4).

David L. Aaron was chosen to sezrve as his

deputy assistant for National Security Affairs.

In

addition to several administrative positions, the rest of
the staff was divided into "geographical clusters,"
focusing on West Europe, East Europe and the Soviet Union,
the Middle East and North Africa, East Asia and China,
South Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Latin America
(including the Caribbean).

Six "functional clusters"

dealt with defense coordination, intelligence
coordination, international economics, global issues,
science, and freedom of information issues.

Three men

comprised the staff of the cluster responsible for the
Middle East:

William Quandt, Robert Hunter and Gary

SicklO.
Carter was well aware of the fact that he was coming
to Washington as an outsider.

He brought with him several

close friends to serve as advisers, most notably Hamilton
Jordan, who would eventually be named White House Chief of
Staff, and Jody Powell, who served as Press Secretary.

To

"provide some balance of experience" to the
administration. Carter had chosen Walter Mondale, a member
of Congress, as his running mate.

He determined to rely

on his Vice President as his "second in command, involved
in every aspect of governing" (Carter 1982, 35-39).
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Carter began each day as president with Brzezinski,
who would provide him with the Presidential Daily Briefing
(PDB)ll, an update on current intelligence (Carter 1982,
51) .
Foreign Policy Objectives
The Carter Administration has often been criticized
as having lacked a central strategy to tie the various
strands of its foreign policy together.

From the

beginning, however, the administration did have a set of
clearly defined objectives that actually emerged during
the transition phase when Brzezinski, Henry Owen and
Richard Gardner developed a memorandum outlining the goals
the new administration should pursue in foreign policy
(Brzezinski 1983, 50).

These goals were refined during

the first informal NSC meeting conducted on January 5,
1977.

With the help of Harvard Professor Samuel

Huntington, Brzezinski prepared a forty-three page
document designed to give the Carter Administration a
sense of strategic priorities.
The document outlined ten basic goals.

First, the

new administration hoped to promote wider macroeconomic
coordination between the United States, Western Europe,
Japan and other advanced democracies to facilitate the
move toward a stable and open monetary trade system.

The
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second and third goals were directed at improving
political and economic relations with "emerging regional
'influentials,'" and developing North-South relations to
promote greater economic stability in the Third World.
Fourth, the administration would push for strategic arms
reduction talks with the Soviets while working to
cultivate a more stable relationship between the two
superpowers.

This relationship would be based on a "more

comprehensive and reciprocal" application of detente.
Furthermore, Soviet ideological expansion would be
countered by "a more affirmative American posture on human
rights" (Brzezinski 1983, 52-54).
The fifth goal addressed normalization of U.S.Chinese relations as a key stabilizing element in the
administration's global strategy.

Sixth, a comprehensive

Middle East peace settlement would be pursued as a means
of preventing further radicalization in the Arab world and
Soviet re-entry into the region.

The seventh goal sought

to facilitate the peaceful transformation of South Africa
toward a biracial democracy and, by establishing a
coalition of moderate black African leaders, to eliminate
the Soviet-Cuban presence in Africa while lessening trends
toward radicalization.

The administration's eighth

objective was to restrict the level of global armaments,
both unilaterally and through international agreements.
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The ninth was directed toward increasing U.S. sensitivity
to human rights and influencing other countries to observe
these rights through various multilateral and bilateral
incentives.

Finally, the administration sought to

maintain a defense posture sufficient to deter the Soviet
Union from using strategic, conventional or political
force against the United States or its allies (Brzezinski
1983, 54-55).
Collectively, these ten goals comprised an ambitious
foreign policy agenda.

In fact, Brzezinski suggests that

a more appropriate criticism of the Carter
Administration's foreign policy is that it was "overly
ambitious" and that officials failed to demonstrate
effectively to the public the degree to which they "were
motivated by a coherent and well-thought-out viewpoint"
(Brzezinski 1983, 57).
The Middle East, along with the future disposition of
the Panama Canal, emerged as one of the highest foreign
policy priorities of the Carter Administration.

In fact,

the Middle East dominated foreign policy during all four
years of the Carter presidency (Carter 1982, 429) largely
because Carter believed that conditions in the region held
important ramifications for United States interests.

In

spite of the disengagement agreements between Israel and
Egypt and Israel and Syria that had been concluded during
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the Ford Administration, the Middle East situation
remained tense (Lenczowski 1990, 160).

Carter noted that

many of his predecessors, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson and
Ford among them, had avoided becoming actively involved in
Middle Eastern disputes until circumstances, in the form
of some sort of crisis, forced them to take action.

He

resolved to break the perpetual stalemate, which he
believed would inevitably lead to another conflict,
perhaps with even greater U.S.-Soviet involvement
(Brzezinski 1983, 83).

In broad terms. Carter sought a

means to provide peace and stability to the region while
preventing the expansion of Soviet influence.

In this

regard, he viewed Israel as a strategic asset (Carter
1982, 274-275).
Carter was well aware of the potential difficulties
in trying to forge a Middle East peace settlement.

In his

memoirs, he notes the hard work and effort that culminated
in the Rogers Plan during the Nixon Administration, only
to have the proposal rejected by virtually all of the
interested negotiating parties.

Many of his security

advisers urged him to avoid the Middle East, where it
"seemed that all the proposed solutions had been tried and
failed" (Carter 1982, 279).

He determined to approach the

region "with great caution" lest failure to bring about
tangible results create an "image of fumbling
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incompetence."

Yet, his commitment to human rights, his

sense of responsibility toward Israel, his desire to
protect American interests by promoting stability in the
region...all of these factors compelled Carter to forge
ahead toward some form of Arab-Israeli peace settlement
(Carter, 1982, 275-277).
Largely due to domestic considerations, Brzezinski
urged Carter to move as rapidly as possible, taking
advantage of the greater leverage he would enjoy during his
first year in office to strive toward a Middle East
breakthrough (Brzezinski 1983, 87).

As such. Carter and

his key advisers decided to pursue an "activist" approach
toward the Middle East, which was actually a reflection of
their ambitious larger foreign policy.

With the possible

exception of the president himself, the individual who
"took the lead on the Middle East" was Secretary of State
Cyrus Vance (Brzezinski 1983, 38).

During the informal

NSC meeting conducted on January 5, 1977, the decision was
made to send Vance to the Middle East as early as
February.

Vance believed it was important to meet with

the key players in the region as early as possible
(Brzezinski 1983, 51).
The basic approach the Carter administration would
take toward the Middle East was formulated during three
meetings:

an informal session on January 30, attended by
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Carter, Brzezinski, Vance, and Andrew Young;

a formal

Policy Review Committee meeting chaired by Vance on
February 4;

and a formal NSC meeting held on February 23,

following Vance's return from a week long Middle East fact
finding visit.

President Carter chaired this third

meeting, during which a target date was set for convening
the Geneva Conference in September of 1977^^. (Brzezinski
1983, 86-87)
In a departure from the two previous administrations.
Carter and his top advisers believed that American policy
should be

directed toward achieving a comprehensive

Middle East peace settlement.

Any agreement between

Israel and its Arab neighbors should simultaneously
address all of the major problems affecting the region.
As such, the settlement should not be limited to separate
agreements between Israel and Egypt, Jordan or Syria
(Lenczowski 1990, 160).

Similarly, the Carter

Administration believed that the idea of pursuing small,
interim steps as a means of drawing the parties closer to
an eventual agreement had lost its usefulness.

In short,

there were no more "small steps" left to be taken
(Brzezinski 1983, 83).
In Carter's view, the extremely complex issues
surrounding the Arab-Israeli dispute "seemed to boil down"
to three major points of contention:

Israeli security.
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ownership of territory, and Palestinian rights (Carter
1982, 279).

At least two legacies from the Nixon-Ford

years posed potential problems, however.

First, Carter

believed that the Geneva Conference forum, established
under the auspices of the United Nations during Nixon's
presidency, was burdened by a cumbersome format.

"If ever

convened, it was to be headed jointly by the United States
and the Soviet Union, with participation by the Israelis
and their Arab neighbors-— and the Palestinians."

This

arrangement lent itself to its own unique set of problems
which not only "defied solution," but prevented
negotiators from dealing with more substantive issues.
Second, Carter's freedom to maneuver with regard to
the Palestinian question, which he believed to be the
"central, unresolved, human rights issue of the Middle
East" (Vance 1983, 64), was greatly restricted by
Secretary of State Kissinger's promise to Israel on
September 1, 1975 that the United States would not
recognize or negotiate with the PLO until it acknowledged
Israel's right to exist and had accepted UN Resolution 242
as the basis for resolving Middle East disputes.

The

issue of communicating with the PLO remained so sensitive
throughout Carter's presidency that in March 1977, when
Carter decided to stand in the receiving line and to shake
hands with the PLO representative after having given an
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address to the United Nations, it caused "quite a flap"
(Carter 1982, 281).
Carter's desire to try a new and innovative approach
to break the Middle East stalemate was translated into the
rough outlines of a settlement plan by March 1977.

His

plan called for Israeli withdrawal to approximately the
1967 borders, creation of a Palestinian homeland," and the
establishment of real, lasting, permanent peace between
Israel and its Arab neighbors^^.

Carter believed that the

peace process should be based on UN Resolution 242, which
emphasized the inadmissibility of the acquisition of
territory by war, and that it should include a broad
definintion of peace, including open borders and free
trade (Carter 1982, 290).

His decision to include the

concept of a Palestinian "homeland," later referred to as
an "entity," was a first among American presidents that
led to shocked protests from Israelis and prominent Jewish
Americans.
Having established the basic outlines of a proposal.
Carter "plunged heavily into the negotiating process
himself" with an intense schedule of meetings with Middle
Eastern heads of state.

He was visited first by Israeli

Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin on March 7-8, followed on
April 4-5 by Egyptian President Anwar Sadat.

Carter then

met with King Hussein of Jordan on April 25-26, President
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Assad of Syria on May 9, and Crown Prince Fahd of Saudi
Arabia on May 24 (Brzezinski 1983, 89).

During these

meetings. Carter adopted what would become a customary
habit of conducting frank, private discussions upstairs at
the White House with his visitors to urge them to consider
his proposal's.

Carter found his discussions with Sadat,

King Hussein, Crown Prince Fahd and Assad particularly
encouraging, but he would soon discover that peer pressure
led many of the Arab leaders to give private assurances
which were widely disparate from their public comments.
Only one Arab leader, Anwar Sadat, seemed willing to
publicly admit that he was willing to deal with Israel^®
(Carter 1982, 286).
Shortly after Carter concluded his first round of
meetings with Middle East leaders, Yitzhak Rabin announced
his resignation, leading to the surprise victory of
Menachem Begin, leader of the conservative Likud
coalition.

Carter's meetings with Rabin had not been

especially promising, but Begin's revisionist program,
which called for territorial annexations and intransigence
toward the Arabs, added a new dimension of uncertainty to
the peace process (Lenczowski 1990, 164).

Begin's

statements during an "Issues and Answers" interview to the
effect that the West Bank was an integral part of Israel's
sovereignty which had been "liberated" during the 1967 Six
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Day War, and that a Jewish majority with an Arab minority
would be established there caused Carter concern.

The new

Prime Minister's views did not bode well for the upcoming
peace talks (Carter 1982, 288).

Meanwhile, Begin's

election caused increased anxiety within the American
Jewish community, leading to more pronounced public and
congressional criticism of Carter's policies.

Carter

eventually became so concerned about deunage to his
"political base among Israel's friends" that he solicited
and received public support from Senator Hubert Humphrey,
the "one man who was trusted by everyone as a friend of
Israel."

Carter also held sessions with Jewish and

congressional leaders from around the United States to
explain his policies (Carter 1982, 288-290).
President Carter met with Prime Minister Begin on
July 19, 1977 to outline his proposals.

Begin indicated

that he could agree to all of them except for the
establishment of a Palestinian "entity."

During private

discussions. Carter felt he might have made some headway
in getting the Prime Minister to consider changing his
position, but his hopes were literally dashed when Begin
returned to Israel and immediately recognized as permanent
several settlements on the West Bank (Carter 1982, 291).
The weeks following Begin's election were
characterized by meetings and statements that appeared to
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constitute diplomatic steps forward, but which tended to
elicit reactions that increased the distance between the
negotiating parties, keeping the Geneva Conference
perpetually out of reach.

Israel's establishment of new

settlements in the West Bank posed a serious threat to the
peace process, as did disagreement'over Palestinian
participation in the Geneva talks (Lenczowski 1990, 165).
While diplomatic progress with Middle Eastern leaders
remained somewhat elusive, the United States and the
Soviet Union took what administration officials hoped
would be a significant step forward.

On October 1, in

their capacities as co-chairmen of the Geneva Peace
Conference, the two countries issued a joint statement
calling for: a comprehensive settlement of the ArabIsraeli dispute based on Isreali withdrawal from the
occupied territories;
the Palestinian people;

ensuring the legitimate rights of
ending the state of war and

establishing normal relations;

respect for the principles

of sovereignty, territorial integrity and political
independence;

ensuring the security of borders by using

demilitarized zones, UN personnel, and international
guarantee;

and Soviet-American agreement to guarantee the

peace settlement (Vance 1983, 463).

The joint statement

caused great concern among the American Jewish community,
congressional leaders and, of course, the Israelis^?.
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On October 4, Carter met with Egyptian Foreign
Minister Ismail Fahmy and Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe
Dayan to convince each of them of the necessity of
compromise.

By mid-October, in spite of reports that

Dayan had prevailed over strong opposition when he
presented the American proposals to the Israeli cabinet.
Carter began to see indications that the peace process was
breaking down.

He was not convinced that the disputing

parties would agree to come together.

On October 21,

Carter thus decided to play his "only hole card" by
sending a direct personal appeal to Sadat urging him to
publicly endorse the Soviet-American proposal.

Sadat

responded on November 9, by announcing to the Egyptian
Parliament that he was willing to go to Jerusalem to
further the peace process.

His announcement was followed

on November 15 by an invitation from Begin, sent through
Carter, to address the Israeli Knesset.

On November 19-

21, Sadat visited Jerusalem, where he addressed the
Knesset, offering Israel recognition and permanent peace
based on an agreement that would lead to the return of
Arab occupied territories including Arab Jerusalem,
recognition of the Palestinian right to statehood, and
secure borders subject to the necessary safeguards and
international guarantees^® (Sadat 1977, 330).
In short, Sadat took the unprecedented step of
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agreeing to Israel's requests "in one fell swoop" (Carter
1982, 307).

Sadat's unexpected announcement created both

uncertainty and excitement in Washington.

Although the

announcement carried the prospects for peace, officials
were unsure how to proceed (Carter 1982, 298).

These

doubts were soon exacerbated by the realization that Sadat
and Begin were still far apart on several substantive
issues.

This disparity was particularly apparent after

Begin's visit to Ismailia in late December.

He proposed a

plan that seemed almost diametrically opposed to Sadat's
position^^.

As the relationship between Begin and Sadat

became increasingly strained. Carter and Sadat reached
nearly complete agreement concerning the substance of the
on

peace agreement^ .
By March of 1978, the Geneva Conference seemed more
distant than ever.

Begin had shown little evidence that

he was willing to change his position, particularly
concerning the West Bank, which he referred to by the
Biblical names "Judea and Samaria" (Carter 1982, 334)

The

Israelis were continuing the policy of building up
settlements in the occupied territories, causing Arabs to
become more frustrated, and leaving Sadat increasingly
vulnerable to attacks from other Arab leaders.

Repeated

Israeli incursions into Lebanon to retaliate against
terrorist attacks made matters even worse, prompting
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Carter to send "a stream of fairly harsh messages" to
Begin in Israel (Carter 1982, 304-305).

The situation

reached a critical point on March 14, when Israel invaded
Lebanon as a reprisal against a PLO attack on the Israeli
coast in which thirty-five people were killed.
Sadat's position within the Arab community had
already been severely damaged by his decision to visit
I s r a e l i i .

Carter was so worried about the Egyptian

leader's growing isolation from the rest of the Arab
community that he repeatedly tried to generate public
support from other Arab leaders.

These attempts were

unsuccessful, in spite of the fact that several leaders
were privately willing to express support (Carter 1982,
300-301).

By May, 1978, Sadat's frustration caused him to

pull back from the peace effort, and he "even spoke
publicly of going to war" (Carter 1982, 315).
Democratic leaders urged Carter to back out of the
Middle East situation and to "repair the damage" he had
done to the Democratic party and to United States-Israeli
relations.

Instead, Carter decided to "go all out" by

inviting Sadat and Begin together for an extensive
negotiating session at Camp David.

Both leaders

"enthusiastically" agreed to attend (Carter 1982, 316).
The official announcement that there would be a
trilateral summit meeting at Camp David between Egypt,
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Israel and the United States was made on Tuesday, August
8.

For the most part, the administration was able to keep

the meeting a secret, so the "news took the public
completely by surprise" (Brzezinski 1983, 252).

Carter

was determined to establish an atmosphere at Camp David
which would encourage the negotiating teams to work with
one another freely, without concern over public reactions.
This meant that there had to be a "minimum of posturing by
Egyptians or Israelis."

Public statements had to be

avoided because, once made, they would very likely become
"frozen positions that could not subsequently be changed."
For this reason. Carter decided to exclude the press
during the Camp David negotiations (Carter 1982, 317-318),
choosing to rely on Press Secretary Jody Powell to update
the media on developments.
To prepare for the upcoming meetings. Carter not only
reviewed the relevant issues, he also studied
psychological analyses of Sadat and Begin, the two
protagonists in the on-going diplomatic struggle.

He

recalled the American Ambassadors to Egypt, Herman Eilts,
and Israel, Sam Lewis, to provide him with added insight
(Carter 1982, 320-321).

The American negotiating team

also included Brzezinski, Vance, Jordan, Powell, Harold
Saunders, the Assistant Secretary of State for Near East
Affairs, Alfred Atherton, Ambassador at large, and William
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Quandt from the NSC Staff.

Walter Mondale and Secretary

of Defense Harold Brown remained in Washington, but
travelled to Camp David as their schedules permitted.
Although he deliberately tried to play down
expectations. Carter hoped to emerge from the Camp David
negotiations with a written agreement for peace between
Egypt and Israel, including a timetable for implementation
(Carter 1982, 321).

From the beginning, however, it was

apparent that Sadat and Begin sharply differed on several
key issues which would transform the Camp David process
from the planned three day meeting into "thirteen intense
and discouraging days."

(Carter 1982, 322).

The

negotiating teams arrived on September 5, 1978 and
remained until September 17, despite repeated threats by
Sadat that lack of progress compelled him to leave.
The Egyptian team consisted of President Sadat,
Minister of Foreign Affairs Mohamed Ibrahim Kamel,
Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Boutros Ghali, Under
Secretary of Foreign Affairs Osama el-Baz, Ambassador to
the United States Ashraf Ghorbal, Director of the Foreign
Minister's Cabinet Ahmed Maher, and three members of the
Foreign Ministry including Legal Director Nahib el-Araby
(Carter 1982, 326).

Throughout the negotiations, Sadat

seemed willing to compromise on several issues in order to
facilitate a larger agreement, while the members of his
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staff were less willing to do so.

In fact, the

differences between Sadat and his advisers became so great
that at one point, on the ninth day. Carter became worried
about his friend's safety, "and directed that the security
around Sadat's cottage be strengthened and kept alert"
(Carter 1982, 389).
During his first full meeting with Carter, on
September 6, Sadat presented the Egyptians' opening
proposal, which was "extremely harsh and full of all the
unacceptable Arab rhetoric."

After discussion, however,

Sadat revealed that he was willing to make concessions on
all but two issues.

The first was land, the second was

sovereignty (Carter 1982, 339-340).

Like Carter, Sadat

wanted a firm framework for establishing peace.

He

insisted, however, that he was not interested in
concluding a separate Egyptian-Israeli treaty.

Thus, he

insisted on addressing the issues of Palestinian selfdetermination and the West Bank (Lenczowski 1990, 173).
Begin, on the other hand, came to Camp David seeking
to outline general principles to serve as the basis for
future negotiations (Carter 1982, 330). If an agreement
were to be made, however, the Prime Minister preferred
that it address Egyptian-Israeli relations first, leaving
the issue of the Palestinians and the West Bank for later
discussions (Carter 1982, 334).

The Israeli team
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consisted of nine members, including Begin, Foreign
Minister Moshe Dayan, Defense Minister Ezer Weizman,
Attorney General Aharon Barak, Major General Avraham
Tcunir, Ambassador to the United States Simcha Dinitz.
Legal Adviser Meir Rosene, Public Affairs Adviser Dan
Pattir, and Elyakim Rubenstein, Assitant Director,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

As with the Egyptian team,

it became apparent that there were sharp disagreements
among the Israelis.

In this case, however. Begin tended

to take the hard line, while other members, such as Dayan
and Weizman, tended to be more flexible^^ (Carter 1982,
395) .
Carter began the Camp David process by meeting
individually with Sadat and Begin to develop a sense for
their respective positions and to encourage them to
compromise as much as possible.

By the third day.

Carter's hopes of simply observing while Sadat and Begin
conducted negotiations had evaporated and he found himself
playing "referee" to keep the discussions on track (Carter
1982, 353).

Eventually, he realized that meetings of all

three leaders were counterproductive.

The negotiating

process evolved into Carter meeting separately on issues
with the two Middle Eastern leaders (or their designated
representatives), until the "best possible compromise" had
been reached.

At this point, the three leaders and their
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advisers met together (Carter 1982, 368).
When neither the Israelis nor the Arabs appeared to
be able to produce proposals that satisfied the other
party. Carter put forth compromise proposals.

In the

process, he complied with President Ford's promise,
contained in a presidential letter of December 1975, that
the Israelis be allowed to see any American proposal
before it was offered to the other parties concerned.
From the outset. Begin insisted on this procedure (Carter
1982, 333; 373).
Several issues caused a great deal of debate between
the negotiating teams, but the most divisive issue by far
concerned Israeli settlement policy.

In the Sinai, Sadat

insisted that the settlements must be abandoned by the
Israelis.

He viewed this as an issue of sovereignty and

could not allow the Israelis to stay.

On a related point,

Sadat would not allow any form of militairy control over
Egyptian territory by Israel, the United States, or any
other nation (Carter 1982, 357).

For his part, throughout

the entire negotiations process. Begin argued that he
could not agree to remove the Israeli settlements in the
Sinai because of the potential threat to Israeli security,
particularly in the Gaza^® (Carter 1982, 347; 359).
The deadlock over how to deal with the Sinai was
complicated by disagreements over Jerusalem, Palestinian
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rights and settlement policies in the West Bank and Gaza.
At several points in the negotiating process, Carter
believed that the talks had broken completely down (Carter
1982, 360; 365; 391).

Eventually, however, as the

president was preparing to go back to Washington,
contemplating how he would minimize the damage of Ceunp
David's inability to generate any sort of substantial
agreement. Prime Minister Begin created a "breakthrough"
by announcing his willingness to submit the Sinai
settlements issue to the Israeli Knesset.

Believing this

concession to be enough for Sadat, Carter hastily put his
staff to work finalizing the agreements (Carter 1982, 396398).

Two agreements, the Framework for Peace in the

Middle East and the Framework for Conclusion of a Peace
Treaty Between Egypt and Israel were signed at
approximately 10:15 p.m. on September 17, 1978 (Carter
1982, 403).
The Framework for Peace in the Middle East included a
preamble which specified that UN Resolution 242 would serve
as the basis for peace between Israel and its neighbors^*.
In Part A, the signatories agreed that Egypt, Israel,
Jordan and "the representatives of the Palestinian people"
should work together to resolve the Palestinian problem.
Furthermore, it outlined provisions for Palestinian selfgovernment in the West Bank and Gaza, accompanied by a
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transitional period of not more than five years
(Lenczowski 1990, 175).

In Part B, Egypt and Israel

agreed not to use force against one another, and to work
toward a peace treaty which would serve to govern future
Egyptian-Israeli relations.

Part C addressed the rules

that were to be applied to Israel's relations with each of
its neighbors, under the aegis of the United Nations
Security Council (Lenczowski 1990, 176).
The second document, the Framework for the Conclusion
of a Peace Treaty Between Egypt and Israel stipulated that
a peace treaty should be concluded within three months.
Furthermore, it contained provisions regarding the
following;
signing;

implementation of the treaty after its
Israeli military withdrawal from the Sinai;

the

future disposition of airfields left in the Sinai, that
would be used for civilian purposes only;

freedom of

navigation and overflight for Israel through the Suez
Canal, the Gulf of Suez, the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf
of Aqaba;

construction of a highway linking the Sinai and

Jordan through Israeli territory;

and specific military

dispositions regarding the placement of Egyptian, Israeli
and UN troops in high interest areas.

The agreement also

stipulated that following the conclusion of the peace
treaty, normal diplomatic relations would be established
between Egypt and Israel (Lenczowski 1990, 176-177).
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The signing of the Camp David agreements marked a
significant turning point in Egyptian-Israeli relations.
Yet it also placed Egypt, Israel and the United States at
the beginning of a new journey, to make the envisioned
treaty a reality.

Both Begin and Sadat came under heavy

pressure from other players on their respective sides of
the diplomatic fence.

In one incident, Israeli right-wing

extremists demonstrated their opposition to the proposed
treaty by throwing eggs and tomatoes at Begin's
automobile.

Sadat faced even greater pressures that would

eventually lead to Egypt's isolation from the rest of the
Arab community.

Arab moderate states joined the

"rejectionists" in condemning the Camp David Accords
(Carter 1982, 410).

Carter appealed to the Soviet Union

to urge the Syrians and Palestinians to participate in
future talks.

The Soviets, however, responded that this

was not likely because "the Israelis had gained everything
and Sadat had gained nothing" in the Camp David talks

^5

(Carter 1982, 406-407).
As the presidential election grew closer. Carter felt
increasing pressure to bring the Egyptian-Israeli treaty
to fruition.

Begin, by his words and deeds, however,

seemed to be moving further away from agreement with
Sadat, causing Carter to speculate that he was trying to
delay the process until after 1980, when a new
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administration might be at the helm of United States
foreign policy (Carter 1982, 418).

As he had several

times during the Camp David negotiations. Carter decided
to intervene personally to help bring the two parties
closer to agreement.

In early March 1979, he traveled to

the Middle East with a draft treaty, shuttling between
Egypt and Israel until the provisions were deemed
satisfactory.

On March 26, 1979, Begin and Sadat signed

the Egyptian-Israeli treaty during a ceremony in
Washington (Carter 1982, 427).

Five days later, Egypt was

formally suspended from the Arab League^® (Lenczowski
1990, 182).
While President Carter's attention was almost
completely devoted to the Camp David agreements and
subsequent treaty negotiations, events in Iran had already
begun to build toward the Islamic Revolution and the
American "hostage crisis."

From the moment he took

office, Iran presented Carter with a moral, ethical and
political dilemma that defied easy solution.

In order to

fully appreciate the scope of this dilemma, certain key
facets of the historical context must be kept in mind.
The Shah of Iran, Mohammed Reza Pahlevi, had a long
standing relationship with the United States.

In fact, in

November 1977, during the Shah's first visit to the Carter
White House, the new president noted that Iran's leader
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had personally known the seven previous U.S. presidents
(Carter 1982, 434).

This is not particularly surprising

since the growth of American political involvement in Iran
coincided with the beginning of Mohammed Reza Pahlevi's
rule.

During the British-Russian occupation of Iran

during World War II, Reza Shah, the former Persian Army
officer who had founded the Pahlevi dynasty in 1926, was
sent into permanent exile.
beceune the new sovereign.

His son, Mohammed Reza Shah,
After the war. President

Roosevelt exerted American influence to compel the British
and Russians to remove their forces.

As mentioned in

Chapter 2, the British complied, while the Soviets
initially refused to withdraw their forces.

Soviet

activities in the Middle East soon became a matter of
grave concern to the United States, making Iran "the first
battlefield" of the Cold War (Rubin 1980, 28).

These

concerns were amplified, and perhaps appeared to be
justified, by the emergence in Iran of a nationally based
and highly ideological communist movement, the Tudeh
Party, formed in 1941 (Farhi 1989, 93).
The Iranian-American relationship that evolved over
the next few decades was therefore primarily affected by
two factors:

Iran's valuable oil supply and Soviet

involvement in the region.

The Shah quickly learned that

either of these two interests, particularly the latter.
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afforded him a certain amount of leverage in negotiations
with the United States.

Meanwhile, the post-World War II

period was one of the most agitated periods in Iran's
political history.

Members of the intelligensia and the

emerging middle class found the Tudeh Party attractive,
not necessarily because of its communist underpinnings,
but as a means of challenging the central government.

In

1949, after an attempted assassination of the Shah, the
Tudeh Party was declared illegal.

The Shah declared

martial law, and began to consolidate his power.

This set

the stage for a new movement to challenge the Shah's
authority, the National Front, led by Mohammed Mossadeq
(Farhi 1989, 93-94).
Among other things, the National Front objected to
the growing level of foreign intervention in Iran,
typified by the heavily slanted oil concessions Iran had
given to the British^^.

Internally, Mohammed Reza Shah

continued to consolidate his power, yet he was reluctant
to challenge the British over the oil issue.

Mossadeq

gained popularity, became Prime Minister in 1951, and
promptly challenged the Shah's authority.

A few months

later, the Iranian oil industry was nationalized and
Mossadeq learned a costly fiscal lesson when Iran was
forced to suffer the consequences of "an almost universal
shipping boycott of Iranian oil" (Farhi 1989, 95).
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The events of this tumultuous period were brought to
an abrupt end in August 1953, when the United States,
fearing that instability in Iran would open the door to
the insidious spread of communism^®, helped the Shah and
his supporters overthrow Mossadeq.

This CIA-sponsored

military coup placed the Shah firmly back in power (Rubin
1980, 55-58), allowing him to continue consolidating his
authority while eliminating opposition.

In 1957, a new

secret police, SAVAK (the National Security and
Information Organization), was established under CIA
supervision.

The Shah used this instrument to move

decisively against the working class and intellectuals,
effectively neutralizing the Tudeh Party in the process
(Farhi 1989, 96).

Meanwhile, with the exception of a

package of reform programs dubbed the "White Revolution,"
which were enacted largely to placate progressive
modernizers within Iran^9 (Farhi 1989, 97), and to keep up
appearances with the United States (Rubin 1980, 108-112).
Little substantial progress was made toward resolving the
"underlying problems of political legitimacy and economic
crisis that had plagued Iran for many decades" (Rubin
1980, 191).
While serious social and political problems were left
to fester, American military aid to Iran, approximately
$500 million between 1953 and 1963, coupled with

187

substantial oil revenues, allowed the Shah to expand his
armed forces from 120,000 to over 200,000 men by 1963.
During this time frame, annual military expenditures grew
from $80 million to nearly $183 million®® (Farhi 1989,
96).

U.S. military aid and arms sales grew even more

substantially during the Nixon Administration, when the
Shah was essentially given "a blank check for arms,"
establishing a trend that would become consistent U.S.
policy (Lenczowski 1990, 184).
When Carter became president, his outspokenness in
favor of human rights and arms reductions engendered
expectations among Americans and Iranian secular-liberal
opposition leaders that he would immediately change the
direction and substance of American relations with Iran.
Carter was aware of the dissension in Iran caused by
dissatisfaction among the country's growing middle class,
well-educated students and strong religious community® ^.
In fact. Carter felt enough concern that, during the
Shah's November 1977 visit, he broached the subject of
human rights in Iran, suggesting that the Shah consider
changing some of his more restrictive policies.

The Shah

simply replied that Iranian laws were necessary to combat
communisim and could not be changed (Carter 1982, 436).
While cautiously raising the issue of human rights in
private (laonnides 1984, 25), Carter publicly reaffirmed

188

the United States' support for the Shah in remarks made at
a dinner given by the Shah in Iran on December 31, 1977.
Carter effectively commended the Shah for his leadership,
calling Iran "an island of stability in one of the more
troubled areas of the world"

(Carter 1982, 437).

His

glowing comments were made in spite of the fact that the
Shah had already been condemned by Amnesty International
for repressive policies that included the use of torture
(Salinger 1981, 3-5).
In tandem with his aggressive military build-up, the
Shah sought to promote rapid modernization in Iran.

In

time, however, the country could no longer support the
heavy burden of military expenditures and the costs of
modernization.

In 1975-1976, a recession began that

quickly stripped the veneer from the apparently "stable"
structure of the Shah's regime.

Widespread poverty,

unsanitary conditions and corruption involving members of
the royal family were among the negative aspects of the
Shah's rule that became more visible during the period of
economic strain.

Resentment toward the Shah continued to

build and now expanded to include the large numbers of
foreign technicians brought into Iran during the
modernization period.

Within a year, several opposition

groups, including elements of the National Front liberaldemocratic intelligentsia, the bazaar merchants. Leftist
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groups and the Shiite clerical strata began to channel
their efforts toward a common goal, removing the Shah from
power (Lenczowski 1990, 186-187).
In January 1978, incited by an article in the Teheran
daily newspaper Etelaat which criticized Iran's religious
leadership, a group of theological students in Qom
launched a demonstration.

Several of the demonstrators

were killed, leading to a chain reaction of violence.
Violence erupted every forty days, coinciding with the
Shiite custom of mourning the dead at forty day intervals.
The cycle of violence continued throughout 1978, reaching
a fevered pitch.

In August, a suspicious fire in a movie

theater in Abadan claimed over 500 lives (Lenczowski 1990,
189-190).

On September 7, following the Shah's

declaration of martial law, several hundred people were
killed by bursts of machine-gun fire during a deadly clash
between security forces and a crowd of demonstrators in
Tehran (Carter 1982, 438).
In a move that has been characterized as too little,
too late, the Shah tried to satisfy his people's demands
for a greater voice in governing, but instead of reducing
unrest, his actions aroused more disatisfaction®^.

In one

attempt to pacify the dissidents, the Shah granted amnesty
to several opposition leaders, including Ayatollah Ruholla
Khomeini, who had spent the past fifteen years in exile
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(Carter 1982, 438).

Meanwhile, he tried to avoid

confrontation with his more radical opponents by
reconciling with moderate opposition leaders including
Karim Sanjabi and Gholcun Hossein Sadeghi of the National
Front.

This attempt proved unsuccessful. (Lenczowski

1990, 190).
Attempts to satisfy anti-Shah forces by changing the
nature of the government also met with little success.

At

one point, the Shah created a "military government," to be
headed by General Gholam Reza Azhari.

However, because

the Shah distrusted his military leaders, he retained
tight control over their activities (Lenczowski 1990,
190).

Carter observed that the Shah "seemed unwilling to

grant anyone else enough real authority to govern."

By

the end of the year, however, he appointed a Prime
Minister, Shahpour Bakhtiar.

The new Prime Minister

quickly called for the Shah to leave Iran, the secret
police to be abolished, those responsible for shooting
demonstrators to be tried, and for civilians to be put in
charge of foreign affairs (Carter 1982, 442).
During this tulmutuous period. Ayatollah Khomeini
emerged as an identifiable leader of the heretofore
fragmented opposition movement.

While in Paris®®, he sent

taped messages to the Iranian people calling for general
strikes, overthrow of the Shah and the establishment of an
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Isleunic republic.

A general strike began in Iran during

the latter two months of 1978 (Carter 1982, 440).
Ayatollah Khomeini clearly had the support of the people,
and he refused to give his support to Bakhtiar.
On January 16, 1979, Bakhtiar announced that the Shah
would leave Iran.

On February 1, Khomeini flew to Tehran

and was welcomed by thousands of supporters.

In the brief

power struggle that ensued, Bakhtiar had the support of
the military, but it fell apart in the face of sustained
opposition.

On February 11, Bakhtiar and the members of

the Iranian parliament resigned, leaving Khomeini to place
his choice for Prime Minister, Mehdi Bazargan, in power
(Carter 1982, 446-450).
While the members of the Carter Administration did
their best to keep up with the rapidly changing
developments in Iran, Carter received conflicting advice
from his top-level officials.
divided into two camps.

The administration became

The first was composed of Cyrus

Vance and members of the State Department, which was noted
for its opposition to the Shah.

The second camp, which

included National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski and
Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, viewed the Shah as an
important ally in the Middle East.

As such, they believed

preservation of his rule was vital to U.S. national
interest.

Carter remained torn between Iran's strategic

192

importance and his commitment to human rights.

As the

political situation deteriorated in Iran, however, he
adopted Brzezinski's view and expressed his support for
the Shah (Lenczowski 1990, 192-193).
As events changed, a more pronounced rift developed
between the White House and the U.S. Ambassador to Iran,
William Sullivan.

Carter asserts that on October 28,

1978, Sullivan sent a cable to Washington advocating U.S.
support for the Shah as the best means of maintaining
stability in the region.

In line with this. Carter chose

to pledge to the Shah "all the support the United States
could properly give him, short of direct intervention"
(Carter 1982, 439).

By January 1979, Ambassador Sullivan

had begun to recommend that the United States insist on
the Shah's immediate departure and try to establish some
form of relations with Khomeini.

Carter, however,

preferred to maintain the policy of supporting the Shah.
Moreover, he sent General Robert Huyser, Deputy Commander
of United States Forces in Europe, to Iran, ostensibly to
strengthen the resolve of the Iranian miliatary, but also
to provide him with updates on the situation independent
of Sullivan (Carter 1982, 443-444).
Once the Khomeini regime took power, efforts were
made to establish a semblance of normalcy in IranianAmerican relations.

This process met with moderate
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initial success and culminated in a meeting between
Brzezinski, Premier Bazargan and two other Iranian
ministers on November 1, 1979.

Serious complications

arose several days later, however, when the Shah was
admitted to the United States to undergo medical
treatment.

Up to this point, the Shah had been living in

various other countries including Egypt, Morocco, the
Bahamas and Mexico.

Iranian revolutionary leaders

suspected that the United States was planning to restore
the Shah to power.

His entry into the United States

heightened this concern.

On November 4, a group of

demonstrators took control of the American embassy,
capturing sixty-six people (Lenczowski 1990, 199).
The ensuing hostage crisis quickly revealed that the
Bazargan government, which was taken by surprise by the
hostage seizure, was only a facade, and that the real
power lay in the hands of Khomeini and the clergy.
Khomeini praised the captors for their deed and used the
embassy take over as a means to mobilize the population by
stirring up anti-American sentiments (Darius 1984, 104).
Attempts by the Bazargan government to guarantee the
hostages' release proved futile.

Bazargan resigned,

virtually eliminating the secular influence on Iran's
political processes (Lenczowski 1990, 200).
The hostage crisis cast a shadow over the final year
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of Carter's presidency.

The growing division between

Vance on the one hand and the president and Brzezinski on
the other became even more apparent, and was resolved only
when Vance resigned after abortive hostage rescue attempt
in April 1980^^.
While American efforts were heavily directed toward
resolving the situation in Iran, Soviet troops entered
Afghanistan, touching off yet another crisis in the Middle
East.

The Soviets entered Afghanistan in the winter of

1979, during a period of domestic upheaval.

The

republican government headed by Daoud Khan since 1973 had
recently been overthrown in favor of a communist regime
led by Mohammed Taraki.

Taraki's successor, Hafizulla

Amin, inspired opposition among religious and tribal
elements, who soon began to fight against the
revolutionary government.

Known as mujahadeen (warriors

for the faith), this group of fighters took control of
large areas in the countryside and waged war against the
regime and its Soviet supporters (Lenczowski 1990, 205).
President Amin was assassinated shortly after the Soviet
invasion, and replaced by a rival member of the Communist
Party, Babrak Karmal.
In response to the Soviet entry into Afghanistan,
President Carter sent a message to Brezhnev labeling the
Soviet action as "a clear threat to the peace,"

adding
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that it "could mark a fundamental and long-lasting turning
point" in Soviet-American relations.

Brezhnev replied two

days later, indicating that the Soviet presence had been
requested by Afghan leaders (Brzezinski 1983, 429-430).
Carter interpreted the Soviet action as an aggressive
attempt to expand their sphere of influence.

The

strategic implications of a potential Soviet take-over
were

disturbing.

From their new vantage point, the

Soviets posed an immediate threat to the rich oil fields
and vital waterways in the Persian Gulf region.
While the Soviets became embroiled in a conflict that
has since been compared to Vietnam, Carter pledged that the
United States would defend the Persian Gulf region:
Let our position be absolutely clear: An
attempt by any outside force to gain control
of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded
as an assault on the vital interests of the
United States of America, and such an assault
will be repelled by any means necessary,
including military force (Carter 1982, 483).
Carter chose from éunong his military, economic and
political means to respond to the situation in
Afghanistan, "the most serious international development"
that had occurred since he became president (Carter 1982,
473).

Direct military action was ruled out unless it

became absolutely necessary.

Instead, the administration

initiated support to the Afghan "freedom fighters" (Carter
1982, 475).

Moreover, a special military command, the
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Rapid Deployment Force, was developed in case American
intervention in the Persian Gulf region did become
necessary35 (Brzezinski 1983, 457; Lenczowski 1990, 207).
Economic actions against the Soviet Union were also taken,
including a highly controversial grain embargo, denial of
fishing rights and an interruption of high technology
equipment transfers (Carter 1982, 475).
With the exception of the grain embargo, which
critics argued placed an unfair burden on American
farmers. Carter's most controversial response to the
Afghanistan crisis was his decision to boycott the 1980
Olympics, scheduled to be held in Moscow.

Carter believed

that pulling out of the games, which were "much more than
a sporting event" for the Soviets, would have a serious
psychological and economic impact on the Soviet Union
(Carter 1982, 474-475).

While this may have been true, it

is undeniable that his decision held similar ramifications
for the United States.
In the political realm, while messages were sent back
and forth between Carter and Breshnev, the United States
pushed hard to obtain a vote of condemnation in the United
Nations.

These efforts were eventually successful.

"This

was," Carter wrote, "the first time such action had ever
been taken against one of the leading nations of the
world" (Carter 1982, 475).

The crisis in Afghanistan also
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gave the Carter Administration an opportunity to improve
relations with the Pakistani government, headed by
President Zia ul-Haq.

These relations would eventually be

used as a means of channeling supplies to the mujahadeen.
y
The crisis in Afghanistan was not solved before
Carter's presidency ended.

The lack of resolution in this

area, coupled with the burden of the hostage crisis that
lasted well over a year, caused Carter to leave the White
House on a very low note.

As he prepared for the

transition, he learned a crucial lesson that would become
even more clear in the weeks to come.

His "power as a

defeated president was not equal to that of one who is
expected to remain in office."

Ironically, he reached

this conclusion after a meeting on November 13, 1980,
during which he and Prime Minister Begin were to discuss
remaining Middle East issues.

The discussions yielded

little substance and it was apparent that the Israelis
preferred to wait until the new administration entered
office before continuing top-level negotiations (Carter
1982, 575-576).
Summary
The Carter Administration entered the White House
determined to help America regain the sense of direction
that had been lost during the Vietnam War and Watergate
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periods.

In Carter's view, this could best be

accomplished by returning to basic values and moral
principles, not only within the United States, but in
relations with other nations as well.

This, coupled with

the president's own religious and moral convictions, led
Carter to attempt to build his foreign policy around the
guiding principle of promoting human rights.
Within the general framework of this ideal. Carter
and his staff fashioned an ambitious foreign policy agenda
that was complemented by equally ambitious domestic
programs.

The Middle East, more specifically the Arab-

Israeli conflict, served as the centerpiece of Carter's
foreign policy, at times to the exclusion of other
regions.

Carter was the first president to break the

cycle of waiting until a crisis had erupted before trying
to effect some sort of change in the Arab-Israeli
conflict.

He felt compelled to meet the situation head-on

because of strategic concerns, human rights issues, and his
own personal beliefs.
Carter's motives in dealing with the Middle East
epitomize a very important aspect of his administration's
foreign policy.

It was driven by inclinations toward

several conflicting impulses, trying to satisfy many of
them simultaneously.

Carter believed that he could

reconcile the realistic demands of statecraft with the
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idealistic spirit of American democracy.

His National

Security Adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski believed ideals were
important, but if a conflict should ever develop between
power and principles, strategic concerns should prevail
(Brzezinski 1983, 49).

Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, on

the other hand, was typically more inclined to urge
restraint when dealing with other nations, including the
Soviet Union.

Vance's belief that diplomatic means should

be fully explored before resorting to force eventually
compelled him to resign after the abortive rescue attempt
in Iran.
The differences of opinion within the Carter
Administration became highly publicized and detracted from
its ability to establish a sense of cohesiveness and
direction in its larger foreign policy.

As various crises

developed, particularly the hostage crisis in Iran and the
Soviet incursion into Afghanistan, Carter began to make
decisions that were more in accordance with Brzezinski's
views, but an overarching sense of direction was still
conspicuously absent from Carter's foreign policy.
More than this, however, the administration lacked an
effective policy planning and coordinating mechanism to
prevent the foreign policy machinery from becoming
overloaded, or to prevent fragmentation of foreign policy.
In essence, such a mechanism would have helped Carter
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identify potential problems and assisted him with the
difficult task of choosing among conflicting policy
intiatives by determining which were higher priorities
(George 1980, 118).

The fact that their goals were too

ambitious notwithstanding, the Carter Administration's
primary deficiency was that it lacked the means to execute
its plans and, once various initiatives were underway, to
ensure its efforts were channeled in the same direction.
Foreign policy did become fragmented during the first
year of Carter's presidency.

Furthermore, it was

characterized by overactivism, a tendency to initiate
policies without having given full consideration to their
feasability, poor conceptualization of overarching
strategy, and a failure to recognize when individual
policies ran counter to one another (George 1980, 118).
Carter's habit of intervening personally in important
policy matters emerged as another characteristic of his
administration.
Ironically, it was within the context of this larger
framework and, one has to admit, largely due to the
personal intervention of Carter, that an extremely
significant change occured in the complexion of the Middle
East.

The Camp David agreements and subsequent

negotiations, while they may have fallen short in terms of
resolving the critical issues of Palestinian rights, and
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the West Bank and Gaza, established an unprecedented
degree of relations between Egypt, the United States and
Israel.

Moreover, Arab reactions to these negotiations,

neunely the isolation of Egypt, caused the dynamics of the
equation to be dramatically altered, pushing Arab-Israeli
relations past the perpetual stalemate that had lasted for
decades, into a new stage of development.
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Chapter 5
THE ESSENCE OF A DUXMNA
Recent events, such as the Gulf War and the historic
negotiations between Israel and the Palestine Liberation
Organization demonstrate that the Middle East continues to
be one of the most important regions in the world from the
standpoint of American foreign policy.

A brief survey of

the development of American Middle Eastern policy
illustrates the difficult nature of dealing with the
competing interests that have arisen in the region.
Initially, when American involvement was driven
primarily by philanthropic and commercial interests, the
United States was able to remain distanced from the
internal affairs of the Middle East.

After two world

wars, however, the previous discovery of large oil
reserves in the region precipitated a shift in American
involvement from protecting commercial concerns toward
considerations of national interest.

Although not yet

heavily involved politically in the Middle East, the
United States began to develop a vested interest in
maintaining stability in the region.
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It was precisely at this critical juncture that
President Truman was compelled to carry Wilson's moral
commitment to the Zionist cause a step further by
supporting the creation of Israel.

Ironically, this very

development had a pronounced de-stabilizing effect on the
region, and placed future presidents on the horns of a
dilemma that has since plagued American foreign policy
toward the Middle East.

How can the United States

reconcile its need to maintain vital access to the
region's oil with commitments to the security of Israel?
What makes this dilemma particularly intriguing is
that it has served as a major battlefield for the
conflicting impulses that have driven American foreign
policy for over 200 years, the Jeffersonian ideal of
promoting democracy throughout the world, and the
Hamiltonian perspective, which asserts that foreign policy
should promote the national interest.

Experience has

shown, however, that even taking a strict national
interests approach creates problems in terms of
prioritization.

Few policy makers would dispute that

American policy must be directed toward maintaining
reliable access to oil, ensuring the security of Israel,
addressing strategic issues, and attempting to promote
peace.

Determining which of these objectives is most

important, however, has proven to be quite difficult.
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Successive presidents have approached the Middle
Eastern dilemma differently, each leaving his own unique
imprint.

The Nixon Administration serves as an exaunple of

the application of a realist-oriented approach, whereas
the Carter Administration was strongly motivated by
idealistic impulses.

The preceding case studies highlight

three basic themes which merit specific attention:

the

differences in Nixon and Carter's ability to discern vital
regional developments while reconciling them with
geopolitical considerations;

the effects of crises on

foreign policy formulation, and the potentially
debilitating effects of bureaucratic rivalries on American
foreign policy.
Comparative Analysis
In a broad sense, this comparative analysis reaffirms
the importance of contextual factors in foreign policy
formulation.

Policy-makers need mechanisms to identify

the salient contextual features surrounding an issue, and
the means to stay abreast of current developments, of
changes in the broad contours of the decision-making
environment.

The ability to identify changes in context

may be the key to recognizing opportunities to achieve
important objectives.

A program or initiative that might

not have been successful under one set of circumstances
may prove quite successful under different conditions.
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Likewise, the inability to appreciate the historical and
contemporary underpinnings associated with a particular
event may lead to missed opportunities, or even worse, to
unexpected crises.
When President Nixon entered the White House, the
most prominent foreign policy issue was Vietnam.

The need

to repair the domestic consensus and to re-establish
support for an active American role in world affairs was
so great during this period that Nixon had to make
disentanglement from Vietnam his highest priority.

His

personal experiences on the Herter Committee and as
Eisenhower's Vice President caused him to approach his
foreign policy from a staunch anti-Soviet perspective.
Detente, the desire to establish a more constructive
relationship with the Soviet Union while capitalizing on a
potential triangular relationship with China, was the
cornerstone of the Nixon-Kissinger strategy.

In essence,

it was a new form of balance-of-power politics that
eventually gave way to the Cold War international system.
This approach caused Nixon and Kissinger to view the
Middle East through lenses that were shaped by a global
strategic emphasis.

While clearly focusing on the Soviet

Union and China, Nixon and Kissinger often had a distorted
image of the Middle East.

Such was the case in 1970, when

Nixon was convinced that events in Jordan were caused by
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Soviet intrigue instead of being the result of regional
developments.

Moreover, Nixon and Kissinger were caught

off guard by the Arab offensive in 1973.

Had they been

more in tune with mounting Arab frustrations, they might
have realized that a new crisis was imminent.
Once the war did break out, however, Kissinger
recognized the potential to make advances in the
diplomatic arena, particularly in light of a direct line
of communication that had recently been opened to Egypt.
Furthermore, Kissinger's recognition that Arab willingness
to negotiate would be severly hampered by a decisive
Israeli victory demonstrates at least some understanding
of the prevailing Middle Eastern context.

If Kissinger

had not succeeded in negotiating relief for the encircled
Egyptian Third Army, for example, the Arab attitude after
the war would have been markedly different.
The Nixon Administration's change in focus after the
October War of 1973 suggests that crises, particularly if
they occur unexpectedly, can cause decision-makers to re
examine their foreign policy priorities.

Prior to the

war, Nixon and Kissinger's global focus had several
effects on Middle Eastern policy.

First, Nixon did not

particularly want to become involved in the region, which
was a hotbed of emotional nationalism and really appeared
to be a "no-win" situation.

This led Nixon to reserve more
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interesting and dramatic foreign policy areas for the
White House, while allowing Secretary of State Rogers to
pursue an elusive Middle East peace settlement.

Second,

however, when Britain announced its intention to withdraw
from the Persian Gulf by 1971, potentially endangering the
stability of the region by creating a power vacuum, the
Middle East became more important from a global
perspective and, thus, received more of Nixon and
Kissinger's attention.

Interestingly, the British

withdrawal coincided roughly with the Jordanian crisis,
leading Nixon and Kissinger to strengthen the American
commitment to both Israel and Iran, primarily in the form
of arms shipments.
During this period, Israel's status as the United
States' only strategic ally in the region crystallized.
Every effort was made to keep the regional balance-ofpower in Israel's favor, a goal that for several years
constituted the heart of Nixon's Middle East strategy and
eventually threatened to undercut the State Department's
efforts.

The Arabs meanwhile, were visibly drawn toward

the Soviets, making the Middle East appear even more
important as a potential arena for superpower
confrontation.
In the initial phases of Nixon's Administration,
which for the purposes of this study will be classified as
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the period prior to the Jordanian crisis, it is difficult
to tell which American interest in the Middle East was
considered preeminent.

However, once Nixon and Kissinger

began to perceive that the region was gaining importance
for the United States from a global standpoint, the Nixon
Administration's priorities began to develop specific
hierarchical guidelines.

Their first priority was to

prevent the expansion of Soviet influence in the region,
thereby preserving Western access to oil.

Israel was

perceived as vital to this process, complicating the issue
of choosing between the American commitment to Israeli
security and promoting relations with the oil producing
Arab states.

After the Jordanian crisis, the belief that

Israel was a vital partner in the Soviet-American
competition caused Nixon and Kissinger to place Israeli
concerns above Arab relations.

This made attempts to find

a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict especially
problematic and led to a policy of favoring the status quo
as the best means of promoting American interests.
This priority scheme persisted until the October War
of 1973.

When Nixon and Kissinger recognized the

potential threat of superpower confrontation inherent in
the Arab-Israeli conflict, the issue of promoting a
settlement was brought back to the fore.

This time,

however, the issue received Kissinger's personal attention
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with the president's support.
In terms of structure, the Nixon Administration
suffered from the ailment that has afflicted many foreign
policy bureaucracies since the National Security Act of
1947, the struggle between the State Department and the
National Security Adviser for primacy in foreign affairs.
During Nixon's first term, Kissinger's span of control
reached beyond the National Security Council into several
areas of the Department of State.

As foreign policy

beceune more centralized in the White House, the State
Department's position became even more tenuous.

During

Nixon's second term, the issue became a moot point when
the president appointed Kissinger as his Secretary of
State, expecting him to fulfill both functions.
Nixon and Kissinger believed that foreign policy
should be developed with minimal constraints on
presidential authority.

Furthermore, they understood the

advantages of well-timed foreign policy initiatives.

To a

large extent, they were able to use their foreign policy
successes to help generate a certain degree of domestic
support, in spite of the crisis of conscience caused by
Vietnam.

The draunatic announcement of an opening to

China, the Paris negotiations, and the successful
mitigation of the Jordanian crisis, combined to help Nixon
win re-election.
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Carter, in a departure from the previous two
administrations, felt the need to move away from the heavy
Soviet-American emphasis that had typically characterized
American foreign policy.

This desire, coupled with his

personal studies of the Middle East, led him to take a
more regionally-oriented approach to the area.

In spite

of his awareness of the strategic importance of the
region, he was strongly motivated by a personal desire to
create an Arab-Israeli settlement.

When Carter became

president, the Middle East, because of the October War and
subsequent disengagement talks, was eunong the highest
foreign policy concerns of the departing administration.
In this respect, it is not surprising that Carter felt
compelled to deal with the Arab-Israeli dispute, just as
it was understandable that the Mixon Administration felt
compelled to deal with Vietnam.
Like Kissinger, Carter recognized the contextual
changes in the Arab-Israeli equation brought about by the
October War.

The Arabs had a newfound sense of honor,

while the Israelis had a newfound sense of vulnerability.
Unlike Kissinger, who used American diplomacy to deal
primarily with the effects of the Arab-Israeli conflict.
Carter determined to deal with specific causes of the
dilemma.

In so doing, he was able to take advantage of

the diplomatic ties established with Egypt during the Nixon
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Administration.

Carter genuinely believed that a solution

to the Arab-Israeli conflict was possible.

Thus, he

determined to make the Middle East a priority concern for
his administration in spite of warnings from his advisers
that it might prove politically costly.
His tight focus on specific issues related to the
Arab-Israeli dilemma allowed Carter to be caught off guard
by successive crises during the latter stages of his
administration.

Ironically, these crises occurred in Iran

and Afghanistan, within striking distance of the area that
received Carter's primary attention.

Carter's foreign

policy, while very proactive in terms of Arab-Israeli
issues, was decidedly reactive in many other areas,
including other Middle Eastern issues.

This had the net

effect of causing his policy to be dominated by one major
issue after another, without an overarching sense of
direction.
Beyond Carter's desire to promote peace in the Middle
East through an Arab-Israeli settlement, it is difficult
to determine which of the other three priorities carried
more emphasis.

Carter was aware of the region's

importance from the standpoint of oil and the SovietAmerican competition and he felt a certain sense of
commitment toward Israeli security.

Yet, his initial

approach to the Middle East did not give any indication
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that Carter viewed any one of these interests to be more
important than the others.

After the crisis in Iran,

Carter shifted his focus from the Arab-Israeli dispute to
considerations of regional stability.

After the crisis

precipitated by the Soviet deployment into Afghanistan,
however, the prevention of Soviet expansion into the
Middle East emerged as Carter's highest priority.
The degree of commitment Carter felt toward Israel
remains somewhat unclear.

The establishment of closer

diplomatic ties with Egypt, coupled with Carter's
friendship with President Sadat, reduced the perception
that Israel was the United States' only potential ally in
the Middle East.

Because Carter did not appear to attach

as much importance to Israeli security as the Nixon
Administration, he ran the risk of losing the support of
the American Jewish community.

Moreover, his conviction

that both sides needed to make compromises in the
settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute exacerbated this
loss of domestic support.
Carter's idealistic support of human rights, which
had been so appealing during the election, eventually
caused him to suffer widespread criticism.

Detente,

although it too eventually lost domestic support, had the
advantage of being highly structured.

Human rights

dictated a much more diffuse approach and engendered a
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great deal of expectation among various groups who felt
their causes were worthy of specific attention.

Carter

could not possibly address all of these issues.

Moreover,

at times, situations developed that forced Carter to
choose one element of human rights over another or,
equally challenging. Carter had to face the dilemma of
reconciling his idealistic goals with his perceptions of
the national interest.

Thus, in much the same way that

Wilson found himself torn between support for the Zionist
cause and the desire to promote self-determination among
the Arab people. Carter faced difficult choices regarding
Israeli security and Palestinian rights.

As the situation

in Iran deteriorated. Carter was forced to choose between
a policy of recognizing the Shah's abuses of power and
supporting his regime in the name of regional stability.
The impression that his policy was moving several
different directions at once was amplified by the
bureaucratic dispute that developed between Brzezinski and
Vance.

Unlike Nixon, Carter did not side clearly with

either his National Security Adviser or his Secretary of
State until very late in his presidency.

Carter's own

indecision was at times magnified by conflicting advice
from his top-level advisers.

As he faced successive

crises in short periods of time, however. Carter began to
move away from his own basic policy of promoting human
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rights toward one of promoting American interests.

This

gradual transformation is evident in National Security
Adviser Brzezinski's observation that the basic directions
of Carter's foreign policy were set quite firmly after the
crisis in Afghanistan (Brzezinski 1983, 35).
The structural difficulties encountered by the Carter
Administration's foreign policy machinery highlights a
crucial lesson.

Without going into the larger debate of

whether it is more appropriate for the State Department or
the National Security Adviser to preside over foreign
policy formulation, it is absolutely essential that the
president provide clear direction through his own
initiatives, or by giving primacy to one organization or
the other.
choice.

Furthermore, he must remain consistent in his

The rivalry between the State Department and the

National Security Adviser was significant, but not
debilitating, to the Nixon Administration, because Nixon's
views were more clearly in line with Kissinger's.

The

high degree of centralization that occurred during Nixon's
second term, however, represents the other extreme, which
must also be avoided.
As the nation's head-of-state, the president must
exert firm control over the foreign policy bureaucracy to
ensure that specific undertakings are in line with his
larger framework.

In general terms, this requirement would
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also dictate that the president avoid becoming too deeply
involved in any one foreign policy matter to the exclusion
of others.

Thus, Carter's decision to become deeply

involved in negotiating a solution to the Arab-Israeli
conflict should represent the exception rather than the
rule.

Moreover, any president who does choose to delve

into one issue to this degree, must do so consciously,
after considering the potential costs in other foreign
policy areas.

It cannot be denied that Carter's personal

involvement helped move the Arab-Israeli conflict to a new
stage of development.

However, by devoting so many of his

resources toward this one purpose. Carter placed his
administration in a vulnerable position.

Without a long-

range perspective. Carter became preoccupied by one issue
after another.
Toward Future Policy
The findings presented above suggest that American
policy toward the Middle East be re-evaluated in light of
recent contextual developments.

The collapse of the

Soviet Union requires a re-definition of basic foreign
policy along both geopolitical and ideological lines in
order to re-prioritize remaining interests.

The Nixon-

Kissinger formula of viewing the Middle East as an arena
for Soviet-American competition is simply no longer
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appropriate.

Geopolitical concerns still exist, however,

as the Gulf War aptly demonstrated.

Now, more than ever,

it is essential that the United States devote the
resources of its foreign policy machinery toward
continually assessing the international context, both
regionally and globally.

This task, instead of becoming

more simple, has actually become much more complicated due
to the loss of the tenuous Cold War framework.
With respect to the Arab-Israeli conflict, this
development will have far-reaching effects in terms of the
Arab countries' willingness to cooperate with the United
States, with Israel and with one another.

Furthermore, it

requires that the United States re-examine its commitment
to Israel to insure that it is not simply continuing the
Cold War oriented policy of providing unquestioned
support.

By moving away from the perspective that Israel

is the United States' only ally, toward one of continuing
to cultivate relations with other countries in the region,
American policy may actually help to further progress
toward an Arab-Israeli settlement.
The recent negotiations between Israel and the
Palestine Liberation Organization are also quite
significant because they demonstrate the degree to which
contextual changes may have already opened the door to
opportunities.

The loss of the Cold War rivalry, which
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for years allowed the Israelis and Arabs to play their
respective sponsors against one another, has forced
players on both sides to reassess their own situations,
making them more amenable to attempting a settlement.

It

is also important to note that these negotiations were not
conducted under the United States' watchful eye, but took
place quietly, under Norwegian sponsorship.

This raises

the question of the role of the United States in future
world affairs.
In dealing with this question, it is going to become
increasingly vital that American policy-makers address the
issue of how to blend the elements of realism and idealism
into a more cohesive, consistent foreign policy.

Too much

reliance on the realistic aspects of power politics may
desensitize policy makers to important regional
developments.

Too much reliance on the idealistic

elements may lead to a foreign policy that lacks a sense
of direction.

The challenge of future presidents will not

only include aspects of those faced by Nixon and Carter,
but will include the resurgence of a new dilemma.

Policy

makers will not be expected to simply choose between
national interests and idealistic endeavors, they will be
expected to combine aspects of them, without allowing
either impulse to throw American foreign policy off track.
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